INTERVIEW WITH

Jack Z. Anderson

by

Dr. John E. Wickman
Director

on

November [?], 1970

for

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
Gift of Personal Statement

JACK Z. ANDERSON

to the

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

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Signed

Date: March 5, 1976

Accepted

Archivist of the United States

Date: March 15, 1976
This interview with The Honorable Jack Z. Anderson, is a preliminary one on his association with President Eisenhower and the Eisenhower administration. This interview was done on November $\sqrt{?}$, 1970.

DR. WICKMAN: I'd like to start before you were in the White House.

MR. ANDERSON: Alright.

DR. WICKMAN: Let's talk a little bit about how you got into the Department of Agriculture.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, I'll be happy to go at it any way you want. As you know I was elected to Congress in 1938 and spent 14 years in the House of Representatives and retired then, I'm happy to say, undefeated. I came home to go back to ranching and stay on the ranch. Then in 1955 when President Eisenhower had his heart attack I was asked by Secretary Benson to come to Denver where he was visiting the President, and to please keep an open mind on what he was going to ask me. Well, I had my suspicions because the administration had tried to get me back two or three other times.
WICKMAN: In what capacity?

ANDERSON: As an assistant secretary or as special assistant of some kind in one of the departments. So this time I did go to Denver and interviewed Benson. He asked me to come back as his Special Assistant, because he had practically lost touch with Congress and he thought that a former Congressman might be of some help to him.

WICKMAN: I see.

ANDERSON: So I agreed to take the job for a year and I guess I did restore his relations with Congress to some extent at least. I arranged a series of breakfasts and we had every Republican Congressman and Senator twenty or twenty-five at a time to these breakfasts and they found out that Benson wasn't the ogre that they had been thinking he was. Although the members of the Agricultural Committees never favored Benson at all, they sort of agreed to tolerate him after they got better acquainted with him. So I spent the entire year
there trying to teach the department something about politics and the Congress and trying to get Benson's program through; that was my primary function.

WICKMAN: Uh-huh, so actually this is, this is a kind of Congressional liaison--

ANDERSON: Exactly.

WICKMAN: Yeah, this is something we frequently run into, I get a better job description from the people who were there than we ever get off an organizational chart. So, that's interesting. Before Mr. Benson had any Secretary of Agriculture in recent times tried to use this same device for Congressional liaison or--

ANDERSON: Now I really don't know, there were several Secretaries of Agriculture while I was in the Congress, Wallace, Wickard and Clint Anderson. I can't remember the name of any others that were Secretaries while I was there.
WICKMAN: I thought maybe, you know, because you were in Congress that your contact with their offices--

ANDERSON: I don't think that anybody, any of the secretaries ever set up a function exactly like the one that I used. I had my own method of contacts on the Hill and I insisted that they be personal contacts. When I was in the White House I noticed that Bryce Harlow did most of his contacting by telephone.

WICKMAN: Yes.

ANDERSON: I told him that I didn't like that method, that I waste more time trying to get somebody on the telephone or waiting for somebody to get off the telephone so that I could talk to them, that I much preferred the personal contact. I used it while I was with Secretary Benson, and it worked out so well I decided that I'd use the same method when I went to the White House, which is exactly what I did. I encountered some resistance at the beginning, they thought that I was spending too much time on the Hill. But after the
first year there they agreed that my method was the best and there was no question of not having me pursue it for the other three years that I was there.

WICKMAN: Did you, one question of local interest because of where the library is located and what not, did you have a great deal of contact with Frank Carlson?

ANDERSON: Oh, yes, I served in the House with Frank.

WICKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: And then when he went to the Senate I saw him frequently. But most of my work was on the House side.

WICKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: We tried it one year on a horizontal basis where each of the staff members in the White House would take certain committees and work those committees both on the House side and the Senate side. But after the first year, Bryce and I talked it over with General Persons and Governor
Adams and we decided that it would be better if I just concentrated my efforts on the House side because that was my old stamping ground and my old love and that worked very well. For the next three years I spent my entire time working the House side of the Capitol; that is working the House side of the Capitol for the White House, that was my primary purpose.

WICKMAN: While you were, while you were with Mr. Benson what just, I realize that this is the kind of thing that might come out better on the second tape or the third tape or whatever, but what do you remember as being probably the greatest problem of his tenure as Secretary of the Agriculture Department?

ANDERSON: Well, the greatest problem that I had was trying to teach the secretary, the under-secretary and the assistant secretaries something about the legislative process, how it worked. Most of the chaps in the Department having had no experience politically, although they were fine men and
excellent administrators, they couldn't understand why if the Department sent a bill to Congress, recommended its passage, that they couldn't get it through just the way they sent it up there. Well, the Congress doesn't work that way; that isn't the legislative process. The Department proposes but Congress disposes and there was never a bill that went into the hopper introduced at the request of the administration, that wasn't changed in some way going through the House and Senate before it got to the President's desk for signature. These fellows just couldn't understand that; it was difficult for them.

WICKMAN: Did you, was it an informal education between you and them or did you ever try to, you know, have meetings or sessions with them?

ANDERSON: Oh, yes. The Secretary of Agriculture usually had a staff meeting about once a week and I don't think that the time ever went by that I didn't use that opportunity to drive my point home a little bit more. And I think finally when I
left the Department of Agriculture all of them had a little better understanding of the legislative processes and how they operated. Because, as you can well understand, if everything that every department sent to the Congress was passed just as it was sent you wouldn't need a Congress. You could just go through the Department and have it signed by the President and the Congress would be nothing but a figurehead. And Congress likes to exert its influence and its authority. After all it's a co-equal branch of government and it's very jealous of its prerogatives.

WICKMAN: I think and this is probably the most difficult part to get across to the people in the Executive Branch that it is a separate branch and that they have to put forth the effort.

ANDERSON: That's exactly right.

WICKMAN: Well, when, let's go on a little bit for this introductory purpose but then when did you, when you left the Secre-
tary of Agriculture, did you go right to the White House or did you come back here?

ANDERSON: No, I was with the Secretary exactly a year from December 15, 1955 to December 15, 1956, it was on December 15, 1956, that I was sworn in at the White House.

WICKMAN: Now was this at the initiation of General Persons and Governor Adams— they wanted you to come over?

ANDERSON: I think Bryce Harlow was always in the background because Bryce and I had been very closely associated on the Hill. He was a member of the staff of the Armed Services Committee and I was a member of the Armed Services Committee and so I knew Bryce well and knew how he operated and I'm sure that he in turn had urged Governor Adams and General Persons to see that I ended up in the White House.

