A PROGRAM TO EXPLOIT THE A-BANK PROPOSALS IN THE
PRESIDENT'S UN SPEECH OF DECEMBER 8, 1953, IN
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION FIELDS

THE PROBLEM

To develop a program which will provide guidance for effective co-
ordination of the domestic and overseas informational follow-up to the
President's UN speech of December 8, 1953, so as to insure that public
statements and resultant actions are in support of current U.S. national
security policies.

I. Objective

The objective of this U.S. program is to develop as part of a long-
range domestic and international informational and educational effort, a
widespread understanding of the implications of the President's UN speech,
particularly in terms of the proposal to make nuclear energy available for
peaceful purposes on an international scale. In this connection, it will
be necessary to point out that the President's speech was not intended
to suggest solutions to problems in the disarmament field but sought to
"open up a new channel for peaceful discussion" and to "initiate at least
a new approach" to the difficult questions of disarmament.

II. Means

Means by which the United States can most appropriately achieve the
above objective are:
A. By stimulating the widest possible discussion and awareness of the implications of the President's proposals through the utilization of all available instrumentalities accompanied by substantive steps in the direction of pooling/atomic materials for peaceful use as made possible by amendment of the Atomic Energy Act.

B. By emphasizing the fact that the President's proposals while also an effort to break the impasse in the disarmament field—an impasse which was created by Soviet intransigence—are primarily designed to prepare the ground for a substantial improvement of living standards within all cooperating countries.

[Caution: This is a long-range program which cannot become effective immediately and which at the present time requires a great deal of patient and exploratory work in the technical and diplomatic fields.]

III. Effect of Initial U.S. Actions

The impact of the President's speech, enhanced by the massive worldwide media exploitation and follow-up actions, by focusing attention on the prospects for peaceful development of atomic energy, initially placed the U.S.S.R. in a defensive position. The speech captured the hopes of the common man and the interest of the scientific and intellectual classes. One of the most striking aspects of the United States success stems from
the fact that the Soviets were placed on the defensive, not by a direct
U.S. propaganda attack or counter-argument, but by a bold U.S. move
towards a goal cherished by U.S. allies as well as neutrals, and to
which the major Soviet contribution to date has been nothing more sub-
stantial than a papier-mâché peace dove. This stroke placed the Kremlin
in the position of reacting favorably or standing condemned by their own
previous propaganda pleas before the bar of world opinion.

As a result of these and other U.S. actions, the U.S.S.R. suffered
serious propaganda reverses, since the world realized that in both cases
their first impulse was to say "No", which by itself revealed that the
Soviet policy was not truly directed toward peace.

However, U.S. successes to date have only been partial and unless
the program is followed up vigorously, U.S. gains will be short-lived.
The initial effect of the President's speech while gratifying has shown
that the significance of the proposals is not fully understood. Specifi-
cally there is a great deal of confusion concerning the social improvement
which can be expected from the peaceful application of nuclear energy
and of the actions which the various countries must take in order to benefit
from this program.

Based upon past activities, the Soviets can be expected to continue
their attacks against any U.S. proposals and counter with such lines of
action as a revived U.S.S.R. Disarmament Plan, possibly calling for an
atomic weapons ban and/or possible limited concessions to past U.S. views; other actions designed to exploit mankind's greater fear of destructive power of the atom than its lesser preoccupation with the constructive potential of atomic energy; and discrediting the U.S. proposal and subsequent steps as not possessing any serious merit but as cover for "espionage, infiltration", etc.

The U.S.S.R. could succeed in its attacks upon the President's program unless the United States is prepared to produce specific "deeds" in the atomic field. The world is looking for the laying of bricks and the pouring of mortar, for things to be happening, rather than for mere words alone.

IV. Further Action Required

A. Reiterate that the United States has been making proposals for atomic and all other kinds of disarmament ever since 1946.

B. Make clear that since, under present conditions, disarmament is extremely difficult to achieve, and since disarmament may not be realizable, the President's proposal was designed to achieve early benefits from the nuclear technology pending an ultimate resolution of the armaments question. This is the heart of the proposal and, if again the Soviets want to reverse the order, they should be exposed as postponing the benefits of the President's plan.

C. Point out that the international tensions, about which the Soviets are complaining so loudly, can be reduced very
speedily if the Soviets would agree to President Eisenhower's proposals of April 16.

D. The United States should avoid giving the impression that it considers the Soviet notes as constructive contributions and should be ready at the appropriate time to make plain that it will not hold up the implementation of President Eisenhower's atomic peace program, pending any fruitless negotiations with the Kremlin. Instead, the United States should be ready at the appropriate time to issue a new invitation to the free world to implement the President's plan without delay. A supplemental list of recommended implementing actions is attached as TAB "A". The domestic implementation programs are attached as TAB "B". These recommended programs envisage:

(1) Concentration of effort on legally allowable non-military applications of atomic energy of particular interest to under-developed areas;

(2) Projection of the U.S. as determined to strike major blows at the root causes of war and international tensions;

(3) Maintenance of forward momentum by concrete, visible, substantive actions possible under existing or later amended
statutes which reaffirm U.S. purposes and intentions.

