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15 January 1959

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FOR THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE

Dear General Draper:

My partial response of 23 December to your letter of 18 December 1958, together with its enclosure, describes the political, economic, and psychological environment in which our Military Assistance Program was born and is now being administered. In this letter I shall attempt to respond further and more directly to your letter. While I intend to address myself to the specific requirements outlined in your letter, I shall also take advantage of your invitation to provide other information and opinions which I feel may be useful to your committee.

A. Accomplishments of the Military Assistance Program.

1. Internal Security. Almost without exception, the free nations of Asia were newborn or reborn subsequent to World War II. All of them were politically unstable and economically weak. Each was faced with the imminent threat of subversion, insurgency, and aggression. But all had the common desire to remain free, and were receptive to our help in perpetuating that freedom, in varying degree. Although the leadership of these nations has varied widely in talent, objectives, and ideals, it has been a primary objective of the United States to insure the stability of any reasonable government, so long as it remained anti-Communist.

Internal security is a prerequisite to political and psychological stability and these in turn are prerequisites to economic viability. The military assistance we have provided to Free Asian nations during the past 8 years has, in most cases, been their principal salvation from Communist seizure from within. The notable examples of this achievement are South Vietnam and the Philippines.

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There were many in 1954 who were willing to write South Vietnam off the books of the Free World. In less than 5 years, under the leadership of President Diem, that nation has climbed far up the path towards stability. With military aid from the United States, this young country has wiped out all organized insurgency. Nevertheless, Communist directed subversion, infiltration, assassinations, and sabotage of economic progress still pose a threat to South Vietnam's security. Until effective law and order agencies are developed, the armed forces of South Vietnam must be charged with both internal security and defensive missions. With adequate support from our economic aid program, such law and order forces will continue to develop and, ultimately, will free the military forces of this para-military role. Perhaps 5 years hence, if there is no significant change in the enemy threat from beyond her borders, we might expect a reduction in the size of the armed forces of South Vietnam which are receiving our assistance.

The suppression of the Communist Huks by the armed forces of the Philippines has become a model for dealing with insurgency. This would not have been possible without our advisory and assistance programs.

Throughout Free Asia, the maintenance of internal security remains a primary responsibility of indigenous armed forces. The fact that it is largely a mission for ground forces accounts in part for the need for sizeable armies. The relative inadequacy of road and rail nets in these under-developed countries requires the deployment of army forces over wide areas. This lack of mobility precludes the stationing of small reserves in central locations, ready to move quickly to troubled areas. The road-building projects which are in process under both our military and economic aid programs should alleviate this deficiency. The added mobility resulting from an improved road net work in many of these countries should, in a few years time, permit the streamlining of indigenous ground forces.

2. Deterrence. There can be no doubt that the highly mobile and hard-hitting forces of the United States are the

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principal deterrent to any major aggression in the area. At the same time, it must be recognized that the forces of our Asian allies are a significant deterrent to localized aggression. The combination of these deterrents is significant. It is extremely important to the support of the United States by world opinion that Asian forces participate in our deterrent posture against the Communist threat to Asia.

3. Strategic Military Flexibility. The MAP-supported forces of our Asian allies make a significant contribution to the strategic flexibility of the U.S. defensive posture in the Far East. This contribution is often ignored and is seldom viewed in its proper perspective. The Pacific Command embraces a vast and complex geographical area. The free nations of Asia form the outer ring of a great arc, with the Sino-Soviet bloc at the hub. Without our influence and guidance, any really cohesive effort towards mutual support against Communist aggression would be extremely unlikely. Thus they are highly vulnerable to individual or piecemeal attack. At the same time, the land area comprising these free nations is vital to our "Forward Defense" concept, if we are to keep the battle zone away from American shores and the approaches thereto.

From the foregoing it is obvious that the mission of this command demands the utmost in flexibility and speed in the employment of the U.S. military forces assigned to it. Maldeployment of our forces in a localized emergency situation could cripple the overall defensive posture of the command. Therefore, the capability of each indigenous force to contain or at least to delay local aggression allows the Unified Commander time and the ability to employ U.S. forces to best advantage. This does not mean that U.S. forces will not come to the aid of individual allies when needed. Rather, it is to our strategic advantage to delay that need as long as possible so that all needs may be dealt with in the proper order of priority.

Our program has developed, in most of our Asian allied forces, a significant delaying capability against enemy ground assault. However, national policy envisages that U.S. forces will provide the major protection of these nations from enemy attack by sea and air. It is my opinion that such a

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concept is not completely sound. I recognize fully the many reasons why we cannot and should not equip these nations with "blue water" navies and sizeable air forces. Nevertheless, I am convinced that an augmentation of their self-sufficiency is warranted in the naval and air arms of these indigenous forces. In most cases, this involves qualitative rather than quantitative improvement. The limited improvements I have in mind are in the areas of amphibious lift, antisubmarine and mine warfare, coastal patrol, close air support of ground forces and air defense. I believe that indigenous forces in this area can be strengthened significantly by a limited indigenous air and naval augmentation, at an acceptable cost. I have submitted recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consonance with this belief.