WICKMAN: Was there any resistance on the part of Mr. Benson to lose you from the Agricultural Department?
ANDERSON: Some, but he knew that I was not going to stay with him any longer so he much preferred to have what he thought was a friend in court in the White House than to have me come home.

WICKMAN: Why weren't you going to stay with him?

ANDERSON: I'd agreed to stay only a year--

WICKMAN: Oh, I see that was your basic--

ANDERSON: Yes, I said that I would come back there for a year.

WICKMAN: Yeah.

ANDERSON: And I stayed exactly a year to the day.

WICKMAN: Uh-huh, but then you stayed on in the White House?

ANDERSON: Yes, well that's a little different. When the President calls I don't see what you could do about it except come.
WICKMAN: You were persuaded by superiors.

ANDERSON: That's exactly right.

WICKMAN: That's interesting because I think this is something; I can't tell you right now how many people have said this but there have been some people who felt the same way, that they thought that some of them had not made a commitment to these things but they said you know 'I reached a point where I wanted to go home and then the President came in or Bryce came in or somebody came in and said we really want you to stay and do this thing here' and so they wound up doing it.

ANDERSON: Well, of course it's a very high honor to serve as a member of the President's personal staff, it's an experience that happens to very few Americans and it's an opportunity of course that I didn't want to pass up.

WICKMAN: Yeah.

ANDERSON: I was naturally thrilled by the idea and I thoroughly enjoyed my four years in the White House.
WICKMAN: Let's get into this working relationship in the White House a little bit, ah, you were sworn in and there you were, now what happened, somebody gave you a desk somewhere.

ANDERSON: Yes, I had a desk in the west wing upstairs, not a very pretentious office, but I didn't need one because I figured most of my work was going to be on the Hill.

WICKMAN: I gather your concept of what you were going to do apparently after consultation with Governor Adams and what not was still legislative liaison basically.

ANDERSON: Yes.

WICKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Yes, I figured that was going to be my primary purpose. After all the White House staff had watched my work at the Department of Agriculture and apparently were favorably impressed with what I had been able to accomplish and thought if I could be of the same assistance to the President that they would like to have me there.
WICKMAN: Could we, this is just a question, I've no idea on this at all but can we equate what you were doing in form at least with what Bryce is doing today? The same kind of thing, he's acting legislative liaison for the President.

ANDERSON: Yes, but I think that Bryce today is working at a higher level. He doesn't have the opportunity for personal contact that I wanted and created so that I could make these personal contacts.

WICKMAN: You mean he's working at a higher level than the actual contact with the Congressmen?

ANDERSON: Yes. What I mean is that he just doesn't have time for personal contacts.

WICKMAN: I see.

ANDERSON: Well, I think he's more of a policy maker in that respect.

WICKMAN: Yes.

ANDERSON: I assume that he contacts a lot of Congressmen but he simply is spread too thin to do the job as effectively as I think we did in the Eisenhower administration.
WICKMAN: And the while you think is the case because while you may have participated in policy your total concern was basically contact.

ANDERSON: Right.

WICKMAN: Yeah.

ANDERSON: That's right. But, I never asked a man to go against his principles. I frequently asked a Congressman, "Can you give us a vote on such and such a bill? If you haven't committed yourself and it's not opposed to your principles, we'd like to have your vote."

WICKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: But I never asked a man to violate his basic principles just to pick up a vote.

WICKMAN: Now let's go back to day to day again, because this is the sort of thing that frequently gets lost, ah, you had staff meetings with the President, weekly, what.
ANDERSON: Yes, every Tuesday was the, not staff meeting, the staff met more frequently than that but the members of the President's personal staff and the leaders of both the House and Senate, Republican leaders would come to the cabinet room and then we would have a conference. That's where I acquired the doodles.

WICKMAN: Yeah, now how about your other contacts with the President? Was this just as can be or was it on a regular basis?

ANDERSON: Oh, not on a regular basis, I usually accompanied any Congressman or Senator who came to the White House to see the President I--

WICKMAN: Yeah, but I mean did you see him without them?

ANDERSON: --accompanied them into the President's office. Oh, yes, a great deal. Yes, I think in one of my books you have a list of the contacts that I had with the President during this period. It would vary sometimes, for two or
three weeks I wouldn't see him at all except in the Congressional leadership meetings or the Cabinet meetings and then sometimes it would be two or three times a week that I would have to go in and see him about something. And he was always available. I didn't want to bother him with small things but when something big came along I thought I should have his decision on, I was never denied the right to see him.

WICKMAN: Let's see, that's, that's an interesting point, too, because there again we're building up and as we go through papers and talk to people now we're building up this feeling and concept that the President was quite available to, again, this distinction of the personal staff and the other staffs he had but that he was quite quickly available to people on his personal staff.

ANDERSON: Yes, this is true.

WICKMAN: Ah, all right let's see if we can take a specific concept here as far as legislative program goes. Presumably out of the cabinet meetings and out of the meetings which the
President would have with the Cabinet officers individually, particular series of policies that you could call a legislative program were developed and then did you come into it at that level?

ANDERSON: Yes, as the programs were being worked on I came in at that level and so that I would know exactly how the President felt about it and what he wanted done. I don't believe the President knew how I operated or how other members of the staff operated. He assumed, of course, that we were doing our job and we were left free to do it.

WICKMAN: What, in this context to the same question that I asked before with regard to the Agriculture Department, what was the toughest selling job you had to do with the President or with the Congress while you were in this capacity?

ANDERSON: Well, I think that the toughest selling job that had to be accomplished while I was there was Statehood for Alaska and Hawaii but that is quite a story and I think that it might very well be left for a future interview.
WICKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: Because that will show just about how this operation worked and how the results were accomplished. It's a long story and I'd like to tell it but I'd like to have enough time so that we can go into it thoroughly. That would be a perfect example of a tough job, tough sell.

WICKMAN: Very good, this would be fine we can tape that any time you want.

ANDERSON: Well, you see Alaska and Hawaii had been used as political footballs for so many years since 1916 in fact. This had been dangled in front of the people of Alaska and Hawaii from 1916 to 1959 when they finally became states and I'm firmly convinced in my own mind if Eisenhower hadn't been in there they might not yet be states. But he is one man who believed what the party platform said and every member of the staff had a copy of that platform on his desk and woe betide the man who was found without it. The President felt that when he accepted the Presidency, was nominated and elected,
that he accepted the party platform with it. I know there were many, many times when the President or Governor Adams or General Persons would say, "Well, now what does the platform say on this?" And we would refer to it and they would say, "Well, that's the answer." Many men have been elected President who thought the platform, the party platform was simply a piece of paper and they promptly turned their backs on it when they got into office.

