

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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NO: POLTO 338

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DATE: SEPT 19, 1961 10 00 PM
HOUR: 00 PM
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FROM: USRO PARIS

TO: ACTION SECSTATE WASHINGTON

FOR KOHLER AND MITZE

P R I O R I T Y

FROM WEISS AND MOODY

~~NOTED~~
BERLIN
62

L I M I T D I S T R I B U T I O N

P A R T I O F I I I P A R T S

This cable in ~~XX~~ three parts.

Part I

1. Meeting this morning of Stikker, 4 PermReps, Horstad and Ambassadorial Group Reps lengthy, somewhat confused, and at points reflected sharp divergences.
2. Stikker announced at outset reservation concerning revised draft of instructions to Horstad prepared yesterday by representatives of himself, 4

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PermReps and Washington experts Amb. Group Reps. Left the impression that it was entirely unacceptable. Weiss was asked to respond and did so by respectfully noting that the SYG's representatives at yesterday's drafting session made only one major reservation. That was to the form of the instruction, i.e. whether it should be addressed to Horstad or to all Commanders. Weiss pointed out that the understanding under which he and his drafting associates proceeded was that there was general agreement that eventually instructions should go to all Commanders but that 4 PermReps desired first an attempt be made to draft an instruction for Horstad which could serve as a model. Weiss also pointed out that para 9 of revised draft explicitly recognized need for separate instructions to SACLANC and CINCCOM.

All PermReps supported
DRAFTED BY:
DEPT/Mr. Weiss/Mr. Moody
9/19/61
AUTHORIZED BY:

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Authority NLE 2007-237 #5
By MLK NEDDE Date 8/20/10

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Weiss interpretation of existing understanding. Comment: Vest later admitted on a confidential basis that Stikker understood that our drafting had proceeded as Weiss described but for tactical reasons had obviously decided to adopt an extreme position throughout the discussion in the meeting of this morning. This in fact subsequently became obvious.

3. Stikker then took occasion to make a sharp attack on what he conceived to be the quite obvious lack of Washington interest in previous PermRep discussions. This he based upon recent report of Pomfin meeting which failed to make any mention of PermReps views. Went on at some length to imply that this substantiated his feeling that tripartite powers were not in fact prepared to take serious account of the views of the Alliance as a whole. He returned to this theme on at least two other occasions in the meeting.

4. Weiss pointed out that previous reports of PermReps discussions were read with great interest and considered very carefully indeed in Washington. Noted that it was entirely probable that Stikker's interpretation of lack of interest in PermReps views was more a reflection of incomplete reporting by people in Washington hard pressed by numerous duties. Stikker appeared to be singularly unimpressed by this argument though Ambassador Finletter also supported Weiss explanation.

Comment: Whatever the facts may be it seems clear that any opportunity which presents itself to Ambassadorial Group, Pomfins, etc., to make explicit reference to or ^{to} take note of discussions of PermReps would go a long way toward soothing feelings. Ambassador Finletter strongly agrees.

5. Discussion then moved to two related points: (1) The extent of detail to be provided in relation to previous Live Oak planning (see para 5 of 18 Sept draft instructions to Norstad) and (2) extent and manner of approval. Regarding

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former point and after long discussion it was clear that wide agreement prevailed extensive information could and should be provided to the Council. Norstad agreed to provide considerable degree of detail subject only to limitations of security. Some question remained as to extent to which this should be oral or in writing or both. General Norstad was requested to provide informally in writing the nature of the detail which he would think could usefully be included in para 5 of instruction.

6. With regard to latter point referred to in preceding para, Norstad expressed sharp negative reaction to approval through PermReps of plans. Some confusion at this point between him and others present as to whether Norstad was referring solely to tripartite plans or NATO plans. Subsequently it appeared that he was principally referring to tripartite plans though he made it clear that approval by governments through PermReps of even NATO wide plans was not considered desirable. In fact he reiterated his previously expressed opinion that neither tripartite directive nor NATO directive was in any way necessary or desirable. He alluded to his responsibilities as Supreme Commander noting that these included requirement for him to undertake all planning deemed desirable.

7. French asked Ambassadorial Reps to explain why under these circumstances Ambassadorial Group felt it necessary to provide directive to Norstad. Weiss explained that as he understood it Ambassadorial Group felt it was absolutely essential that there be no confusion or misunderstanding as to what basic strategic policy objectives were intended by the four governments. In this connection it was felt both necessary and desirable to be explicit about graduated nature of force application designed to bring Soviets to a more reasonable negotiating posture.

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Similarly necessary be explicit about circumstances and conditions under which nuclear weapons would be employed. Moody and Froment-Meurice agreed.

8. Norstad stated he wished to make it clear that he did not agree with the strategic concept embodied in the directive and in any event felt that it was inappropriate coming from tripartite powers since the concepts involved could only come from NATO as a whole. He doubted that NATO would agree with concept. He expressed grave reservation regarding graduated concept and particularly ability to control essentially explosive military operations in the manner which directive seemed to imply. He expressed view that manner of stating restrictions on use of nuclear weapons implied a defeatist attitude which was highly undesirable.

9. Weiss noted that he had no intention to enter into debate with General Norstad on wisdom of strategy which was, of course, evolved by appropriate senior authorities of four governments.

