



PURPOSE AND USE OF THIS OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS

This Outline Plan of Operations sets forth courses of action, responsibilities and timing prepared by the OCB in order to carry out NSC policy with respect to Singapore and the Federation of Malaya (Southeast Asia), NSC 5612/1, for which the President has designated the OCB as the coordinating agency.

This Outline Plan does not encompass every U. S. agency activity or program but does include major programs, particularly those requiring interagency coordination. It includes contemplated important actions as well as those already in the process of being carried out.

Each agency has agreed to carry out the actions and programs contained in the plan subject to modification or review should a change in circumstances so indicate. Such changes will be agreed through normal interagency coordination, where appropriate, and will be made in accordance with usual procedures and through usual channels, and not necessarily with any formal amendment of this Outline Plan. A new plan will be prepared as soon as practicable following approval of a new or revised NSC statement of policy.

The Department of State will normally transmit the full text of approved Outline Plans to the chiefs of mission concerned for use in exercising their coordinating responsibilities. Other agencies may transmit the complete plan or extracts thereof to senior field representatives on a strict "need-to-know" basis whenever such distribution is essential to effective implementation; provided that distribution to field representatives, when made, will normally be limited to those who are already holders of the basic NSC policy on which the Outline Plan is based.

Concurrence in this plan by the responsible agencies represented in the OCB does not automatically constitute authorization to operating officials to undertake new programs or modify existing programs, but shall serve as a basis for appropriate operating instructions to be developed by each of the participating agencies.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NLE 2012-102 *3a</u>
By <u>MLK</u> NLDDE Date <u>8/21/13</u>



OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

January 11, 1957

OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
SINGAPORE AND THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA

I. INTRODUCTION

- A. References:
- (1) U. S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia (NSC 5612/1), Approved by the President September 5, 1956.
 - (2) NIE 64-56, The Political Outlook in Malaya through 1960, dated January 24, 1956.
 - (3) NSC 5602/1.
 - (4) Executive Order 19575.

B. Special Operating Guidance:

1. U. S. operations in Singapore/Malaya should be conducted in the context of U. S. objectives which are: to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the Communist bloc; to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free, representative governments with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

2. Accepting the present primary role of the British in Singapore/Malaya, the U. S. should proceed along parallel lines insofar as the policies of the two governments coincide. At the same time the U. S. should continue to build up its own non-British contacts and intelligence sources and show discreet but direct interest in, and understanding of, the local situation.

3. Multi-Racial Nature of the Population. The population of Malaya is heterogeneous. The Malays, who regard themselves as the "true" inhabitants of the peninsula and therefore entitled to special privileges, number in the Federation only a small plurality over the second largest group, the Chinese. (If one combines the populations of Singapore and the Federation, the Chinese are the more numerous.) Other significant groups are the Indians, Eurasians, and Europeans. The problem of building a Malayan nation is vastly complicated by the fact that the separate groups have not intermarried to any great extent and continue to adhere to their separate languages, religions, and customs. The diversity of interests presents opportunities for communist exploitation.

The rapid movement toward self-government and independence in Singapore/Malaya raises the important problem of preventing the Peiping-oriented Chinese from gaining ascendancy through constitutional or other means.



U. S. representatives must be ever-mindful of the rivalries among the racial groups, avoid identification with any particular group, and to the extent possible use their influence with leaders of all groups to promote cooperation among them.

4. Independence for the Federation. It is planned that the Federation, with the blessing of the British, will become a sovereign nation within the Commonwealth by the end of August 1957. The problem will then become the maintenance against communist subversion of a free, pro-western nation composed roughly of half Malays and half Chinese.

a. Malaya already exhibits many of the symptoms of hyper-sensitivity to western pressures which newly independent Asian nations have so consistently demonstrated. The U. S. should be ever mindful of this sensitivity.

b. In particular, in determining the size of our official staff in Malaya and the degree of our direct involvement in Malayan affairs, we must take into account the danger of appearing to Asian eyes as intent upon supplanting British influence with our own.

c. Similarly, not only during the period of transition to independence but also afterward, we must avoid unnecessary action which would tend to confirm British suspicions that we are eager to assume their role of Malaya's protector and "big brother".

d. The presence of a large Chinese population predisposed to view Communist China with favor, the inroads already made in the Chinese community by communist elements, and the secondary nature of the U. S. role in Malaya require exercise of the greatest discretion and ingenuity on the part of American representatives in Malaya in their efforts to obtain information and to exert their influence.