4. U. S. Bases. While it cannot be claimed that our assistance programs have provided us with vital bases around the periphery of Communist Asia, it is true that our retention of bases in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, is in large measure attributable to these programs. These bases are country contributions to mutual security. In other Asian countries, our programs have developed additional bases which will be available for our use in emergencies, and without which our forward defense concept would be invalid.

5. Economy. From a selfish point of view, our program has employed the vast manpower resources of our Asian allies at astounding low cost, to man America's first line of defense around the perimeter of Communist Asia. However you look at it, the Free Asian soldier, whom we support at approximately one-tenth the cost of a U.S. soldier, is defending our borders when he defends his own.

6. Free World Assets. Our programs have been instrumental in denying the Communist orbit access to the food, raw materials, markets, and manpower of Free Asia. These, together with Japan's industrial base, are undeniably the targets of Asian Communism. The addition of these assets of Free Asia to the potential and programs of Communist Asia could easily result in a power potential which could crush the remaining Free World in political, psychological, economic, or military warfare. Any withdrawal or significant

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reduction of our programs in these Free Asian countries would constitute an invitation to Communism to move into the resulting void.

7. Psychological Accomplishments of Program. Because our program has been providing assistance to nations which are, for the most part, new and underdeveloped, the psychological impact has been profound. It has helped to generate, among a naive and unformed population, a greater awareness and understanding of the threat posed by Communism. It has developed pride and prestige in nations whose manpower heretofore had never been permitted to bear arms, or who had served only in the colonial forces of foreign powers. It has demonstrated to our allies our intent to combine our defenses with theirs in a mutual stand against any further Communist encroachment. It has proved, through our advisory and training efforts, that Americans and Orientals can work and live in harmony and understanding under the common bond of military brotherhood.

8. Where the Program Stands Today. In the eight Asian nations which are recipients of grant military aid, we are assisting in the support of approximately one and three-quarters million military personnel. Additionally, we are providing token military assistance on a partial reimbursement basis to the forces of Indonesia and Burma. Over 80% of these indigenous forces are ground forces. This is in consonance with national policy and country capabilities; it is complementary to the U.S. assignment of forces to the Pacific Command, which is predominantly naval and air strength.

With the exception of Japan, the forces of our Asian allies were in being, albeit extremely weak, at the inception of our program. So, rather than to build units to meet desired force goals, our effort for the most part, has been directed toward reorganizing and streamlining existing forces while at the same time equipping and training them.

Our program has succeeded in its initial objective of providing these nations with the substantial capability of

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maintaining internal security. In our secondary objective of providing a limited capability to withstand aggression, we have not yet reached our ultimate goal. Notable shortfalls are in Japan and Laos, but for different reasons which I shall discuss later. Progress, by U.S. standards, has been slow but nevertheless gratifying, if viewed in proper perspective. Our third program objective is the development of national collective security. Personal, national, and ethnic animosities, along with the Geneva Accords, will continue to constitute formidable obstacles to the attainment of this goal for some time to come.

Our program has succeeded in equipping the basic indigenous forces and in providing individual and unit training. Many of these forces have progressed to the point where they are now ready for more sophisticated training and more advanced weapons and equipment. We are satisfying the need for joint and combined training through the medium of exercises throughout the area. We have conducted several successful courses of instruction in joint and combined operations and planning, attended by selected military personnel from our allied forces.

We are facing a major problem with respect to more advanced weapons and equipment. The greater part of the indigenous forces in this area were hastily equipped with World War II or older weapons and equipment, largely from excesses from Korea and the war in Indo-China. Much of this material was junk, or nearly so, when provided through the program. Time and cost dictated this action. Unfortunately, the initial equipping of these forces took place during a relatively brief period, with the result that vast quantities of materiel require replacement almost simultaneously. The effect is a sizeable requirement for modernization which is difficult to satisfy on an orderly and phased basis. This problem is acute, in light of the increased capabilities of Communist weapons.

9. A Look at the Future. I am optimistic as to the prospects for future accomplishments of our program in Asia.

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However, let me say that my optimism is tempered by the somewhat tenuous assumptions upon which it is based. I am assuming (a) that our public and the Congress are becoming increasingly aware of Free Asia's importance to our global concept of defense, and of the threat to Free Asia; and (b) that patience and far-sightedness will prevent the trading of tomorrow's physical security for immediate financial savings today.

