

7 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR C.D. JACKSON

Subject: Latin America

1. You requested some thoughts on Latin America, based upon lessons learned in the Philippines. In order to be of most help to you, in the possibly brief time before my departure overseas, I am dividing my suggestions in two parts. The first part is attached. The second part requires deep study of an area unfamiliar to me. If there is insufficient time to write the second part, there are competent folks in C.I.A. who can do it.

2. The first part is an outline of my personal opinion of the basic mechanism needed to win the struggle we face. It is a start, not exhaustive. [redacted] It is the first time I have tried to describe it concisely, so perhaps there are some rough spots. Latin America is rich in assets for its most efficient working.

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3. The basic mechanism must be looked at as only the covert or semi-covert part of the United States team in each country. The rest of the team should be playing in the same game, towards the same goal. If it isn't, the United States loses. Thus, the critical task falls upon the Executive, for clear statement of our policy towards each country and compliance of officials to both spirit and letter of that policy.

4. The second part of my suggestions concerns the application of the basic mechanism to each country. The start should be a penetrating review of what we know of each country. From this review, by individual country, we list the real targets to be destroyed, the assets (including names of persons) in that country which will destroy the targets, and a sketch of how an agent or agents make those assets viable. The description of the basic mechanism contains thoughts on this.



5. If this way of doing is acceptable, then the means are next. You know where help awaits you in doing it successfully.

Edward G. Lansdale

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Colonel ~~USMC~~

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BASIC MECHANISM

1. Mission

a. Basically, we are seeking a Pax Americana in the world. This peace will be realized when we obey practically the command: love thy neighbor as thyself. Inherent in this command is: love thyself. What is the foundation of our love for ourselves as a nation? It is: the freedom of the individual. This freedom has been described, and re-described, in each political expression we cherish the most as a nation. It is what we live or die for, as citizens. It is this love we must kindle in our neighbors, the other nations.

b. When the citizens of a foreign country believe in the same high principle as we do (i.e.: freedom of the individual), with or without similar mechanics of government or economy, then that foreign nation becomes a true ally of ours. It sees the world as we do. Our enemies are automatically the same, our goals the same. It exists in harmony with us. The Pax Americana will be complete when all nations subscribe to this high principle. That is what we bring about.

c. This is not visionary. I have witnessed foreign forces dedicated to this principle (advised, aided, and encouraged by us) bring about the destruction of a communist politburo, the defection of communist leaders, the defection of mass support of communist troops, and the surrender of the majority of well indoctrinated communist troops. Thus, it is practical and realistic in the world we know today.

d. The Soviets have so sold their dialectical materialism abroad, that their followers work for communism, full bellies or no. The weapon to destroy this Soviet communism, or other enslaving beliefs, is dedication to the freedom of man, with the weapon wielded by fighters who remain dedicated, full bellies or no.

2. Summarized Description

In each country, there are forces and leaders (actual or potential) believing in the freedom of the individual, in forms as varied as our own interpretation of that principle. We must put the United States (represented by its agent), quietly, into intimate contact with those forces and leaders, strengthening them until they become the authority of that country. Then we insure that such authority does not become perverted into fascism or communism. We insure by aiding internal balance of power, vigilantism, and similar means. In all of this, we are the friendly helpers, not the doers. We help others help themselves.



3. Agents

a. The crux of the operation is in using the right manpower for our agents. Thus, before describing the operation, personnel should be discussed out of context to emphasize importance. It is vital to have a man for a man's job.

b. For each country, there should be a principal agent, an assistant who should be both understudy and executive officer, and technicians (administration, para-military, psychological-political, intelligence) to support the principal and his assistant as required. In small countries, the technical staff could be small or borrowed for temporary duty. In larger countries, the technicians could become sub-principals and assistants in divisions of the work to be accomplished. In a pinch, the United States would gain even if it could only spring the principal agent alone into free action in the target country.

c. The key man is the principal agent. He must possess qualities or capabilities set forth in the next paragraph. His assistant should possess the same qualities, actually or potentially. (This work can be dangerous; an assistant must be ready to step into the shoes of the principal). Technicians need have those qualities only to the degree necessary for their own tasks.