5. Status of Singapore. Singapore is expected to achieve full internal self-government sometime early in 1957, and plans to hold elections for a new legislative assembly in August. Britain is expected to retain military bases in Singapore and to remain responsible for Singapore's external defense and foreign affairs.

6. Relation of Singapore to the Federation. For a variety of reasons, Singapore and the Federation have moved separately toward full self-government and independence. Some form of merger of the two territories appears logical and desirable, but not certain to take place in the foreseeable future.

C. Major U. S. Commitments

The provisions of the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, apply to the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore since the U.K., one of the signers of the Treaty, is sovereign over those areas. The early independence of the Federation of Malaya will alter this circumstance. The present Chief Minister states privately he favors Malaya's joining SEATO, but internal political factors may preclude this step. However, some form of indirect connection is a possibility, e.g., through the special bilateral defense treaty with the U.K. which is under final negotiation.

II. ACTIONS AGREED UPONNSC Citations

Para. 59. "Accept the present primary role of the British in Malaya insofar as they are willing and able to maintain it, and collaborate with the British so far as practicable."

Para. 60. "Encourage the British and local authorities to take vigorous actions to curb communist subversion, and be prepared to assist in such action as requested by British or local authorities."

OCB Courses of Action

1. U. S. representatives in Singapore and Malaya should continue tactfully their efforts to convince the British of the wisdom of encouraging local government leaders to take courses of action which appear to the U. S. to be necessary.

Assigned to: State
Support : CIA
Target Date: Continuing

2. The U. S. should prepare itself to fill, if circumstances warrant, voids left unfilled by non-communist forces in the event of a rapid deterioration of British and Commonwealth influence.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: When situation requires

3. The U. S. should collaborate with British information officials in the conduct of the U. S. information program insofar as such collaboration serves U. S. interests.

Assigned to: USIA
Support : State
Target Date: Continuing

4. The U. S. should continue to impress on the British the general threat which communist subversion poses to their own and Free World interests in Singapore/Malaya.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

5. U. S. representatives should continue their efforts to persuade the government leaders of Malaya/Singapore that their present control and the future independence of these areas will depend upon mutual and constant vigilance and firm action to break up the well-organized and well-financed international communist organization in both territories. U. S. representatives



Para. 60. (Cont'd)

should continue their efforts to persuade government leaders that they must take action to protect all citizens from the effective intimidation methods used by the communists.

Assigned to: State
Support : All agencies
Target Date: Continuing

6. The U. S. should encourage the two governments to discredit, arrest (possibly through income tax evasion), or deport those rich pro-Peiping Chinese merchants who allow themselves to be useful adjuncts of the communist organization.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

7. Local government officials should be urged to adopt effective measures to prevent circulation of communist propaganda through books, films, and newspapers.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

8. Schools, unions, and youth groups should be provided, through indigenous channels so far as possible with books, publications, films, and other similar materials calculated to present the anti-communist world in a favorable light to offset the effect of communist propaganda, and should receive the help of visiting U. S. leaders and specialists.

Assigned to: USIA
Support : State
Target Date: Continuing

9. The U. S. should, when opportunities arise, discourage the training of Malaysians, particularly in such fields as diplomacy and defense, in neutralist countries and should encourage their training in the U. S. and other countries firmly committed to anti-communist foreign policy.



Para. 60. (Cont'd)

Assigned to: State
Support : USIA, Defense
Target Date: Continuing

10. U. S. representatives should encourage Singapore Government leaders to use sufficient pressure, through covert or other means, on the large-circulation Chinese-language newspapers to slant their news to the West instead of Peiping and to print accounts of the hard life in Communist China.