WICKMAN: Uh-huh.

ANDERSON: I saw this happen many times.

WICKMAN: Were you, this will rely on your memory a little bit here again just because I've, it's been a long trip, but were you, you were on the staff when Governor Adams went off weren't you?

ANDERSON: Yes.

WICKMAN: Yes, uh-huh, I'd like to have, because we do have we have the opinions, we have the reactions, we have the feelings, we have whatever, of a number of other people on the same subject
and I was just wondering how it appeared to you because you
were in quite a sensitive position with the Congress. The
Congress (at least this is in my feeling now which can or cannot
go in the record it doesn't make any difference) but the Congress
had considerable amount to do or say or didn't do or say about
this particular happening.

ANDERSON: Oh, yes, this is very true.

WICKMAN: And I would just like to get your reaction to the--

ANDERSON: Well, to me this is something that should not have
happened to as fine a man as Governor Adams was, I admired him
greatly. Most of the staff were somewhat in awe of the Governor
but I had served with him in the House and felt that I knew him.
He wasn't a different man in the White House than he had been,
he was always rather taciturn and reserved but he had a heart
and this thing that happened to him was a terrible thing to
happen to a real fine American citizen. It was certainly care-
lessness on his part, it was lack of, what's the word I'm trying
to think of, lack of knowledge of how serious the things that he
had done were until they reached the light of day and everybody knew what occurred. But I was terribly sorry to see Governor Adams go because he was really an asset to President Eisenhower.

WICKMAN: One of the things you know, this might be confusing for future generations, confusing to some of us even now even though I lived through the period and quite aware of what was going on but when you consider the "scandal" side of this thing it's so small that people are going to ask I'm sure "well, how did it get blown to the proportions it did" and then you know the press took on after this in almost a psychotic way they seemed bound and determined to--

ANDERSON: Oh, well, any person in a sensitive spot such as Governor Adams occupied at the time is going to have these things blown up. Now one of the things that I was told when I came to the White House was that I was never to contact under any circumstances any of the independent agencies. This was one of Governor Adams rules and he violated his own rule, which was a mistake, and the "scandal" as you said was blown up far beyond anything that it deserved in my opinion.
WICKMAN: Do you think it just was simply allowed to cook too long? In other words before anybody in the White House tried to do anything about it, it just--

ANDERSON: I think this is quite true.

WICKMAN: That's interesting because you get all sides of this, some people have blamed the press, that it's all been the press' fault, some people have blamed the President. In the early days of the Johnson administration one of the, one of the analogy, which was not an analogy really, I don't think but again you may think differently but when the analogy was made was that one of the early scandals of the Johnson administration was resolved, finished because the President apparently moved almost immediately, this was the one with his press secretary, not press secretary, yes, secretary--[Walter Jenkins]

ANDERSON: I recall it but I can't think of his name.

WICKMAN: '64.

ANDERSON: I know what you mean.
WICKMAN: I can't think what his name was either which is probably merciful but this thing was resolved very quickly and you heard no more about it and some people have said that if General Eisenhower had moved more decisively and faster he could have, he could have taken the heat off that.

ANDERSON: Well, I think this is true but I don't think that Eisenhower realized what was happening or what was going on until it had simmered and boiled so long that it finally blew off the lid.

WICKMAN: How did the Congressmen, when Congress first got wind of this, what kind of reaction did you find up there, were there a number of people who were willing to, to not do anything about it or let it pass or--

ANDERSON: Oh, yes, but then there were a number of them who had had, oh, you might say unfortunate conferences with Governor Adams who were just delighted that this thing happened, which amazed me. I never like to see a man's character or reputation torn down and this of course did
happen to Governor Adams. It was something that will live with him to the grave and it was just most unfortunate that some of the people on the Hill were elated when they heard about it. But I think the reaction of most of them was, 'well, the poor guy'.

WICKMAN: Do you feel that that tends to touch on another point too that's some of interest to me, do you think that the White House, now getting retrospective, obviously now while you were there but in retrospect, do you think that the White House could have put on more of a staff or given more attention to this congressional liaison business?

ANDERSON: Which, in which administration?

WICKMAN: Well, in the Eisenhower administration.

ANDERSON: No, I think that we pretty well covered the situation. I don't think he would have needed more staff for congressional liaison purposes. It might have been well to have had someone else on the staff who'd had the experience that I had.
WICKMAN: This is really what I was getting at because with Governor Adams it seems to me there were times when if they just could have had two or three Governor Adams' or that is if the people, people of that level and caliber had been undertaking some of the things which the Governor undertook solely that that might have eased the position he was in cause he, as you said, he frequently was a person who said, "No" and there was just one of him and I see almost, I can see the same thing in congressional liaison where if there had been two or three highly skilled people who could move into that situation, they could have, they might have been able to do a lot more.

ANDERSON: Yes, this I think is true.

WICKMAN: But the workload you know.

ANDERSON: Yes, well, a person can only do so much in a day and our days were long, we were always at the White House at 7:30 in the morning and never knew when we were going to get home. Sometimes it was midnight or past midnight, especially
if there was a House and Senate conference and we had to keep our finger, so to speak, on the conferees. We had to wait and stay around as long as they met. So frequently it was more than an eighteen hour day.

WICKMAN: This is, this also gets to be a very common experience; I hear this from a number of people in the Eisenhower administration, I don't know it would be interesting if we really could find out what the, of course, everybody all of us in our work feel that we work, you know very hard and long, but it would be interesting to compare administrations on just how hard and long various people are working.

ANDERSON: You mean in various administrations?

WICKMAN: Yeah, the various administrations.

ANDERSON: Yes, that would be interesting.

WICKMAN: Because it would. It seems in some cases that everybody in some echelons of the White House, everybody goes home automatically at 5:00 o'clock, while you know other people just--
ANDERSON: Well, that was never true in our case. I asked Bryce the morning that I was sworn in on the staff, he was the top congressional liaison man. I said, "Now let me understand how this operates, do I understand that you're given a job to do, you work at it till it gets done?" And he said, "That's exactly right." So that's the way I took the job, that's the way I worked. You didn't worry about the hours, you didn't think about them, you just worked until the task you designed yourself or had been assigned to you that day was completed.