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d. There are three qualities essential in a principal agent. They are three loves:

- 1). Love for what the United States means
- 2). Love for his fellow man, communicable
- 3). Love or affection for the target country or peoples

e. Love for what the United States means is largely a matter of understanding our history or growth honestly and of believing the principles of our founding and maturing. This will permit the principal agent to recognize persons and forces we should help, when he is on the ground in the target country. In turn, it will attract those persons and forces to the United States, in the word-and-action expression by the agent. Included in this love is a real belief in God, the philosophies of Jefferson and Lincoln, realizing that our economic and social structure had growth from small beginnings, that we have suffered political blights, and a working knowledge of clandestine forces in our own Revolution and Civil War. This will tend to prevent the holier-than-thou attitude which our enemies have found as our great weakness.

f. Love for his fellow man, communicable, means an acceptability in all strata of society, a true gregariousness, an ability to pass through the facade around a fellow being and reach the man beneath, and to overcome personal dislike of habits or mannerisms to find the likeable. This will permit an intimate working relationship with the U.S. ambassador and other necessary U.S. officials and with the native leaders and forces to be helped. It will permit the healthy growth of the agent's influence over opinion makers such as editors, publishers, writers, politicians, and military leaders. Also, it will increase personal security for the agent as he increases his well-wishers.

g. Love or affection for the target country or peoples means an ability to get as deeply below the surface as a foreigner can, to understand desires and reactions of a people predictably. This love or affection must not be limited to one social class or native customs or scenery. It must be based upon a deeply affectionate friendship with individual persons in that country, (this affection could include that for a mistress or mistresses), so intimate that the individual persons communicate the basic mores, aspirations, and instincts of the native people in the little day-to-day bits to the agent, with neither party quite aware of the process. With this love, the agent becomes instinctive in picking the "right" action, one that will find instant response among native persons and forces. In this respect, the critical friendship or love must be fairly representative of the predominant part of the population (agrarian, labor, or professional with roots in agrarian or labor).

h. There are other qualities required in an agent, of course. They are part of established personnel doctrine, and useful. The "three loves" described above are unique, needed for unique requirement. In an energetic, well-balanced person, they become a "one-man army"... our most efficient, least costly but most precious instrument.

i. The principal agent must either have achieved stature in the target country or be capable of achieving stature. The two best places to look for him are in the target country or the United States. Long-time residents in a foreign country tend to paternalistic colonialism or to thinking of natives as divided between social equals and not-quite-bright mass ("children" in its milder form, "niggers" in its worst). Perhaps he can be picked from a list of "most loved Yankees" supplied by native opinion makers in the country (our existing U.S. apparatus there has means to obtain a list, even though it might be contaminated) or supplied by U.S. citizens who know the country well (this might not be as accurate as that supplied by the natives). Such a list might name former ambassadors, military personnel, business men, or professionals who had spent several years in the target country and would find a ready welcome again.



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4. Pre-Operations

a. The first step might well be the selection of the principal agent. He could then supervise and participate in preparations, which would be in the United States, mostly Washington.

b. The preparation phase could include:

- 1). thorough review of the country's situation as known to us (C.I.A. has)
- 2). listing of forces and persons in target country who favor or potentially favor freedom of man (roughly those who subscribe to liberty in some form: independent editors and publishers, political or civic leaders for free balloting or social justice or even free public education, an Army clique working against official corruption, veterans groups who still hold to ideals of unselfish patriotism from service for their country, youth or student groups, younger people in government or civic affairs who are the potential leaders tomorrow, prominent citizens or families educated in the U.S., service-to-the-community groups such as Jaycee, Lions, League of Womens Voters, and fairly uncontaminated labor and agrarian groups)
- 3). listing of targets (including communist and fascist leaders and groups, corrupt and corrupting factors and persons in the body politic)
- 4). review of the target nation's rules prescribing the freedom of man (Constitution, laws, legal interpretations)
- 5). review of statements by national heroes bearing on the freedom of man or bolstering institutions which subscribe to such views (these heroes' words speak with more acceptability than a foreigner's)
- 6). review of the factors in the target country which must be considered for sound planning of both strategy and tactics: social strata census, economy by political subdivisions, religious census, influence of U.S. on population or subdivisions of the population
- 7). personal visits by the principal agent with U.S. officials most concerned in forming policy re the target country (he needs to gauge them well, for their continuing views can diminish or increase the risks he runs)

c. The preparations can be briefened to a quick review of the situation, listing of potential assets and targets, and meeting U.S. policy formers. More thorough review and research could be accomplished by C.I.A. in Washington, with results forwarded to the agent later.