Because there is little potential for early or significant economic improvement in most Free Asian nations, I see little justification or possibility of massive reductions in U.S. dollar support of our program in the near future. On the other hand, I believe that in a period of 10 years, much can be expected. With SEATO as a base, I can see a significant development of a collective politico-military-economic structure among the nations of Free Asia. This period should see a mellowing of selfish nationalistic fervor and international animosities. It should see the acceptance of Japan back into the family of nations, and her reemergence to a role of leadership in Asia. It should see continued improvement in the politico-psychological climate in Japan which will enable her to assume full responsibility for the support of an adequate defense structure. These developments will lift a large part of the assistance burden from the shoulders of the United States. Japan is the key to economic solvency in Free Asia.

The next decade should see a significant scaling downward of the numbers of personnel in the indigenous forces we have been supporting. This will result from the development of reserve force structures, logistical support systems, and the increased capabilities of forces equipped with better weapons. A U.S. plan now under review proposes a reduction of some 62,000 in the strength of the Republic of China armed forces by the end of 1964. Korea is already reducing her divisions from 20 to 18. However, such reductions are to be compensated by the modernization of weapons and equipment, so that savings in personnel support costs over the long haul will be offset by materiel acquisition costs in the mid-range period.

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Finally, through our training programs, the coming decade should see the development of a corps of Asian leaders, possessing the political, military, and economic talent and maturity which is essential to regional military and economic unity.

B. Interrelationships and Effects of Military and Economic Assistance.

Important visitors to the countries of Free Asia have leveled criticism at the alleged imbalance of our military and economic assistance. It is true that in these underdeveloped countries the bulk of economic assistance funds goes into direct and indirect support of the military. These visitors argue that tanks and guns do not impress a downtrodden people who need schools, roads, and medical care. But the cold, hard fact remains that without stable government and physical security, there can be little if any economic or social development. In fact, without the former ingredients, there would be no free nation to develop. Thus, in Asia, it has been a case of "first things first." No one will welcome more than I a state of security in these nations which will permit a greater flow of our assistance into the purely economic and social improvements.

My staff includes no competent economic analysts nor is it supplied with the information necessary to evaluate the adequacy of U.S. economic programs in Asia. However, it takes no expert to recognize that there must be a proper balance between military and economic assistance, and that this relationship must shift with changing conditions.

I would list the plus and minus effects of military and economic programs as they relate to our foreign policy objectives, as follows:

1. Plus Effects.

a. Most important and already mentioned, we have provided stability for free governments.

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b. We have enlisted Asian assistance in our global posture of deterrence.

c. We have provided, at low cost, a measure of flexibility for our own defense posture.

d. We have the use of bases which will permit us to defend in the enemy's front yard instead of on our own doorstep.

e. We have developed indigenous skills where few or none existed. Many of these skills will benefit the countries economies.

f. We have developed roads, communications, and other facilities which are of benefit both to the military and to the economy.

g. We have won friends despite the fact that we followed on the heels of colonialism.

h. We have made significant strides, through combined and third country training, toward overcoming international animosities.

i. We have filled a void which otherwise would have invited Communist seizure.

j. We have denied significant resources to the Communist world.

k. We have provided gainful employment for a large segment of manpower in areas where a surplus of labor has always existed.

2. Minus Effects.

a. The need for initial emphasis on military aid has not permitted, with funds available, commensurate economic and social development. Undoubtedly, this has had the effect of winning friends to a greater degree among the leaders than among the population.

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b. The maintenance of the forces we have assisted in developing has put a strain on the economies of those countries which contribute to such support.

c. It can be argued logically that we have helped to create a standard of living among military personnel, in some countries, which is higher than that among the civilian population, and that these higher standards cannot be sustained by the nations' economies.

d. We have fostered a degree of dependence upon U S. aid which sometimes breeds resentment.

C. Problems Encountered and Lessons Learned.

During the past 8 years, the Military Assistance Program in the Pacific Command has encountered many obstacles and suffered much criticism. As in most programs of similar magnitude and complexity, there have been cases of mismanagement and maladministration. I should like first to discuss some problems affecting our program in general and then to review problems peculiar to the individual countries involved.

1. Administration of the Program.

a. Common Criticisms. We encounter such things as corruption, diversion of military supplies and equipment to the civilian economy or to non-MAP units, pilferage, thievery, hoarding of MAP-supplied material, and political maneuvering in the military hierarchy. None of this is condoned. Much has been done and more will be done to prevent these irregularities.

A frequent criticism is that our country programs are based upon unreliable asset data, with overprogramming as the result. This is often true, and a part of the cause is quite simple to explain. Most of our programs were initiated on a "crash" basis. Excess U.S. equipment was introduced hurriedly into the country forces when the MAAGs were established, initial assets were difficult to inventory with any degree of accuracy. Current inventories are often found incorrect and in most countries there is a tendency to hoard. Review of programs and good end-use utilization inspections by the advisory groups are essential. However, we have not been able to staff our advisory groups to do a policing job of the magnitude which is required to prevent all irregularities.