WICKMAN: That's interesting, that is an interesting assumption in many cases there are many organizations in parts of the federal government where they would want a recapitulation almost before you went, before you finished it all, there would be quite a great latitude there to perceive.

ANDERSON: Oh, yes, we were given plenty of latitude. It was assumed that we had horse sense and were fairly intelligent and that we were going to do our job right and not embarrass the President.
WICKMAN: Now what, in working with Bryce, from your point of view what were his, his responsibilities as far as a working relationship between the two of you, how did he divide this up?

ANDERSON: Well, Bryce had the overall control of the congressional liaison and Ed McCabe did most of the work on the Senate side and I did the work on the House side. And we'd meet frequently and Bryce would say, "Well, do you think we ought to do this today?" And we'd say "Yes" or "No." And if an exact job was to be done, we did it and if not why then we immediately turned our minds to something else and went on with that. We had a splendid working relationship.

WICKMAN: Did this, I'm trying also to remember, the personnel change, you and Harlow and McCabe were all through, worked together all through your time on the job?

ANDERSON: Yes.

WICKMAN: Yeah, yeah, that in itself is rather interesting, too, because that's the consistency there that you frequently don't get in some of the other activities--
ANDERSON: No, this is true.

WICKMAN: --the White House they change around.

ANDERSON: Yes.

WICKMAN: What, after Governor Adams went out, again in retrospect you might have a better answer the second session, but what was the major difference between his handling of the operation and that of General Persons, Jerry Persons?

ANDERSON: Oh, Jerry's office was always much more readily available, he was exactly the opposite of Governor Adams although they had been very close friends. General Persons was a very outgoing sort of chap, he made decisions sometimes on the spur of the moment and had to correct them later but none of them ever got to be so serious that they would in anyway embarrass the administration. That was the last thing in the world that Jerry Persons wanted to do.

WICKMAN: Yes.

ANDERSON: But he was much more available than Adams had been and much easier to talk to and—
WICKMAN: Apparently more personally involved then too at all levels, I get the idea, rightly or wrongly, that Governor Adams was staffing things out, the work got done, and then it came back, in a sense, in a package.

ANDERSON: Yes.

WICKMAN: And he looked at the overall package, either approved or didn't or sent it on to the President or didn't whatever had to happen, whereas, all the way through the process with General Persons, there was possibly greater chance of participation by other people and--

ANDERSON: That's right.

WICKMAN: And there was greater import to the idea.

ANDERSON: This is true.

WICKMAN: That's an interesting observation too that there was this difference.
ANDERSON: Well, to give you an example of how Adams operated, shortly after I joined the White House staff there was talk of dumping Benson. The Republican members of the House Agricultural Committee and the Senate Agricultural Committee were very much in favor of this and so Governor Adams asked me if I would take an assignment to interview a good cross section in both the House and Senate of members who came from agricultural areas but who were not on the Agricultural Committees. I said "Yes, if I could take my time and do a thorough job of it." So I undertook to interview approximately forty members of the House and about fifteen or sixteen members of the Senate who were not members of either the House or the Senate Ag Committees. I went to them each and said, "May I talk to you in confidence?" And every one of them said, "Yes." And then I would ask them their feelings about Benson and I would make a brief thumbnail one paragraph report of my interview. I had this typed. It took about three weeks to interview all the people that I wanted to and I must have chosen well because to this day not one of those confidences
have been violated. I sent the report into Governor Adams and said, "Here's the report you asked for—there hasn't been a word of it anywhere but I expect to see it in Drew Pearson's column tomorrow". And it never showed up, showing that I had chosen my people well when they said they would talk to me in confidence that's exactly the way it worked out. But Adams went through the report and then called me in and said, "Well, Jack, the decision has been made and although you've done an excellent job of interviewing these fellows, the President has decided to keep Benson on". So that work went for naught but at least it showed me that you can trust most Congressmen and you can talk to them in confidence, provided they understand the confidential nature of the subject.

WICKMAN: Yeah, of course, the fact that you had been a member of the Congress didn't hurt any so you know—

ANDERSON: Oh no, that helped, that helped immeasurably.
WICKMAN: One question, again, on the change between Adams to Persons, did your, were there any aspects of your job that became more difficult when this change was made.

ANDERSON: No, not at all.

WICKMAN: It really didn't have any, much effect.

ANDERSON: I really didn't see that it had any effect, I just continued operating as I had been, there was no objection to it and so we went ahead from there.
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DR. WICKMAN: I have some questions, and we can take these up or we can just spring off on anything you want to on the question of statehood for Hawaii and Alaska. I noticed in doing some of my background work that the attitude of Congress seems to have changed in the 1940s and '50s about this particular question. So for our first question, could you contrast the attitude in Congress while you were a Congressman towards Alaska and Hawaii statehood with the attitude that you found when you were legislative liaison in the White House.

MR. ANDERSON: I think perhaps the attitude in Congress changed somewhat, but I do believe that most of the Congressmen were in favor of statehood for Alaska and Hawaii for a good many years. They'd been promised this since 1916 in every party platform, this was sort of dangled in front of them as one of the goodies, and I think Congressmen in general were beginning to get fed up with this continual promise and no action. So, as I told you before, when President Eisenhower took the office of the Presidency, he was a firm believer in what the platform said. He figured that when he was elected that he accepted the platform, and he decided to go by what the platform said. I know
that he was concerned about Alaska; he felt that the military
was going to withdraw so much of the territory that perhaps
Alaska would not be a viable state. He was never concerned
about Hawaii; he was sure that they would be a pay-your-way
state. His principal concern centered around Alaska. I
can't tell you how many meetings we had in the President's
office with the Secretary of the Interior and others and how
many times this proposition was discussed in staff meetings and
in the Congressional leadership meetings. I remember when we
were getting down to the wire, when hearings were being
conducted on both Alaska and Hawaii, and the President still,
before the leadership, expressed his concern over Alaska. And
I remember one morning when Joe Martin [Rep.-MA] and Charley
Halleck [Rep.-IN] were discussing the problem with the
President, they said in effect, "Well, Mr. President, don't you
worry. When the bill comes up, we'll take care of it
professionally." Well that sort of irked me, because here we
were again with statehood for Alaska and Hawaii in the platform,
and it looked as though the Republican leadership was going to
kill the measure when it came to the floor.

WICKMAN: Well, now why would they want to kill it? Do you
want to elaborate on that?