d. The principal agent should bear in mind that our situation information might be weighted by the superficial (the bulk of our intelligence "take" sometimes coming from public journals and diplomatic circle gossip) or the unwittingly biased (U.S. officials are constantly subject to skillful psychological efforts by self-seeking groups, frequently in their social life abroad). The situation information, however, is invaluable. He can evaluate it further for himself when he is in the target country.

e. Religious organizations were purposely left out of the examples in 4b(2) above. This is a separate subject and will not be discussed here, other than to point out that there have been examples of captivity of religious entities by Soviet communists, "empiricus Hispanicus" forces, and fascists, as well as examples of heroic endeavors for man's freedom by other religious entities.

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f. The principal agent's cover needs to be well back-stopped in the United States, since foreign groups have relatively easy access to such information. This might require additional time for the principal agent to establish cover before departure. The cover should permit fairly free travel within the target country, provide a logical reason for him to visit with U.S. and native officials, permit him being seen in nearly all strata of society, and demand as little of his time to maintain as possible (his principal agent duties can run to an absorbing 18-24 hours a day during crises). In friendly countries, where an agent is helping build forces to uphold the stated laws of that country, it becomes relatively unimportant if the cover is blown. (There are times and places where his usefulness might even increase by status and presence being a public secret). In sensitively neutral, unfriendly, or enemy countries, cover becomes all important; the agent must devote the major share of his time to living cover; his actual productive work as principal agent might be limited to what he can accomplish in a half hour or hour of painstaking effort each day.

g. In connection with cover and recruiting of the principal agent is the question of length of tour. Unlike the overseas tours of other U.S. officials, the length of time for the agent should be indefinite, possibly stretching into decades. His labors might not bear fruit immediately, actually will not in the long-range or strategic construction of assets. Among compensations for the agent, however, is the fact that folks he enjoys being with are coming into power and they, in turn, will be constantly doing things for him, personally and socially, to make life more pleasant.

5. Operations

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a. The first week in the target country should not be wasted on administrative matters alone (building cover, house-hunting, landing baggage). The principal agent should be alertly observant and adroitly naive in curiosity, re-evaluating what he learned in Washington against first-hand knowledge, and reporting his first estimate of the situation at the end of the first week. This is character building: reminding of his real mission, need for objectivity, and that he is actually on 24-hour duty. Concise estimates of the situation from time to time help in clarifying thinking, remind of factors overlooked before, and help establish a time-in-history-of-the-country sense necessary to good planning (this starts indicating pendulum swings of social and economic changes, mounting favorable conditions for targets or assets, etc.).

b. The principal agent's first official act is to report to the chief of U.S. mission, usually the ambassador. He should resolve to be a good, useful member of the U.S. team, quickly finding ways of giving covert help to the overt mission. It is important that he and the ambassador have harmonious, even intimate relations, and the burden is on the principal agent to bring this about. When differences between the two have to be referred to Washington for settlement and delimitation, the agent's effectiveness can be damaged. It is often better to postpone controversial actions until a more agreeable future. It is vital for him to keep the ambassador informed on fast-breaking political events in which he is involved. If the ambassador is a kindred soul, he will prefer being called from bed in the middle of the night on important matters, letting the agent have his bedside telephone number, even arranging simple telephonic codes.



