

8824

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
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Classification

Control: 896

Date: October 16, 1961
8:00 P.M.

- #2 AMB
- #3 MIN
- #1,4 STOSSEL-2
- #5 MC GUIRE
- #6-9 DINEUR
- #10,11 OES-2
- #12 TSC

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General Norstad has authorized me to transmit following summary of his recent contacts with German representatives concerning Live Oak and broader military planning, which will be of interest to Department and Bonn.

1. Upon his return from Washington October 4, Norstad was disturbed to hear report through British channels that, in Anglo-German military staff talks in September, German representative (General Schnez, Chief of Staff to General Foertch) had indicated that FRG was "not rpt not interested" in military probes or in any post-probe ~~probe~~ limited and selected offensive operations in event of forceable Soviet action to block access to West Berlin. This report seemed related to other reports that FRG believed that naval blockades, economic embargoes or almost anything should be substituted for military action in any form.

2. On October 7 General Norstad summoned German IIR

General von Butler and General Mueller-Hillebrand, Deputy

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Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy at SHAPE, and, without discussing sources told them he had heard reports to effect indicated in preceding paragraph. He said he required assurance as to where FRG stood on this matter since reports attached ^{foundation} ~~formation~~ of all planning on Live Oak basis and on broader basis now rpt now being considered in NAC. He asked for clear statement on this subject, noting that it could be given to him as an individual rather than as official if for political reasons this was preferable to FRG.

3. In accordance with his views as expressed during Washington visit, General Norstad told German representatives that it was essential to plan ^{for} ~~about~~ economic and naval blockades which might be required in Berlin situation and in particular as collateral measures to bolster military probes. However, he felt that there must be immediate military reaction to forceable blocking of access to Berlin if West hoped to demonstrate its seriousness of purpose. He questioned usefulness and effectiveness of economic embargo if this was to be our primary retaliation to blocking of access to West Berlin by force.

4. On October 13 General Norstad was informed by General von Butler that his request for statement of German position was under active consideration at highest level in FRG. Von Butler understood that it was intended to send Strauss to explain position to Norstad once it was worked out and

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that Strauss would come not rpt not in his capacity as Minister of Defense but as official spokesman of FRG. Von Butler said he had sent report to Bonn supporting Norstad's position and he indicated that Ambassador Grewe's comments and recommendations to FRG (which von Butler had seen) had not rpt not been consistent with position favoring action restricted to economic embargo which Grewe had, under instructions, presented in Washington.

5. On October 14, von Walther, German Ambassador to NATO, and von Herwarth, senior Foreign Office official now rpt now on duty in Luebka's office, called on General Norstad. It seemed apparent they were under instructions to sound out Norstad's views in further detail but they had nothing positive to offer in connection with German position. Norstad reviewed points he had previously made to von Butler. Regarding limited offensive actions, Norstad urged that plans should be in readiness for such actions which, under certain circumstances, might represent only possible ^{military} step which could be taken after failure of military probes and prior to resort to all out war. He also stressed that Germans cannot repeat cannot be bystanders in present situation but must participate in ^{decisions} ~~defense~~ ^{their} and implementation.

6. Von Walther and von Herwarth said German position still under

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consideration in Bonn but they intimated their expectation that results of consideration would be satisfactory to Norstad. They confirmed belief that Strauss would visit Norstad.

8. At close of conversation with Norstad von Walther and von Herwarth raised question regarding willingness of U.S. to use nuclear weapons to defend Europe. Norstad responded with assurances along lines given to Danish Ambassador Schram-Nielsen on this point (Embassy's A-591.)

GAVIN

Drafted and authenticated by:
SHAE/Lt. J. Stoessel Jr./hfo

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