Assigned to: USIA
Support : CIA
Target Date: Continuing

11. The U. S. should continue the stepped-up publication of "Bebas" (Malay-language publication for Malays) and work out an effective Chinese newsletter publication to reach non-English-speaking Chinese.

Assigned to: USIA
Target Date: Continuing

12. The U. S. should encourage the local governments to improve their own information services in order to present the truth to the people, counteract communist distortion, obtain public understanding of government actions and publicize favorable developments in economic, social and political fields. Upon request, and with British clearance and consent where necessary, provide U. S. advice and training in improving local information services, which should be operated by, with and for the local population.

Assigned to: USIA
Support : State
Target Date: Continuing

13. While recognizing that the problems of elementary and secondary education are the responsibility of the elected governments and of the U. K., the U. S. should cooperatively assist in covert and overt measures designed to reduce subversion in the Chinese schools.

Assigned to: State ~~TOP SECRET~~
Support : USIA, CIA
Target Date: Continuing



14. The U. S. should encourage and where appropriate help to provide the means whereby indigenous agencies can organize and revitalize youth groups as a counter-attraction to the appeal of communist-oriented activities.

Assigned to: State
Support : USIA
Target Date: Continuing

Para. 61. "Employ all feasible means to prevent Singapore and the Federation of Malaya from falling under Communist control. In the case of armed attack, place initial reliance on Commonwealth, ANZUS, or SEATO resources as appropriate, but be prepared to take such additional U. S. action as may be required."

15. Covert actions will be undertaken as appropriate in support of U. S. Government objectives.

Assigned to: CIA
Target Date: Continuing

16. The U. S. should use every effective method possible to prevent Malayan recognition of Communist China.

Assigned to: State
Support : All agencies
Target Date: Continuing

17. Efforts should be made to strengthen the diplomatic, political, cultural and economic ties of Malaya and Singapore with the Philippines, Japan, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, the Government of Republic of China, and Pakistan.

Assigned to: State
Support : USIA
Target Date: Continuing

18. U. S. representatives should attempt to convince the local Chinese that help from Communist China would be inviting a fate such as that experienced by Hungary, North Korea and North Vietnam; that Russia and China impose special harsh treatment upon their colonies, and upon home grown communist leaders after the take-over; and that being drawn into a communist system will lower present living standards and enslave the people.

Assigned to: USIA
Target Date: Continuing



Para. 61. (Cont'd)

19. The U. S. should encourage eventual political recognition between Malaya and the Government of Republic of China, but postpone pressing this issue until a more opportune time because now it would cause bitter dissension and weaken the new government. Meanwhile, quietly encourage closer contacts, particularly trade.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

20. The U. S. should encourage the development of effective local police and military establishments adequate for internal security.

Assigned to: State
Support : Defense, ICA
Target Date: Continuing

21. Prepare planning studies with other SEATO nations, if feasible, for the defense of Malaya and Singapore against overt communist aggression.

Assigned to: Defense, State
Target Date: July 1957

22. Prepare unilateral planning studies with respect to countersubversive and military action which might be taken by the U. S. to thwart any communist attempt to seize control from within.

Assigned to: Defense, State
Support : CIA
Target Date: July 1957

Para. 62. "Encourage the development of a strong, stable, independent Malayan nation within the Commonwealth."

23. U. S. representatives should impress upon Singapore/Malayan leaders that independence and political stability depend first upon successful control of communist subversion; second, upon immediate and sustained efforts further to develop responsible, well-organized political parties; and third upon placing in effect as many social and economic reforms as are practicable to move the standard of living gradually and perceptibly upward.



Para. 62. (Cont'd)

Assigned to: State
Support : USIA
Target Date: Continuing

24. U. S. representatives should seek to convince the Chinese, Malays and Indians that their present and future prosperity has been and will continue to be heavily dependent upon trade and ties with the free nations; that present and future trade prospects with Communist China are negligible in comparison.