Attachments:

1. TAB "A" - Recommended Implementing Actions, dtd 2/4/54.

2. TAB "B" - Check List of Suggested Agency Actions, dtd 2/4/54.
RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS

1. Explore the feasibility of establishing an international scientific school in the United States and invite instructors and students from all of the free world. The AEC's International Isotope School should be considered as a possible base of departure for the effort.

2. Greatly intensify public reporting of unclassified current accomplishments in the United States atomic energy program leading to beneficial applications of atomic energy; include reiteration of past accomplishments which have not been thoroughly reported; stage special events for media coverage of the unclassified aspects of power machines such as the EBR and the HRE, and industrial research devices such as the MTR; recount past and current progress in agriculture, medicine and industrial applications of atomic energy; make the utmost of the public hearings on proposed legislation for power development at home and in aid of allied nations; push the international distribution of power reactor technology as fast as it is declassified.

3. Develop for United States industrial, labor, religious, women's and general civic leadership orientation tours of the unclassified phases of plants working on power development and beneficial uses of radioisotopes.

4. Push to the limit in other countries distribution of word on the availability of isotopes from the United States; consider making their purchase more attractive by relaxing the reporting requirements laid on
purchasers in the present program, and by a vigorous program of news on the results of use of radioisotopes in other nations. Publicize the availability of training in safe handling and of safe-handling equipment.

5. Take appropriate action in the labor and management field to stimulate discussions on non-military application of atomic energy, including increases in industrial efficiency by the radiography of welds and castings.

6. **International Organization of Nuclear Science**

   a. Consider the feasibility of a National Science Foundation survey of the adequacy of the exchange of unclassified scientific information in the field of nuclear science which is taking place at present.

   b. The following special problems may also be suitable subjects for consideration: scope and organization of exchange programs for teachers and students; the possibility of giving additional scientific or financial support to existing laboratories overseas; the need to create new laboratories and research institutes; the need to endow new chairs; revision, modernization and improved distribution of text books and technical magazines (including the use of large numbers of "review copies" and free "trial" subscriptions), a review of the policies
of American scientific foundations in the above fields, including a survey of financial requirements; and a preliminary analysis of a large international program of scientific popularization.

c. Explore ways and means of establishing an annual award for outstanding contributions to non-military applications of atomic energy.

NOTE: In all the above projects it should be stressed that the nuclear program is a long-range affair. No miracles can be expected immediately and the results will improve in proportion to international cooperation.
CHECK LIST OF SUGGESTED AGENCY ACTIONS

1. A copy of the speech should be placed in the hands of all key Federal employees, as far as practicable, at the expense of each agency. A pertinent covering letter or memo from the agency head should accompany the speech.

2. Encourage maximum dissemination of the speech through all special media and groups with which the agency has regular contact.

3. A reprint of the speech or its highlights should be sent to members of the agency's external official committees by the agency head—with a covering letter pointing out the significance of the speech and its applications to the work of the agency and its programs. Such letters, together with any proposed digests or highlights of the speech, should be cleared in advance with the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) Working Group.

4. The significant policy aspects and highlights of the speech should be worked into domestic government radio and TV programs, and in appearances by Government officials on local and network programs.

5. A reprint of the speech and its highlights with appropriate agency comments should appear in agency publications over a period of several months.

6. Officials and employees of each agency should be encouraged to discuss this speech and its agency significance before groups and audiences in regularly scheduled appearances such as conventions, etc., within the next several months.

7. Agency officials should be encouraged to discuss this speech, particularly as it relates to agency programs, before local groups in the communities in which they reside or with professional groups to which they belong.

8. Equivalent dissemination should be made of any pertinent statements relating to the speech made by the President or key Government leaders.

9. Agencies should seek opportunities to use, in addition to the printed matter on the speech, films and newsreel clips, kinescopes and radio recordings, etc., in their own agency programs or in allied activities
10. **Liaison with national organizations**—civic, religious, professional, labor, women's, veterans, farmers, etc.

   Agencies having major daily working programs with nationally organized groups should make special effort to call the attention of the speech to these groups. These organizations should be encouraged to make extensive use of the President's speech in all their national and local organization activities, including:

   a. printing of the speech or its highlights in all suitable organization publications;

   b. incorporation in regular program activities, such as discussion groups, forums, study groups.

   The plans of approach to national organizations by the agencies involved should be coordinated in advance so as to avoid duplication of effort and insure uniformity of impact.

11. Emphasis should be put on getting the President's message to all American educational institutions and organizations on all levels.

12. Emphasis should be put on bringing the President's message and its implications to the attention of the American Labor movement—through the Department of Labor.

13. Emphasis should be put on reaching the American rural leaders and farm audiences through the facilities of the Department of Agriculture.

14. Special efforts should be made to get the President's message into the hands of American industrial leaders, business firms and their employees. This might be a joint effort of ODM and the Department of Commerce.

**NOTE:** Before any hard-hitting promotional campaign can become fully effective there must be some substance put into the A-bank proposal, so that writers and talkers can have something concrete to write and talk about.