ANDERSON: Yes, I think they were accepting it with tongue-in-cheek. I don't think that they really favored it. In fact if you will examine the record you will find that Martin, Halleck and [Leslie] Arends [Rep.-IL], the Republican leadership, all voted against statehood for Alaska. Now those of us who knew what was going on realized that Hawaii could never become a state unless Alaska became a state. This was because of the southern attitude toward Hawaii. As you know, the southerners didn't like the mingling of the races; and, although I always felt that Hawaii was the most perfect example of how the races could mix and get along together that I'd ever seen, and I wish more southerners could have seen it, they just had reservations about it. And I am sure that Hawaii never would have become a state if Alaska had not become a state first, and the President continually expressed himself in meeting after meeting about the way the legislative process worked. He said, "Well, why can't they pass the two bills simultaneously. That would be satisfactory to me." Of course, the Congress doesn't work that way. Each bill had hearings on its own merits and each question had to be resolved
by itself, not together. Well, hearings were held on statehood for Alaska, the bill was reported, and finally a rule was granted; so the bill was scheduled for deliberation and a vote. And I remember after the rule was granted on the bill, John Saylor, who was the ranking Republican on the House Interior Committee, came to me, and he said, "Anderson, you have work to do. I give you a list of 26 key Republican members that we've got to have on the vote, when it comes to a vote on the floor, in order for Alaska to become a state."

He handed me the list, and the night before the debate and the vote on the floor I closeted myself in one of the congressional offices that I had a key to on the Bill. About 9:00 o'clock at night I called the White House switchboard, and gave the girl on the switchboard the list of names that I wished to talk to and proceeded to call all 26 members. Some of them were at cocktail parties, some of them were at dinner, some of them were at home, and some of them were back in their district. But from 9:00 o'clock until 1:30 the next morning I called and talked to each one of the 26 members whose names I'd been given. Some of them expressed vast surprise that the White House was interested. They said, "Well, we understood that you fellows down there weren't too interested in this
statehood for Alaska." But most of them pledged me their vote when I said, "We'd like to have your vote on the statehood for Alaska tomorrow," realizing as I did that Hawaii would never become a state unless Alaska did. My work must have done some good because when the vote came on the statehood for Alaska in the House it passed by a margin of 42 votes. In other words, had 22 members changed their vote to "no," Alaska would not have become a state. Now I can't tell you, sitting here, that all 26 members that I called voted for the bill; I think I checked the record the next day and most of them had. But I can tell you that had 22 members changed their vote, Alaska would have been denied statehood. It was a perfect example of how a staff member did his job. I was apprehensive about it because, when the next leadership meeting was called, Joe Martin told the President, "Mr. President, we had things pretty well under control until we had this blitz." And the President said, "What do you mean by the blitz?" Well Joe Martin didn't name any names, I was sitting right there at the end of the Cabinet table, and I figured "Well, I'm out of a job. I'll probably be asked to resign tomorrow." But it didn't work out that way. The President said to Joe during the meeting, "I'd like to talk to you about this after the meeting
is over." And he took Joe Martin into his private office with him, and I presumed that my activities were discussed. But then Jerry Persons [Wilton E.; Assistant to the President] went into see the President, and he told me later that he told the President, "Mr. President, Jack Anderson was just doing his job. He and Secretary [of the Interior, Fred] Seaton have tried for at least three weeks to sit down and discuss this matter with Joe Martin, and Joe wouldn't see them." And the President in effect said, "Well, forget it. Jack was doing his job and that's good enough for me." So, as you know, the rest is history. Alaska didn't have too much difficulty in passing the Senate, and then, of course, the statehood for Hawaii was a forgone conclusion. When that bill came up in the House and in the Senate there was very little difficulty in securing its passage. We didn't have to do near the work that we did on Alaska. But that is the true story of how Alaska and Hawaii became states.

WICKMAN: There are a couple of things that I'd like to have your opinion on. I ran across a comment by former Governor Gruening in which he said that one of the reasons why there was problems on the Alaskan statehood bill in the Eisenhower administration was that President Eisenhower endorsed statehood
for Hawaii in his State of the Union message of February 2, 1953 but omitted any mention of Alaska. And Gruening has also said, in both his books on the subject, that the President's reversal from his earlier position—his pre-campaign and campaign position that Alaska should have statehood—was attributed to his political advisors whom he didn't identify. Is this a viable comment? I know that the mention of Alaska statehood is not in the State of the Union message of 1953, but I don't know whether the omission was an oversight or whether there were actually people who wanted to leave it out.

ANDERSON: No, I think this was still an expression of the President's concern about Alaska being a viable state.

WICKMAN: About the military aspect?

ANDERSON: The military withdrawal of so much territory leaving comparatively so little that Alaska would not be a viable state—that was the President's principal concern. He felt that he had to carry out the sentiments contained in the party platform, which of course included statehood for both Alaska and Hawaii. And I'm sure that the fact that he mentioned it in his State of the Union message meant that he wanted the Congress to
act on statehood for Hawaii first. I'm convinced in my own mind that he would have come along then and recommended statehood for Alaska. But Congress just doesn't work that way, and Hawaii could not have become a state first. It had to be Alaska because of the southern Democrats.

WICKMAN: If Alaska became a state, then they would go along with Hawaii to balance.

ANDERSON: Exactly. And that's exactly what happened. And those of us who knew how the legislative process worked were convinced that this is the way it had to be done, and so my very strong efforts on behalf of Alaska at the time the bill reached the floor of the House. Gruening was in my office many times during all the discussions that preceded the actual vote on the bill, and I remember telling [Governor] Gruening, "Yes, [Governor,] we're going to make Alaska a state. I can't tell you just when it's going to happen, but it's going to happen." I was convinced in my own mind that this was a sure thing. And as things turned out, I was right.

WICKMAN: Why were you so sure?
ANDERSON: I think I knew the feeling on the Hill. I was pretty well convinced that the time had finally come, after these many, many decades of promises, when the Congress was ready to act. And, of course having served up there, I think I knew the feelings of the Congress better than anyone else on the staff. I remember one time after the Halleck-Martin incident when Charley Halleck was elected to minority leader in place of Joe Martin, I'd made a bet with Bryce [Harlow] on it. I said, "Bryce, you're sure that Martin is going to be re-elected. I'm convinced that if the White House keeps its hands off, which it should do (we should never interfere in any way with the internal work of the Republicans in Congress) that Charley Halleck will be elected. So there's no use in arguing about it or discussing it further; I'll just bet you a dollar and you bet me a dollar. We'll let Sally Studebaker, your secretary, hold the stakes." The afternoon that the vote came I heard about it, and Halleck had been elected by a margin of 4 votes. So I just called Sally Studebaker, and said, "Sally, put the two dollars on my desk." And she expressed absolute and utter amazement that Martin had been defeated. The next time I went into Bryce Harlow's office, a day or two later, his wife was in there whom I knew well, and he said,
"Betty, I want you to meet Jack Anderson again. He's the only man on the White House staff who knows the House better than I do."