Assigned to: State, USIA
Support : All agencies
Target Date: Continuing

25. The U. S. should encourage the efforts of the Malayan Governments to foster and to nurture primary loyalty to Malaya. Conversely, actions by the governments of Singapore and the Federation which increase apprehension of Malayan Chinese as to their stake in the country should be discouraged.

Assigned to: State
Support : USIA
Target Date: Continuing

26. U. S. representatives should encourage government leaders to convince as many Chinese as possible that (a) they have a stake in a non-Communist Malaya, (b) inviting Communist China's support would endanger their stake, (c) it does not pay to be a communist or a communist sympathizer, (d) after independence they would be well-advised to accommodate themselves to conditions by working peacefully to minimize discriminations rather than turning to revolt, (e) they can improve their position through constitutional processes, and (f) the "Chinese Communism is different" line is false.

Assigned to: State
Support : USIA
Target Date: Continuing

27. U. S. representatives should attempt to convince Malay leaders that it is in their own interests to permit the Chinese



Para. 62. (Cont'd)

greater participation in the new Malayan Government, and to allow conditions under which the Chinese can prosper with minimum interference and discrimination.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

28. U. S. representatives should seek opportunities to convince government leaders and business management that it is in their own interest to encourage and develop free trade unions as an important block to communist objectives of subverting the labor movement.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

29. Working to the extent feasible through American trade unions and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the U. S. should facilitate (and should encourage the U. K. to facilitate) the provision of funds and skilled labor organizers to strengthen the non-communist labor organizations in Singapore and the Federation, and simultaneously encourage employers by all appropriate means to recognize and support non-communist labor organizations affiliated with the Singapore Trade Union Congress and the Malayan Trade Union Congress.

Assigned to: State, USIA
Target Date: Continuing

30. The U. S. should discreetly encourage the Malayan Chinese Association, within the Alliance Party, to step up its efforts to attract the support of more of the Chinese community through use of skilled party organizers, publicists and advisers, and encourage the Alliance Government to assist the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress and give them credit for legislation and other official action which tends to encourage all Malaysians to regard Malaya as their home.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing



Para. 62. (Cont'd)

31. The U. S. should continue to encourage the political parties within the Alliance to use moderation in their dealings with each other and to impress upon their leaders that the best hope of a favorable future for an independent Malaya lies in maintaining good working relations within the Alliance.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

32. The U. S. should encourage, and if requested, assist in the creation of a School of Public Administration within the University of Malaya.

Assigned to: State
Support : ICA
Target Date: Continuing

33. U. S. representatives should try persistently, but tactfully, to persuade elected Malayan officials that the future best interests of Malaya would be better served if those Malaysians possessing accredited U. S. professional degrees were allowed to practice their calling.

Assigned to: State
Support : USIA
Target Date: Continuing

34. The U. S. should continue its present practice of avoiding actions, such as those relating to the U. S. stockpile, which would tend to affect adversely the price and marketing of rubber and tin.

Assigned to: All agencies
Target Date: Continuing

35. Within limitations fixed by the necessity to avoid giving the impression the U. S. intends to dominate Malayan commercial markets in the future or is trying to supplant the British, the U. S. should promote trade and investment between the U. S. and Malaya by continuing present



Para. 62. (Cont'd)

activities, by dispatching a trade mission to Malaya and Singapore, and in strengthening the U. S. commercial staff in Singapore/Malaya.

Assigned to: Commerce
Support : State
Target Date: Continuing

36. The U. S. should plan for the prompt establishment of diplomatic relations with an independent Federation of Malaya.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Immediate

37. American influence in Singapore/Malaya should be increased by developing education facilities, teacher grants, book programs and an effective positive documentary motion picture program. The exchange of persons program, emphasizing labor, press and education grants, should selectively include American negroes and Asian-Americans.

Assigned to: USIA, State
Target Date: Continuing

38. Seek to moderate excessive nationalism and combat narrow communalism among the Malays by distributing books in translation, circulating more widely news publications in Jawi, sending to the U. S. Malay leaders drawn from the smaller remote as well as the larger populous communities, stimulating inter-communal youth activities, and extending to secondary schools, largely attended by Malays, publications, films and sports programs.