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b. The Military Advisor. I would like to say a word about the man in the field who plans and administers the country program. To my way of thinking, he has shown a remarkable grasp for what is a relatively new and complex military-diplomatic science. The absence of serious incidents involving advisory personnel is a tribute to his stature. I am impressed with the caliber of most of the advisory personnel I have observed. The Military Departments have made great progress in the selection of people for this important duty, and toward making such an assignment acceptable from a career point of view. The new Military Assistance Institute in Washington should improve the quality of key personnel assigned to MAAGs, with a resulting improvement to the program as a whole.

Our only real basis for complaint is that the advisor's tour of duty is too short. No advisor stays through the foundation and execution of a single annual country program. During his tour of duty, which ranges in most countries from 12 months without family to 24 months with family, he executes a program prepared by his predecessor and prepares a program to be executed by his successor. Regardless of his talents, he does not have an opportunity to get the complete "feel" of the program and the people with whom he works. I am speaking of those advisors occupying key assignments in the MAAG structure.

We have moved toward a solution of this problem in Korea with our project for constructing family housing. However, I feel that the solution to the overall problem lies in the elimination of the disparity between net income, privileges, allowances, leaves, etc., of the military advisor and his civilian counterpart in the U. S. Mission. I am not a proponent of a career specialist corps of military advisors, but I do believe that the conditions can be made sufficiently attractive to warrant a three year assignment, six months of which would be spent in a language course and the remaining two and a half years in the country. The importance and monetary value of the program justifies this conclusion.



c. Roles and Missions of Indigenous Forces. This is a subject which is raised frequently by visitors and investigating bodies because it is important to the justification of our programs. We have been accused of having no roles

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and missions for the indigenous forces we are supporting in the Pacific Command. I can assure you that, as we develop our U. S. plans for general and limited war situations, the roles and missions for the indigenous forces are being geared to these plans. Roles and missions have been stated in the form of "desired operational capabilities" and have been disseminated to the advisory groups as part of their guidance for programming the development and improvement of allied forces. However, I have come to the conclusion that this is not adequate.

Recently, the Philippine Government and Armed Forces intensified their demands for increased military assistance. We have, in the past, brushed off these demands as an example of a country having a "champagne appetite and a beer income". This recent intensification of demands was motivated partially by the Taiwan situation. However, it was more clearly the result of a complete lack of understanding on the part of the Filipinos as to what we expect of their Armed Forces and what they can expect of ours in any emergency. I am convinced that each of our allies must be informed on these two subjects. As the result of this experience, we are developing a clear cut statement for each of our MAP allies which will include the general concept of how we will fight a general war or limited war together, the missions of each Service of the country's armed forces, and what the U. S. may be expected to do in their support.

These statements are being submitted to the JCS for approval. It is my hope that they will serve not only as guidance and justification for the Military Assistance Programs but also as the basis for combined planning with each of our allies, as the political climate permits. Such a climate exists in the Philippines now, where combined U. S.-Philippine planning is underway in the Mutual Defense Board.

I have given a great deal of thought to the "spread" of our military assistance throughout the command. This is a difficult subject. Our small programs (Philippines, Laos, Cambodia) could not be much smaller without complete withdrawal and that is neither militarily nor politically

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expedient. Our large programs (Korea, Thailand, South Vietnam, and Taiwan) are putting the aid where we need our strength. I have not yet been able to put my finger on any basis for suspecting regional maldistribution. This is a further indication to me that our assistance programs are in consonance with our U. S. war plans.

d. M&P Training. The training of indigenous personnel which we conduct in the countries, in the United States, here in Hawaii, and through combined training exercises and weapons demonstrations is a remarkably effective diplomatic as well as military instrument. The only significant problem we have encountered is in ensuring that the talents of the people thus trained are put to the best subsequent use. We have found cases where U.S.-trained personnel have been handicapped because of this training. Occasionally, they have been looked upon by their superiors as potential rivals in the struggle for recognition and advancement, and were therefore put in positions where they would not constitute a danger. More often, however, it has simply been a case of poor personnel management and utilization.

We are trying to keep abreast of this problem are are making some headway. We can only go so far toward influencing assignments of indigenous personnel. We have impressed upon government and military leaders the need for a proper balance of school-trained personnel in training assignments and operating units. Our objective, insofar as practicable, is to make certain that trainees become trainers, thereby reducing the need for training by U. S. trainers.

e. Democracy versus Military Dictatorship. Perhaps a few words in regard to the type of regimes we are supporting with some of our country programs would be in order. Our critics have sometimes implied that, through military assistance, we have created and are supporting military dictatorships, or as it is sometimes phrased: "The military elite." If my knowledge of history serves me right, most newly independent nations find themselves led by military regimes. Usually, the same virile leadership which won their independence is the only leadership which can

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maintain it. However, this is not always the case. Thailand, which is certainly not a new-born sovereign nation, comes closest to meeting the definition of military dictatorship in this area.