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c. Knowledge of the principal agent's official status and mission by other U.S. officials should be on a need-to-know basis. His most annoying distractions will come from the official U.S. family, usually in the form of conjectural gossip about him which reaches foreign ears. He must correctly diagnose the motives behind this gossip (often unconscious jealousy), develop a tough hide, and ignoring the gossip go right ahead winning friends in the U.S. family under guise of his cover. He should remember that a legion of other agents have undergone similar suffering. The more flagrant cases can be reported to the U.S. chief of mission for any required disciplinary action.

d. A thoughtful study of persons and groups favoring freedom of man should result in the selection of those most-likely-to-succeed due to strength, financial backing, or popularity. Persons and entities in the government should not be overlooked. It might be that the person or persons who are most attractive because of their attained position are practically inaccessible, are nearing the end of a term in office, or are otherwise situated so as to make the agent's efforts not entirely rewarding. He must select assets which he can move close to and which will be worthy of the tedious and absorbing efforts he must make. Having selected his most promising assets, the agent then moves in close to them to make friends. He can perform services (even hospitably housing a person temporarily in his home to let him escape the pressures of affairs or dangers), give luncheons or dinners (preferably in his own home rather than club or restaurant), remembering the social graces of thank-you notes and congratulations, holiday or anniversary presents (thoughtfulness towards the person rather than ostentation), and run the gamut of sincere friendship.

e. As the principal agent develops his friendship, he also develops his role of encouraging adviser. This comes naturally as the asset commences discussing problems he faces, a conversational gambit easy among friends. Part of the advisory role is in helping define the shape of problems (educating on the nature of the enemy, methods of defeating the enemy, organizing his work, selecting or rewarding subordinates and associates). This is delicate work. It is most effective (and welcome by the asset) when done as "let's take this out and look at it" (deftly amplifying what he has stated previously, so that it appears to be his own thinking) rather than as the all-knowing, smarter-than-sin answer man. (My favorite answer to requests for such advise is: "what's best for your country?" or "for your children's children?", and then developing from there).

f. What do these assets do when the principal agent becomes friend and adviser? They fight the internal enemy, for the good of their own country. The fact that this enemy is also inimical to the U.S. becomes incidental. The assets' means of defeating the enemy are organized, trained, advised, encouraged, helped. For example, communism resorts to violence as a means. This must be met by counter-organization and action (guerrilla warfare, street fighting, demonstrations, breaking-up demonstrations, psychological warfare including black sabotage). Factors which encourage communist expansion or recruiting must be eradicated, perhaps in the form of social, political or agrarian reforms. Communists recruit people who feel they have no other way of righting wrongs to them; as more peaceful and rational means are opened, the communists start failing. This requires genuine understanding, interest, and work by a national authority, usually a government entity. Hope, or the possibility of a better way of life, must be given to the people, or communism cannot be defeated.

g. Supporting assets can be encouraged, helped, and even organized if non-existent. These might be news media (publishers, editors, radio station owners, broadcasters often turn out to be surprisingly courageous patriots), political and social reform groups. In the latter, it is more effective when the key man, usually the executive secretary, is secretly paid by the agent, although his motives should be sincerely patriotic for his own country and he be recruited on this basis.

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h. In developing assets, both principal and supporting, the agent must ever sense their relationship to the strategy (usually longer-term) he has planned and is following: knowing when to start support growing to fulfill an eventual foreseeable need, and knowing which assets to spend the most time with at given moments (i.e. which tactics are crucial ones and must succeed, thus are worthy of his hardest efforts). If the principal agent can take a day off periodically (say once every two or three months), lock himself in a room for some concentrated thinking, and write up his estimate of the current situation, then he can study this estimate for weak points that need strengthening and strong points which need continuing maintenance. From this study, he can list actions to be undertaken in the following period. In other words, he also is evaluating his current efforts with assets in terms of eventual good results.

i. There are two important aspects of supporting assets which should not be overlooked: use in developing a proper psychological climate for aiding the resolve, growth, and action of principal assets, and development of future principal assets out of supporting ones. An example of the first aspect might be: the candidacy of a principal asset on a reform platform which would require psychological efforts by supporting assets (news media, civic groups, "Asset-for-President" clubs) to sell the mass on the need for reform, to focus on the asset as the person to bring about that reform, and to keep him encouraged upon the course he is embarked. (In the Philippines, in 1950-51, hard work had to be expended on making the Army acceptable to a skeptical public before it could start making headway in fighting Communist guerrillas; it required just such an effort by principal and supporting assets). As for the second aspect, it is wise to develop future leaders or leadership groups to insure a continuation of the political climate being constructed. Thus, some of the supporting assets must be viewed as long-term investments, to be nurtured for maturity five to ten years from the present. In this category would be younger persons for future government leadership (ask trusted patriotic natives to list them; they welcome the opportunity), and persons graduating from youth groups who should be attracted into more mature groups subscribing to desirable principles.

