CHRONOLOGY - "Atoms for Peace" Project


2. Many drafts of Candor through September -- none satisfactory because they either told too much or too little and were uniformly dull. During this time mounting columnist hue and cry, led by Alsops, referring to Candor (9/9) and disclosing much draft material.

3. Moratorium pending new idea.

4. Mid-September 1953, new draft, largely inspired by Radford -- including tremendous recital U.S. atomic might -- "one atomic bomb equal to all bombs dropped by all allies on Germany during the war" kind of stuff.

   (Last days of Sept., much discussion on whether to continue -- Jackson polled high officials with letter 9/25, and key inner group breakfasted with President at the White House 10/3, for which Jackson had written briefing.)

5. New draft, including Russian potential for injuring the U.S. This was closer to what was wanted, but it had the basic defect that all it really contained was mortal Soviet attack followed by mortal U.S. counterattack -- in other words, bang-bang, no hope, no way out at the end.

6. Summer 1953, vacationing in Denver, President had vague and general germ of the atomic "pool" idea -- on which he sent a message to Strauss from Denver via Bobby Cutler.

7. Strauss-Jackson discussed ideas on ways in which this might be done, and Jackson put in rough speech draft in very general terms.

8. Strauss and Jackson came to New York August 19th to have breakfast with the President when he returned from Denver for the Baruch Anniversary. He read the draft, and discussed amplification of the idea, with Strauss supplying details on how it might be done.

9. Highest level, top secret discussions. First draft of "Atoms for Peace" speech as such dated November 1. Meanwhile, Strauss was working on details, and as result of his talks with Pres. and other preparations, prepared memo dated November 6th, which included all basics including safe method. (Note: method still classified)

10. Gradual crescendo involving more and more people, including White House meetings, while this speech shaping up -- by which
time it had become a Strauss-Jackson act, Strauss supplying more and more atomic pool ideas and Jackson putting into words.

11. Approval all around immediately prior to Bermuda, and decision by the President that Strauss and Jackson should go to Bermuda.

12. Several long discussions between Strauss and Cherwell on validity and feasibility of plan, leading to Cherwell’s advising Churchill to raise no British objections.

13. Work on plane on final draft, between the President, Strauss, Foster Dulles, and Jackson.

Delivery of speech at UN — December 8, 1953