While I do not subscribe to General de Gaulle's theory that "Politics are too important to be left to politicians", I do maintain that when the alternatives are as dire as they are, we must accommodate temporarily to the lesser evil. For instance, Sarit has not abolished the monarchy. He has retained several able, and seemingly honest and dedicated statesmen in positions of influence. In varying degree, rule by the "military elite" is a phrase to be expected in the growth of an underdeveloped nation, particularly after it has been subjected to colonial rule or enemy occupation. The principal attribute in favor of the regime in Thailand is that it has not been characterized by oppression.

2. Japan. It is in Japan that our program has suffered the greatest shortfall in the attainment of desired MAP objectives. This headquarters, based upon our overall combined plans for defense, estimates a purely military requirement for 11 divisions for the ground defense of Japan. There are 6 divisions in being. We estimate a requirement for 322 major combatant ships. There are 83 on hand. We estimate a requirement for 23 modern tactical aircraft squadrons and 22 air defense missile battalions or squadrons. There are only 2 tactical fighter squadrons operational in the Japanese Air Self Defense Force and both are far from combat-ready. No air defense missile units are programmed. The solution to this shortfall lies, for the most part, outside of the military program.

a. Attitude Toward Rearmament. The effort we and our allies expended during World War II and the occupation period to make peace-loving citizens of the Japanese was highly successful. On the foundation of this success, a well-directed and adequately financed Communist propaganda campaign further has stiffened public resistance to rearmament. This campaign has found millions of willing followers through its "front"

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organizations, such as those dedicated to "Anti-Rearmament", "Return of Okinawa and the Ponins", "Anti-U.S. Bases", "Anti-H-Bombing Testing," and the "USSR-Japan" and "China-Japan Friendship Societies". This condition is the basic cause of Japan's disappointing contribution to her own defense. The military career does not attract qualified leaders. Japan's financial contribution to her defense structure in recent years has been approximately 1.5% of her annual gross national product. This is as low as any country contribution, percentage-wise, in Free Asia and perhaps in the world. The Japanese military leadership and Prime Minister Kishi are in sympathy with U.S. objectives. Presumably, Kishi is moving about as rapidly as he can under the circumstances in the direction we desire. To move faster without carrying public opinion with him, would mean the end of his government and probably of his party.

The solution to this principal obstacle to our program in Japan lies in the economic and psychological areas. First, we must develop with the Japanese, a long range plan for the future financing of Japan's defenses. This plan must take into account the full potential of Japan's industry, not only to produce armament for Japan but also for the other nations of Free Asia. In the long run we should supply Japan with only technical advice and assistance and, principally on a reimbursable basis, those items she cannot produce economically. Our State and Defense Departments recognize this requirement and are moving to deal with it. Secondly, there is a need for an increased psychological effort in Japan on our part. Our efforts in this regard are insignificant in comparison with those of our opposition. We must find some way to counter the reaction to the restrictions we have imposed upon Japan's trade with the U. S. and with Red China. Trade is Japan's life blood. We must also find a way to counter the claim (not peculiar to Japan) that she has increased the risk of Communist aggression by condoning U. S. bases in her islands and accepting U. S. military aid. I recognize that the opposition to a psychological campaign on our part is formidable. Nevertheless, this is a battle to which we must face up, because a neutralist Japan will be forced into accommodation with, and ultimate domination by, the Communist World.

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b. Leadership. Inadequate management ability in the military leadership and particularly in the Air Self Defense Force, has contributed greatly to the short-fall of our program, and to poor utilization of the materiel provided under the program. Failure of an ambitious but necessary pilot training and maintenance program has been the direct result. Through our MAP program and with the excellent assistance of U. S. forces in Japan, particularly the Fifth Air Force, we are working hard to correct this deficiency.

3. Korea. This program, as you know, is under heavy fire from the General Accounting Office. It has been under CINCPAC cognizance since July 1957 when the Far East Command was consolidated with this command. My initial opinion is that many of our program difficulties are the residual effects of the Korean War, during which we supplied the ROK forces through our own logistical system on the more "lavish" basis which is characteristic of hot war situation. Here we created a new and large armed force, without developing at the same time its vital logistical component. Time and the enemy did not permit this orderly development of a balanced force structure. Now we are suffering the consequences. We are facing the slow and painful process of educating backward people in logistical know-how, while they are engaged in providing support to a large and going concern.

Further to complicate our problem, the loose controls of a combat arena, together with a pitiful standard of living has bred a new class of indigenous "entrepreneur" seldom equaled in ingenuity. Obviously, I refer to those responsible for the diversion of program materiel to other than its intended use. I do not claim that our failures are all attributable to the Koreans. There have been failures on our part to anticipate, plan, and to establish controls. In any case, the combined result is the criticism of over-programming on the basis of unrealistic asset data, diversion of material, inadequate controls and policing of the program.

Unfortunately, the reports of investigating agencies, such as the General Accounting Office, have emphasized the shortcomings without tempering the criticism with due credit for the progress being made in corrective action. General Decker, as Commander U. S. Forces Korea, is directly responsible for administration of the program in Korea. A

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former Comptroller of the Army, he is fully aware of the deficiencies and is taking vigorous command action to alleviate them.