Part IIPART II OF III PARTS

1. At this point discussion reverted to the question of what it was that NATO would in fact be permitted to approve by way of military plans. Stikker position as it finally emerged was that in order to gain allegiance of Alliance as a whole it must be accorded right to approve rpt approve all plans including Live Oak notwithstanding recognition of the fact that tripartite powers retain special responsibilities and authorities in connection with Berlin. Unanimity of opinion on part of Norstad, all PermReps and Amb. Group Rejs that this cannot be accepted. British inclined to be most sympathetic to Stikker position though they too felt that there must be clear acknowledgment that Live Oak plans cannot be approved and altered by NATO.

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2. Subsequent extensive discussion on preceding point never resulted in bringing adequate resolution between opposing views. Comment: It became obvious that tripartite/quadrupartite approval of paper covering tripartite/NATO relationships might have been useful in clarifying thinking as to precise point at which military control of operation shifted from tripartite to NATO. For example, there was lengthy and somewhat fruitless discussion of significance of corps vs. division vs. battalion etc. in terms of implications for NATO.

3. Toward end of discussion Weiss offered ad referendum following point of view and suggestion. Noted that discussion seemed to have become rigidified around question of whether NATO would have opportunity to approve Live Oak plans which Stikker insisted was essential and others insisted was unacceptable and inconsistent with tripartite responsibilities. Suggested possibility that if directive plus Norstad briefing were to be combined with request for discussion and comments from the Council on Live Oak plans, without commitment to accept or alter plans accordingly but only to give careful consideration, this might conceivably satisfy NATO. Stikker flatly rejected this suggestion reiterating that NATO approval of plans was essential. Comment: Vest later expressed view informally to Moody and Weiss that Stikker quite probably striking an extreme position at this point in order to offset what he considers to be opposite extreme occupied by French. We responded by ^{pointing} ~~pointing~~ out that Stikker seemed to be going so far with this tactic there was great danger that he might overplay his hand since no one in Ambassadorial Group would, on the basis of discussions with which we were familiar, agree with NATO adjustment and approval of Live Oak planning.

4. Norstad made numerous further suggestions directed toward clarifying draft instruction, most of which seemed very useful. In addition, prior to end of

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meeting, Moody suggested that discussion had focused almost entirely on ground access question and that PermReps and NATO would be well advised not to ignore air access question when thinking about how this affected their interests and responsibilities vis-a-vis Berlin matter. Noted further that argument might be made that under certain circumstances advantage would accrue to NATO by resisting temptation to accept prematurely full responsibility for military operations in relation to Berlin. Finally, he indicated on highly confidential basis that some work was now underway in Washington dealing with problem of NATO/tripartite relationship over control of military operations which, when approved, might be useful in further defining exact nature of how and when NATO might assume control. In subsequent brief discussion on this point Stikker seemed unmoved but inability to go into detail limited usefulness of this part of exchange.

5. Meeting ended with suggestion that all those present give further thought to implications of remarks made with view to seeing whether a solution to the problem could not be found. Anticipated that this matter will be discussed to some extent in PermReps meeting scheduled for tomorrow and this in turn may provide additional useful background information for a subsequent meeting of Stikker and 4 PermReps.

Part III

PART III OF III PARTS

1. Obvious from previous remarks that meeting this morning could only leave one with numerous serious concerns.
2. First there is question of Stikker's attitude. There has seemed to us to be a full understanding on part of 4 PermReps of the difficult problem which exists of bringing Alliance into line with previous tripartite planning. French are perhaps least sympathetic on this point and British most but all agree that is

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serious problem. However, Stikker takes the most extreme position possible. He warns that refusal to be fully forthcoming, by which he means including agreement to have NATO modify and approve Live Oak planning could, to quote him, "result in the end of NATO". He has stated on a number of occasions rather dramatically, that he has been informed that various governments would "haul out their troops" before accepting Live Oak planning ~~and thereby~~ without opportunity to accord specific approval to such plans. He took some pains at end of this morning's meeting to direct remarks to group as a whole and specifically to Amb. Group Reps to fact that he hoped his position was not misinterpreted, insisting that he shared completely desire to bring NATO into line. However, he pointed out that refusal to agree to approval by NATO of Live Oak plans presented the Alliance with "the greatest crisis it has ever faced".

3. As indicated earlier, Vest has offered informal and, of course, highly confidential opinion that Stikker position is largely tactical. Difficulty is that his constant reiteration of extreme themes raises question as to whether his intent is a tactical ploy or whether in fact he believes that there exists a deep substantive cleavage within the Alliance over the basic policy underlying Live Oak planning and reflected in current draft directive for Norstad. Obviously, if it is the latter, no amount of drafting adjustment to the directive will avoid necessity for facing up to serious implications of such an issue.

4. Second serious problem which emerged was expression of grave reservation regarding basic strategy and concept offered by Norstad. After meeting member of one delegation queried us as to whether Norstad comments did not reflect basic disagreement on policy as between Norstad and US Government.

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5. Moody, Weiss and Froment-Maurice were specifically requested by SYU to delay return to Washington for at least a few more days. Presumably he hopes that meeting of today plus meeting of Council tomorrow will permit a further meeting of 4 PermReps later in the week designed to find solution to current impasse.

6. We think that it probably makes sense to stay at least through Wednesday to see how events evolve. We understand Ambassador Finletter proposes to forward recommendations along line suggested in para 3 of Part II above.

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