WICKMAN: Very good. I also have another comment that is kind of interesting, same source, Senator Gruening's same book. This is rather interesting I think partly because in the two books he seems to have tempered his own views a little bit, at least he tempered his language if not his own views. He laid great stress on the resignation of Secretary of Interior Douglas McKay and the appointment of Fred Seaton in connection with the Alaskan statehood bill. I'm wondering if you have any comment on how that might have figured into the program for Alaska statehood.

ANDERSON: Well, I did not serve on the staff while McKay was Secretary. Seaton was the Secretary of the Interior when I came aboard, and Seaton was very sincere in his desire to have Alaska a state. He told the President so; he tried to outline in detail why he thought Alaska would be a viable state.

WICKMAN: What were some of his reasons, do you remember?

ANDERSON: I don't recall them. Of course there are natural
resources some of which, like the oil, have been uncovered lately, giving Alaska a tremendous amount of money that they never expected to have. The natural resources were one of Fred's real reasons and also the fact that the Republican platform had promised them statehood. Fred was a great believer in Alaska as well as Hawaii, and he worked hard to accomplish the desired result. But a funny thing is that the day the vote came on the bill and statehood for Alaska passed, Fred Seaton was in Alaska. When he came back, I said, "Seat, you know it isn't easy to get a bill passed when the Secretary of the Interior is out of the country, and the entire Republican leadership is opposed to the measure."

WICKMAN: This might be of interest as part of your working relationship with various people. Besides testifying at the hearings on the bill, what else did the Secretary of the Interior do? What else could he do? Was he in effect lobbying for this bill?

ANDERSON: I guess you could call it lobbying; certainly that's what I was doing. We were trying to use our persuasion to convince the members of Congress that we should carry out the wishes of the party platform and make both Alaska and Hawaii
WICKMAN: Now why was he in Alaska at that time, do you remember?

ANDERSON: I don't recall the reason for him being there. I don't think that he expected the vote on the statehood to come up as quickly as it did. Once the hearings had been completed and the bill was reported by the committee, the granting of a rule was a very simple matter, and it was on the floor I think before Secretary Seaton actually realized it was going to be there. Now I don't know what sort of material Gruening wrote in his book because I haven't read the book. I knew Gruening quite well, (I knew [E.L. (Bob)] Bartlett who later became a senator as you know) but if he in any way infers that we let down on the statehood for Alaska, even though it came prior to Hawaii, he can't be right.

WICKMAN: When he wrote these two books, he was looking back after the fact, and I think he seems to express the idea that the administration was for statehood for Alaska. But, because of his position, he probably put a lot of weight on what **he** did, what the **Senate** did; and, I suppose, he came up with a joint
effort. In looking over the Bill File [Records Officer Reports to the President on Pending Legislation; File located in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library] that isn't exactly the way it looks. It looks as though a good deal of steam came from the administration. I think you've just said that.

ANDERSON: Yes.

WICKMAN: The House and the Senate got into this, and that's how the passage was effected.

ANDERSON: Well, yes, because, as I have indicated previously, the key vote, the crucial vote on the whole thing, was the first vote in the House of Representatives on statehood for Alaska, and that passed by a margin of 42 votes. I'll remember this perhaps as long as I live because it was a perfect example of what we discussed the last time you were here—of the hard sell, of the difficult thing to do. I think perhaps Gruening's book would naturally be a little self-serving because, after all, he wants to paint himself in the light that Alaskans will remember. Maybe I'm doing the same thing as far as that's concerned, but I am giving you the facts as everything occurred because this is one thing that I'll recall as long as I live.
WICKMAN: After statehood for both states became a fact, did you notice any marked effect in Congress? It just seems to me that this is a time when you’re adding congressmen, you’re adding senators, you’re adding people into the political process from these states; and I was wondering if there was any change?

ANDERSON: No, I don’t believe so because when they voted for the bills, they accepted the fact that there would have to be four more senators, two from Alaska and two from Hawaii, and three more congressmen, one from Alaska and two from Hawaii. But the irony of this whole thing is that they would not have become states if it hadn’t been for a Republican President and a Republican administration; yet they promptly elected two Democratic senators from Alaska and one Democratic senator and two Democratic congressmen from Hawaii. We had always felt that Hawaii would be a Republican state and that Alaska would be a Democratic state. It just didn’t work out that way.

WICKMAN: Why do you think that was the case?

ANDERSON: I can’t tell you. Of course Senator [Daniel] Inouye, who was first elected to the House, was a very popular war hero.
He lost an arm in service of his country when he was with that crack-jack Nisei division in Italy. Spark Matsunaga was another prime favorite in the islands; so they were both elected to the House of Representatives I guess because of their popularity at home. Inouye has since been elected to the Senate along with [Hiram] Fong, who is the Republican, but they still have two Democratic congressmen, well the lady congressman, I can't think of her name now.

WICKMAN: Patsy Mink.

ANDERSON: Yes, Patsy Mink and Spark Matsunaga. But that's ironical I think.

WICKMAN: I wondered, did you work with these delegations after they became states?

ANDERSON: No, my work was done. That was the end of it. I remember meeting Governor [John] Burns one time. I was in Washington visiting at the time, and I met Governor Burns, and he introduced me to a friend of his and said, "Here, I want you to meet the man in the White House that knew more about statehood for Alaska and Hawaii than anybody else."
WICKMAN: Very interesting.

ANDERSON: Well, I think it's true. I think that I did know more about what was going to happen and what did happen than anybody else on the staff. Of course while I'm telling you this in such a short time, this took months and months of doing and meeting after meeting with various congressmen and senators and groups and so forth. But once the bills had passed, my work was done, and I paid no further attention to what went on.

WICKMAN: Aside from the South's resistance on Hawaii, what other obstacles were there in the thinking of congressmen on the subject? In other words, what kind of opposition did you really have to overcome in working with the congress?