As you know, the MAAG organization in Korea is not a typical MAAG. I have no direct command control over the Service advisory groups in Korea, even under the 1 January reorganization. In the MAP organization in Korea, these advisors are under the subordinate component commanders and are, therefore, not within the MAAG personnel ceiling allotted by DOD to the Pacific Command. This organization is based upon the premise that CINCUNC, having operational control of all ROK forces (which he has further delegated to his subordinate component commanders), should also delegate to these commanders the means (advisory groups) by which they must maintain the combat effectiveness of those forces. The resulting organization has been blamed for many of the deficiencies of the program. I have heard many arguments pro and con for both types of organizations for Korea. I have not yet reached an opinion on this matter. This is a subject which Mr. Dodge's group might want to discuss while they are in Korea and I shall be most interested in their findings and recommendations.

With respect to future ROK force goals, I am not prepared at this time to commit myself to a drastic reduction. Unlike Taiwan, there is no terrain barrier between ROK forces and the enemy threat. Furthermore, in view of the unrestricted capability of CHICOM forces to reinforce North Korea, there is no solid basis for concluding that the threat to South Korea has diminished as a result of recent CHICOM withdrawals. There is still a significant deficiency in our air defense of the ROK. With compensatory modernization of the active ROK divisions and strengthening of reserve divisions, there may be justification for further reductions in the ROK Army. However, General Decker's headquarters is now conducting a thorough study of this matter and his conclusion will not be available to me by the time of your visit here.

4. Taiwan. This program is perhaps the most satisfying program in my area. I suppose this is because we have had a recent opportunity to put it to a limited test. Its most

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interesting and challenging aspect is that it has been implemented under conditions characterized by a wide divergence between U.S. and country objectives --- defense of Taiwan and the Penghus versus return to the Mainland. This has meant that we are faced constantly with the question, "what are defensive weapons and units and what are offensive weapons and units?" It goes without saying that our decisions in that regard are never completely accepted by our critics because there is no fine line of distinction.

The problem resulting from this difference in national objectives is largely in the utilization of MAP-supplied equipment as reflected in unit deployments. We have long maintained that there were too many forces on the offshore islands. By recent agreement these will be reduced by approximately 15,000, including one infantry division. In exchange we are furnishing weapons which will increase the firepower capability in the OSI.

The MAAG has developed a revised long range program for the GRC forces, extending through 1964, which we are reviewing and refining here. The program includes devices to make significant reductions more palatable when presented to the country officials. It is a modernization program and takes full account of the skills and manpower limitations of the GRC, as well as estimated enemy capabilities.

5. Philippines. I have already covered some of our difficulties with this program and the actions we have underway. A major handicap to this program is the disinclination of the Philippine Government, due to corruption, greed, apathy, and political and economic immaturity, to contribute more to the annual support of its defense establishment. This contribution approximates 1.5% of the Philippine gross national product and is comparable to the inadequate contribution made by Japan to its own defense.

6. South Vietnam. This has been one of our most successful programs, thanks to an outstanding job on the part of our advisory group, and to honest and energetic leadership. Other than the generally low level of native education and technical know-how, the problems affecting our program are related principally to the restrictions imposed by the Geneva Accords. Neither the United States nor South Vietnam were signatories to the 1954 Armistice Agreement but both have chosen to respect

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its provisions. The provisions which most seriously affect our program objectives are those which prohibit the introduction of greater numbers of foreign military personnel than were present in the country at the close of hostilities, and the similar prohibition against the introduction of weapons of increased capability. Our interpretation of the Geneva Accords has resulted in self-imposed limitations on the size of the MAAG, without regard to the added task it has assumed since the withdrawal of the French advisors. Our adherence to the prohibition on weapons creates a problem in replacing worn out materiel. For example, the small Vietnamese Air Force is equipped with old U S. Navy F8F fighter bombers which will not be supportable much longer. Naturally, the country wants jet aircraft and it would be a logical step in progressive development to provide them with suitable jet aircraft for the limited air force roles. Because of the strict interpretation of the Geneva Accords, it appears we will have to settle for propeller-driven aircraft. These are typical of the problems which plague us and for which there is no ready solution.

South Vietnam is one country where our relationship with the natives permits us reasonably close control over the development and execution of the country's defense budget. While we recognize the need for attention to economic and social development in Vietnam, both the country team and President Diem have done an excellent job of planning military projects with an eye to the resulting benefit to the economy.

7. Laos. Our small program for Laos supports an indigenous force numbering only 25,000 and yet our problems with this program are numerous. Our mission in Laos is somewhat unique in that the assistance program must develop in the Armee Nationale Lao (ANL), not only the capability to maintain internal security and resist aggression, but also to win votes. This latter function means participation in a "civic action" program to strengthen support for the central government among the villagers. This is done by building roads, trails, digging wells, providing medical facilities and supplies, and by the very presence of ANL troops in the remote areas.