j. Some of the brighter people on the enemy side have engaging personalities. The principal agent should not neglect them, if possible. He not only can learn about the enemy's psychology (or even plans, personnel, operations) in careful contacts with such persons, but can also find possible defectors among them. (The capture of the communist Politburo in Manila came from the defection of a highly-principled younger communist leader). This is an exceptionally delicate operation, and should only be attempted if the agent is thoroughly aware of the dangers and the enemy organization. The better method of obtaining defection is through proper infiltration, with the infiltrator obtaining the defection of a key person, then having the defector remain in place. However, the right principal agent can have a surprisingly serious effect on the enemy through such contacts, (even though the effect be purely negative by making suspect those persons contacted).

k. How far should the United States (i.e., the principal agent) go in financing and training the assets in their struggle against the enemy? The answer is: the minimum possible for success. We should strive to create self-reliance as much as possible, and being a cornucopia supplying all wants does not create self-reliance in the recipient. The principal agent will be asked continually for material aid; he must be ever alert to native sources and means of aid, encouraging their use whenever possible. He can advise on local fund-raising and obtaining native congressional appropriations. There are exceptions, however, when U.S. aid is required, and it is wise to extend this gracefully and promptly. More often, though, it is better to have a homespun or makeshift local mechanism operating quickly to meet a need, than to bring in a handsomely-expensive gadget from the U.S. If conceived and paid for by natives, their enthusiasm and pride can offset far more efficient U.S. gimmicks. Bringing in U.S. technical experts for spot training of natives is helpful, if the experts are "simpatico".



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1. It is wise to look over the target country's laws, with a view towards improving the country's legal means of protecting itself against internal enemies such as communists, as well as protecting the rights of man. Self-protection and rights often are in conflict, so that the rights might suffer for the former. The principal agent should work towards making that suffering temporary (suffering being perhaps a declaration of martial law, suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, or rule by fiat), even though he might advise the taking of steps for self-protection when the nation is endangered. His circle of friends, and influence, should extend into the law-makers.

m. Without being stuffy of self-conscious about it, the principal agent must live his life abroad as an exemplary U.S. citizen. He is Ben Franklin in Paris winning friends for a country which cherishes high political principles, even dangerous principles. If he does this, he will find his influence steadily multiplying and with it friendship for the U.S. This will increase the effectiveness of his insisting upon assets working for the best interest of their own country, and make our good intents towards foreign people genuine.

n. Influence of the principal agent also is extended by his remembering the encouragement of rewards. Rewards need not mean financial expenditure by the U.S. He can suggest promotions of subordinates and associates among the assets, when deserved, editorial acclaim (editorial-writing friends often welcome such suggestions), or honoring by group subscription to a memento. Even direct rewards by the agent can be personal, warming gestures (a watch off his wrist for heroic action or as a keepsake for an occasion).

o. The principal agent should learn the knack of what I term "the moment of truth": the bringing together of natives who secretly subscribe to the same high aims yet do not quite trust fellow natives, and make them outline their aspirations and dreams in front of each other, so that they can team up in confidence afterwards. This comes with their complete trust of the principal agent.

6. Support

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a. This paper contains the personal opinions of the writer, not the

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b. Further, there are details of psychological-political and paramilitary warfare not mentioned here which are technical necessities for the success of the operation described.

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c. The "principal agent" described in this paper performs a somewhat different role than presently expected of most C.I.A. agents, State Department representatives, or Armed Forces officers. He falls perhaps, just outside their present missions, perhaps closer to the classic role of a Presidential agent.


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d. Finally, there is need for organization not only to integrate covert with overt operations, but for harmonious work within covert operations themselves.


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Colonel USAF



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