Assigned to: USIA
Support : State
Target Date: Continuing

Para. 63. "Seek to assure free world strategic interests in Singapore, favoring, only if consistent with this end, elective institutions in

39. U. S. representatives should continue their efforts to obtain intelligence on the plans and activities of influential elements in the country.



Para. 63. (Cont'd)
Singapore and Singapore's
incorporation with an
independent Malaya within
the Commonwealth."

Assigned to: State
Support : Defense, CIA
Target Date: Continuing

40. The U. S. should encourage the British Government to take a sympathetic attitude toward Singapore's aspirations for internal self-government, so long as such aspirations are pressed by a responsible non-communist elected government able and willing to control subversion.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

41. The U. S. should avoid becoming identified in the public eye with possible British obstructionism in the eyes of the Malaysians and Chinese with regard to nationalist aspirations for self-government.

Assigned to: State, USIA
Target Date: Continuing

42. The U. S. should continue to impress upon the British at all levels that public declarations containing the implication that Singapore can never be truly independent, militate against a merger of Singapore and the Federation.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

43. The U. S. should encourage the Alliance Party, which forms the government in the Federation, to build up its strength in Singapore.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

44. U. S. officials in the Federation should continue in the most subtle manner to bring to the attention of the Federation's leaders the necessity of avoiding statements and actions which appear to dampen hopes for continued cooperation and ultimate merger between Singapore and the Federation. Likewise, the U. S. should try to influence



Para. 63. (Cont'd)

the Singapore Government not to take steps which might further harden the opposition of the Malay leaders even further to such a merger.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

45. The U. S. should not urge an early merger between Singapore and the Federation until it becomes clear that the newly independent Malaya can accommodate the local Chinese and control communist efforts to destroy the new nation.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Continuing

46. U. S. representatives should continue to remind the U. K. and the local Asian government leaders that every further step toward accommodation with Communist China involves the risk of adding to the appeal of Communist China to the local Chinese.

Assigned to: State
Support : USIA
Target Date: Continuing

Para. 64. "After Malaya attains full self-government and independence, be prepared, as appropriate and consistent with recognition of Commonwealth responsibility, to assist Malaya to maintain stability and independence, and encourage it to join SEATO."

47. U. S. representatives should continue to seek opportunities to encourage the Federation of Malaya to apply for admission to SEATO upon the assumption of Malayan independence. Since, however, present Malayan attitudes are such that Western pressure on Malaya in this regard is likely to engender only opposition to SEATO, our efforts at encouragement must be discreet and deft.

Assigned to: Defense, State
Target Date: Immediate

48. After independence, the U. S. should encourage the Federation to apply for UN membership and should actively support its application and encourage immediate participation after independence in other appropriate international organizations.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: Immediate



Para. 6A. (Cont'd)

49. Should the Federation Government approach the U. S. for economic or technical assistance, the U. S. should consider such a request sympathetically, taking into account the Federation's plans for utilizing its own resources, resources available from public lending institutions and private investors, and the availability of assistance from the U. K. and other nations. If practicable, any large scale U. S. economic assistance should be extended in the form of a loan for U. S.-approved projects.

Assigned to: State, ICA
Target Date: Continuing

50. The U. S. should consider limited participation in Singapore and Federation trade fairs and exhibitions, particularly taking into account the effectiveness of such measures to counter penetration of these markets by Communist China.

Assigned to: Commerce, State, USIA
Target Date: Continuing

51. The U. S. should undertake to negotiate a modern Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, an investment guarantee agreement, and a treaty for the avoidance of double taxation.

Assigned to: State, Treasury, Commerce
Target Date: After assumption of sovereignty by the Federation

III. ACTIONS NOT AGREED UPON

None.

IV. ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE WORKING GROUP

None.

FOOTNOTE: Wherever appropriate, the above courses of action will be applied to the situation existing in British North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak, particularly those courses which deal with combating communist subversion, although not covered officially by NSC 5612/1.