Here again, the provisions of the Geneva Accords have been a serious handicap to the administration of our program. These Accords required the Royal Lao Government

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(RLG) to integrate 5,000 armed and Communist-supported Pathet Lao into the army, the government and the state. In a supplementary election in May of 1958, the recognized Pathet Lao party (Neo Lao HakZat) succeeded beyond all expectations in winning seats in the National Assembly. U.S. objectives are now directed toward strenghtening the non-Communist position before the next general election in late '59 or early '60. Obviously we are fighting against time to strengthen our program.

The Geneva Accords prevented the introduction of a conventional MAAG into Laos. As a result, it was necessary to establish a "cover" agency called the Programs Evaluation Office (PEO) to carry out the mission. This small agency has been staffed with civilians, principally retired service personnel. Recruiting for PEO has been difficult, both quantitatively and qualitatively. We have learned the lesson that in a primitive and rugged country, with mainly guerilla-type forces, it takes young and virile types to do the advisory job.

Furthermore, the French Mission remained in Laos and was charged with training the ANL, so that PEO's mission has been largely one of logistical support. Neither the U.S. nor the French programs have been particularly effective.

The ANL was equipped initially with French excesses (U.S. assets) from the Indochina War. Much of this materiel was hurriedly issued to the ANL in "junk" status, because of the situation. The ANL maintenance and repair capability was nil, and as a result the program got off on the wrong foot. Incoming MAP equipment must be introduced to the area through the port of Bangkok. This creates a problem in itself. Furthermore, the materiel arrives in Laos through more than one port of entry and distribution within the country is the most formidable problem of all. Road-building projects are underway to improve distribution and mobility. Aerial supply is being improved and augmented. Training has been difficult because of the low level of education and technical know-how and the language barrier.



In order to get this program on the right track, one of our principal objectives is the ultimate establishment of a conventional MAAG. Since the integration of the Pathet Lao,

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the International Control Commission (ICC), which polices the armistice area, has withdrawn, but there is always the threat that it may return. The local French and the Lao now favor our taking over the training program. So while the climate is not yet favorable to the overt introduction of a MAAG, it has been agreed that we may now introduce a closely limited number of active duty military personnel under civilian cover, and on a phased basis, as the initial move toward our ultimate objective. The first increment of this active duty military nucleus is now with my headquarters, developing with my staff the details of a plan for immediate corrective action. The broad outline plan which has received approval in principle from Washington, includes a logistical effort to weed out the junk and move in the critical materiel requirements, and a training plan to revitalize the ANL which provides for French participation.

Our Laos programs have come in for a lot of unfavorable publicity, mostly directed at the economic aspects. Critics of the military program claim that we are supporting an army whose size we do not know. This is not true. They claim further that the ANL, at the first sign of major aggression, will fade into the mountains and jungles. This is essentially true and is exactly in accordance with the plan of which our critics obviously are unaware. The principal role of the ANL in our strategic concept is to delay the enemy, mainly by guerilla-type harassment of the enemy rear areas.

Laos is basically a neutralist country. Many of its civilian leaders are naive and by no means awakened to the Communist threat. On the other hand, most of the military leaders are aware of the threat and are inclined to deal with it forcefully. The ANL is recognized as the single cohesive anti-Communist element with both the capability and the desire to fight Communism. The loss of Laos, situated as it is with respect to the remainder of the Southeast Asian Peninsula, would be a body blow to the hopes of the Free World.

8. Cambodia. In all of Southeast Asia, the French have retained their strongest influence in Cambodia. A neutralist government, headed by the flighty and unpredictable Prince Sihanouk with his unstable political leanings, has alternately smiled and frowned at our program and its administrators. The French have retained their favored position. The MAAG



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mission has been restricted principally to equipping the forces, while the French have carried the training responsibilities. But the Cambodians have permitted neither French nor U. S. military personnel access to the operating units of their Armed Forces, so training is sub-standard and end-use inspection inadequate.

The MAAG Chief has repeatedly and patiently pointed out to indigenous leaders the fallacy of these restrictions as well as the value of a combined effort to force effectiveness. As a result of his persistence, Prince Sihanouk recently issued a directive which should permit the MAAG to accomplish its full mission and to work in cooperation with the French. This is a significant opening, but as yet it is too early to judge its effect on our program.

Because of the unstable political orientation of the government and the armed forces, our program mission is limited to assisting this small force (27,000) in developing a capability to maintain internal security. Thus, our concept does not provide for Cambodian forces to participate significantly with our other allies in the defense of Southeast Asia.