ANDERSON: I think that the real opposition was the opposition of the southerners to statehood for Hawaii. Had the vote come on Hawaii first, it would not have passed; and, therefore, Alaska would not have even come up. But it had to work out the way it did with Alaska coming first and Hawaii afterwards. I found very little opposition except that some congressmen just apparently blindly followed their leadership.
WICKMAN: Yes, this is the side that I see.

ANDERSON: Yes. They blindly followed their leadership and would have voted the way they were asked to by Martin, Halleck and Arends had I not been doing my work at the same time.

WICKMAN: And the leadership apparently felt that it wasn't what, the time?

ANDERSON: I guess they figured it wasn't time, but I thought it was high time.

WICKMAN: That's an interesting observation on the leadership. It will be interesting to see years from now what emerges as their reasoning for this thing.

ANDERSON: Well, of course, Joe Martin has passed on. Charley Halleck has retired from the House, and the only one of the Republican leadership in the House that is left is Les Arends. And of course Bill Knowland [Rep.-CA] was the leader in the Senate at the time, and he's retired from politics now; it looks as though he's retired from politics.

WICKMAN: Knowland for example has been interviewed in this oral history project by the team from Columbia University, and
I don't know what he said because I don't have the transcript yet.

ANDERSON: Well, I'd be very interested in hearing what Bill has to say about it.

WICKMAN: Now did he support it, statehood for Alaska?

ANDERSON: As I recall he did. My memory doesn't serve me too well now because, after all this was 12 or 13 years ago, and although I remember the key incidents that occurred, it's hard to remember everything that happened. And besides, at that time, I was only working the House side as I think I explained in our previous interview, and I was not working on the Senate side.

WICKMAN: I would think that Californians, the legislative delegation, would have favored Alaskan statehood.

ANDERSON: Oh, I think you'll find that the Californians, both Republicans and Democrats, voted almost unanimously for both states. I can't recall exactly how they voted, but it would be almost unanimous. Yes, we in California and on the Pacific coast felt sort of an affinity for both coming states and were
very much in favor of it. I'd always favored it while I was in the House, but I'd never had a chance to vote on it.

WICKMAN: I see. No, it never got very far while you were in the House. It was one of those things never organized to get done.

ANDERSON: Well, you never had a President before who thought that he accepted the party platform when he accepted the nomination and election as President. And Eisenhower did.

WICKMAN: This is an interesting comment. You made that before in the last tape—his absolute dedication to the platform. I think that's a very important point. It's one that more people will accept later on than maybe some have in the past. They haven't really been able to see it.

ANDERSON: That's right. But you've seen other Presidents go in and forget about the platform. They promptly start putting their own ideas into effect as Roosevelt did in 1933. I wouldn't want to say anything because he's passed and gone, but I don't think that he paid much attention to the party platform.

WICKMAN: Well, of course it's fairly well conceded by political
historians as well as political scientists that the platform of the '32 election, the Democratic platform, was primarily designed to win the election—that in many ways it reads almost like the Republican platform.

ANDERSON: That's right.

[Interruption]

ANDERSON: General [Andrew J.] Goodpasture's primary job was the correlation of bills and messages and things of that sort that were to go to the House. There was another man in there, I can't remember his name now, who actually engrossed the bills before they're signed by the President. But Andy's job was the correlation of everything that went with the bills. In other words the recommendations for a veto or recommendations for passage, he had to assemble all this material before the bills were engrossed. That was his primary job.

WICKMAN: Did you have a good deal of contact with him?

ANDERSON: Oh, yes, with Andy, quite often. He was a thoroughly
dedicated man, dedicated to the President and dedicated to his job. I remember quite well, his office was right off Governor Adams' office in the lower west wing. I knew him and his secretary quite well.

WICKMAN: He didn't participate any way in this, in your liaison?

ANDERSON: No, not at all.

WICKMAN: His concerns came primarily when the bills had gone through.

ANDERSON: That's right. That was his primary concern, correlating all the factors that had to do with the legislation after it had passed and seeing that it was ready for presentation to the President—which is quite a task.

WICKMAN: Yes, it's almost the task of a historian really.

ANDERSON: Yes.

WICKMAN: This is again a kind of inside question, only somebody who has worked there and watched this could really answer, but when this material had been collected I imagine there was some kind of summary recommendations then.
ANDERSON: Yes.

WICKMAN: Was this just a mechanical process?

ANDERSON: Well, it was largely mechanical of course because the expressions of opinions on a certain bill would come from various sources, but it would be Andy's job to put them together for presentation to the President. In other words, if a bill had passed that affected the Department of Agriculture, there would be a recommendation from the Secretary of Agriculture on whether or not that bill should be vetoed or signed. And there would be recommendations from people on the Hill as to whether it should be vetoed or signed. And he had to gather all this material together so that it was available to the President on an instant's notice to look at before the engrossed bill was presented to him.

WICKMAN: What usually happened? Was this a situation where Goodpaster went in with this material, and he made the presentation to the President?

ANDERSON: Well, I think what Andy would do would be to outline what was in the material that he was presenting to the President.
Then, as Truman said, "The buck stops here," and the President had to go through the various data that were presented to him and make up his own mind. He had to make the decision.

WICKMAN: Can you ever recall any time when the decision process really got strung out or became a real problem?

ANDERSON: Oh, yes. I can remember very well a bill passed by the Congress and sent down to the President which the Secretary of Agriculture was very adamant in having vetoed. I don't recall the exact provisions of the bill at that time. Some of the Senators and House members were very strongly in favor of it being passed, I think a majority in both bodies. And I recall that Senator [Karl] Mundt [Rep.-SD], Senator [George] Aiken [Rep.-VT], and three other Senators, Senator [Milton] Young [Rep.-ND] was one of them, Senator [Carl] Curtis [Rep.-NB] and one other, came down one morning to see the President to urge him to sign the bill. I took the five of them in to discuss the matter with the President. Before we went in, I said, "You realize that the President's time is very limited. He's going to hear you through. But when I scratch my right ear with my left hand, Karl, will you sort of make a note of the fact that the interview is over?" And it
worked out perfectly. We were scheduled for fifteen minutes, and I think we only took eighteen, and I was highly complimented by the President's appointment secretary when I took the five senators out after eighteen minutes. And then, on this same bill, the President went in to discuss it with the Senators just before a cabinet meeting had broken up. I recall the President looking out of his window, I was in there for over two hours that day, and he saw Secretary Benson hurrying by and he says, "Get me that fellow." So I hollered to the Secretary, and he came in to discuss it with the President. And the President said, "You've backed me into a corner. As a military man, I don't like this. Sometimes you have to lose a battle to win a war. Now," he said, "I guess I'm going to veto the bill as you've indicated you want done, but I'm in a horrible predicament." But the upshot of it was that the President vetoed the bill. And attempt was made to override it, but it was not successful. I think there was only one veto overridden in the four years that I served in the House.