9. Thailand. From the standpoint of our military program and objectives in Thailand, our principal obstacle has been the absence of competent and aggressive Thai military leadership. Through MAP, we are assisting Thai Armed Forces totaling approximately 89,000. The total Thai Armed Forces number approximately 135,000. This means that the Thais maintain forces which, by our standards are unessential and therefore ineligible for MAP support. These include "Palace Guard" type units and obsolete and useless ships. One of our objectives, with which we have had small success, is to convince the Thais that the funds they expend to support these unessential units could be better spent on strengthening the combat effectiveness of essential forces. But here we are dealing with the stubbornness of long sovereign experience, and progress is slow and sometimes frustrating.

There are Thai generals, admirals, and air marshals far out of proportion to the number of army units, ships, and air force squadrons. Military rank is a mark of social attainment. Top military leaders are involved in politics and private

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enterprise which leaves little time for their military tasks. As a result, training, supervision, and management are far below the desired standard. However, unit commanders in the field show more motivation and the slow but sure progress which is being achieved is due largely to the combined efforts of our advisors and these subordinate commanders. The threat of reducing aid to Thailand has already been considered as a lever to influence the desired results, but this course of action has been discarded as politically inexpedient. And so our program proceeds with patience and restraint, recognizing that in the final strategic analysis, we need the Thais and their homeland on the side of the Free World.

10. Indonesia. Recent events in Indonesia have caused considerable concern both here and in Washington. Since early 1957, Indonesia has sought military aid from the United States on a reimbursable basis. Because of the uncertain nature of Sukarno's political objectives and the sensitivities of some of our major allies, U.S. national policy chose to defer action on the Indonesian request for aid. When the internal situation in Indonesia reached a fever pitch last year, the Communist bloc responded quickly to the needs of the central government. Indonesian military officials were forced, reluctantly or otherwise, to accept assistance from Communist countries, much of it in the form of naval vessels and combat aircraft.

To avoid driving the Indonesians to the Communist bloc, the U.S. agreed to the provision of a token amount of the military equipment requested. After a considerable delay, while reappraising the rapidly changing Indonesian internal situation, authority was granted in August 1958 to deliver this token packet of equipment, amounting to 7 million dollars and consisting principally of army equipment. Recognizing an opportunity to explore the possibilities of a more permanent military relationship with Indonesia, we introduced a minuscule group which we called the U. S. Military Technical Advisory Group (MILTAG) to arrange for the delivery and turnover of the equipment. This was a unilateral U. S. designation not recognized by the Indonesians as are MAAGs elsewhere, since there is no U.S.-Indonesian Mutual Security Agreement. This group was headed by a carefully selected major general from the staff of the Commander in Chief U. S. Army Pacific. He

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functioned in complete coordination with the U. S. Ambassador and carried out his assignment most effectively, in the light of the adverse conditions which prevailed in this delicate situation.

From experience, we have learned that our strongest allies in Indonesia are the army forces under the influential General Nasution. He and his army, if properly supported, have the potential and the desire to keep Indonesia non-Communist. We are now awaiting Washington approval of a follow-up assistance program. There has been reluctance to furnish assistance to the Indonesian Air Force because of suspected Communist leanings among its top leaders. My feeling is that we must help all three services in reasonable degree rather than to concentrate our aid on any one service. Whether or not we can influence the Indonesian Air Force to any great extent is problematical. However, it is a certainty that we cannot if some means is not generated to open the door. Furnishing aid to the Indonesian Army and Navy and not to its Air Force would jeopardize the ultimate attainment of U. S. objectives in Indonesia.

A small and short-range U. S. assistance program in the case of Indonesia is not the answer. A government level decision must be made soon, before more ground is lost. It is an untenable situation, when a nation seeks our help and offers to pay for it, for us to respond by furnishing too little and too late the items we decide they should have rather than what they want. I need not remind you of the importance of Indonesia to the military and economic picture in Asia.

11. Burma. I have no direct representation in Burma and we are monitoring, from afar, another token reimbursable aid program totaling 25.9 million dollars. With the same objectives in mind as in Indonesia, Washington has approved the introduction of three officers into Burma to work with the Embassy, ostensibly as technical advisors during equipment delivery. These officers are expected to arrive here soon for orientation on their way to Rangoon.

D. Summary. I feel that the lessons we have learned during the past few years in which this command has been associated with the Military Assistance Program are reasonably

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indicated by the problems I have described, and the actions we have taken or are taking. I have only one recommendation to make. It embraces three words --- patience, persistence, and understanding. If our public and the Congress can be made to understand what we are doing with military assistance, our objectives, our problems, and above all, to appreciate the enemy threat, I feel that success will be the result.

I am impressed with the relative importance of the Military Assistance Program to my overall mission and responsibility as CINCPAC. This explains why I have chosen to answer your letter in some detail. We are anxious to be of assistance to your committee in its important task. I have refrained from including many statistics in this letter because we can provide those during your visit. Assuming that the committee may desire to use this letter in the documentation of its report, I have also covered material which will be included in the oral discussions which I look forward to while you are here.

Sincerely yours,

H. D. FELT

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