WICKMAN: Why do you think that is?

ANDERSON: Well, because of staff work. He vetoed the REA bill,
and everyone was sure that Congress was going to override it. But we sustained his veto in the House by a margin of one vote. I remember that incident very well. I knew where the votes were; I knew who was going to support the President, and I realized that we had to have a certain number of votes from those who had voted for the bill in the first place. They would have to change their position and vote to sustain the President's veto. And we got them, to a man, and sustained the veto by just one vote.

WICKMAN: Of course, this is the recurring theme throughout almost all of General Eisenhower's later career, in the military and as President--the quality of the staff work and staff organization and the willingness which he had to delegate authority that seems to have carried him through almost every situation.

ANDERSON: Well, as I indicated previously, he felt that we were men with some horse sense and intelligence, and he figured that we were doing our job and he didn't interfere with us--doing our job and his job at the same time.
WICKMAN: Of course I realize you weren't on the White House Staff at any other time, but I wonder if there is any contrast between what you saw happen while you were in Congress with regard to the way the White House Staff operated or the Congressional affairs operated.

ANDERSON: Well, I have never quite seen the set-up like the one Eisenhower's staff had for him. I had a lot of good personal friends on both sides; and, as I indicated previously, I just felt that because of the personal contact of someone from the White House walking into a Congressman's office and saying in effect, "I'm Jack Anderson from the White House; I'd like to talk to the boss," they would usually see me immediately. I think that that kind of personal contact had an awful lot to do with President Eisenhower's success. I think that was the inspiration for the cartoon you just saw out there by Herblock where the President has had an extremely successful Congress, I mean as far as getting his program through was concerned. Really we gave the Democrats a licking that year, and I think it was based largely on good staff work by the members of the staff.

WICKMAN: One of the points I was interested in developing
there was that you were in Congress during the Truman administration. How did this same thing seem to work then? In other words, were you as Congressman approached by someone from the White House on a bill the President was interested in or the White House was interested in?

ANDERSON: That never happened to me during my fourteen years in the House under both Roosevelt and Truman.

WICKMAN: Was it primarily the leadership thing--the Republican leadership would organize the Republican Congressmen?

ANDERSON: Well they would try to. Yes, they would try to of course. I was, as I indicated, a sort of a maverick. I didn't always follow the party line. Now a perfect example of that, when I was in the House, was when we voted to extend the draft in September of 1941, I believe it was, three months before Pearl Harbor. That bill only passed by a margin of one vote, 203 to 202. There were eighteen Republicans, only, that voted for it, and I was one of those eighteen. And I'll always feel that was the most important vote that I cast during my fourteen years in the House of Representatives.
WICKMAN: You did this voting as an individual Congressman. Nobody came from the White House and said, "The White House is interested in this passing."

ANDERSON: No. No contact with me from the White House at all. I had to do this on my own.

WICKMAN: This I think is a very significant point because again it's a point that can be lost as time goes by of the changes that came about in how the White House operated from the '40s and the '50s.

ANDERSON: Well, that's what I have been trying to tell you as best as I can remember--how the staff operated during my four years.

WICKMAN: Now it looks to me and, we discussed this the last time too, as though the subsequent administrations have, in a sense, used the same technique. They've modified it, but I think that, I can't really speak with any authority on the Kennedy administration, I don't know what they did; but I think Mr. Johnson used a very similar tactic, didn't he, in having Congressional liaison that went to the Congressmen.
ANDERSON: You would have to ask someone who was in Congress at that time because I was here in California and knew nothing about how the White House operated at that time.

WICKMAN: Well, I've assumed that with the Nixon administration that Bryce has gone back and has used this former pattern somewhat. Of course he's out of it now.

ANDERSON: Yes, well Bryce I'm sure could give you some information about how both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations functioned. Although he was not on the staff, he was in Washington at that time, and, being a very astute fellow, he would know exactly how they operated I'm sure.

WICKMAN: If I'd ever get him to sit down long enough. The question was if the work was divided up along some predetermined model. In other words, were there areas that you would take and other areas that Bryce took, or was it just whatever came up and everybody got in there?

ANDERSON: I think that was more like it; whatever came up everybody got in. If it was something of extreme importance, Bryce would say, "Drop everything and let's get on this." And we'd get on it immediately and do the job. Ed McCabe, Jack
Martin, myself, we'd just throw ourselves into whatever had to be done immediately and try to get it done.

WICKMAN: Now, Martin and McCabe, Martin particularly, of course he's gone and we can't ask him the question, what did he do?

ANDERSON: He worked mostly in the Senate side.

WICKMAN: You worked the House side?

ANDERSON: I worked the House side. But when it came to Civil Rights there were so many legal aspects to that, and I was not a lawyer, I only have a high school education, that I would usually get Ed McCabe for someone with a legal background or Jerry [Gerald] Morgan to do some of the work. I could handle the general aspects of it, but when it came down to the legality, the legal questions that were involved in Civil Rights, I just didn't feel that I was competent to handle them.

WICKMAN: Now would McCabe then go out and do the liaison part, the contact part?

ANDERSON: Yes, he would in effect do my work for me on Civil Rights because of the legal aspects of it.
WICKMAN: Then on something besides Civil Rights what would he do? Nominally what did he do?

ANDERSON: He didn't work as much on the Hill as Jack Martin and I did, but he was on call any time that he was needed. Either Jack Martin or I would ask Ed, "Will you see Senator so and so or Congressman so and so on this question," and Ed was always available.

WICKMAN: This you know this goes back to what I had mentioned in the last interview that one of the most important things we can do in these interviews is to discuss what we just did on how the work on a day-to-day basis or a week basis or a month basis broke out among various staff members. Now all that's left in many cases is a formal statement of the individual's job which frequently bore no resemblance whatever to what he did. You find that after three months or three weeks in the job, one person was picked out here to really work on that and somebody else was doing something else. If you went by just that bald description of what supposedly they were doing, it sometimes doesn't match up at all.

ANDERSON: No, I can understand that. I can realize why this sort of interview is extremely valuable to you.