INTERVIEW WITH
General Ray W. Barker
by
Dr. Maclyn Burg
Historian
on
July 15, 1972
for
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
Gift of Personal Statement

PATRICIA B. WRIGHT

to the

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

In accordance with the provisions of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 as amended (63 Stat. 377) and regulations issued thereunder, I, Patricia B. Wright, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a transcript of a personal statement approved by me on May 15, 1976 and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. The gift of this document is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Title to the material transferred hereunder will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.
2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of this instrument available for research as soon as it has been deposited in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

3. A revision of the above stipulation governing access to the aforesaid document may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States or his designee if it appears desirable to revise the conditions herein stipulated.

4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

5. The donor retains to herself during her lifetime all literary property rights in the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of this instrument. After the death of the donor, the aforesaid literary property rights will pass to the United States of America.

Signed  Patricia B. Wright  Ray W. Barker's daughter
Date:  June 18, 1976
Accepted  James B. Houlée  Archivist of the United States
Date:  July 12, 1976
This interview is being taped with General Raymond W. Barker—

GEN. BARKER: It's Ray, not Raymond.

DR. BURG: You can correct that, Mrs. Stone, to read, "Ray W. Barker". And we are doing this particular session in General Barker's home in Southern Pines, North Carolina, on the 15th of July, 1972. The interviewer is Dr. Maclyn Burg of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library staff. The subject of this series of interviews would be General Barker's papers that are being given to the Library, so the topics are just discussions of what is in the material.

GEN. BARKER: Now if you'll turn that off for a moment.

DR. BURG: The first thing that we've examined is a large scrapbook, a photographic record of the Allied air effort in support of the invasion of the continent of Europe; and it's signed over to Major General Barker by Air Staff SHAPE. It's a large black book, dimensions, oh, approximately fifteen inches by perhaps twenty three inches or maybe twenty inches. You have no difficulty seeing it; and tucked in with it is a poem—the original copy from the London newspaper—and a carbon-copy poem concerning the Mulberry Harbors by A. P. Herbert. To the scrapbook are attached two clippings. One is on the death of Admiral Bertram Ramsay, who had been picked to head the Allied naval effort.
The second is an obituary notice on Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory. They, too, are in the big black book dealing with the air strikes in Europe.

I'm going to add to the inventory, now, three large antique map cases, numbered 13, 14 and 15. These were a set of maps given in this instance by Napoleon to one of his marshals, Marshal Jacques Etienne Joseph Alexandre MacDonald. They passed ultimately into General Barker's hands through the offices of T. Bentley Mott, who was used by General George Catlett Marshall to carry out a mission to save Marshal Henri Philippe Petain's life at the end of the operations in France when the Allied Forces took over. So the three cases of maps include only the areas along the French beaches—the Normandy operations. The maps in turn came into the hands of General Mott through an elderly woman who was descendant of Marshal MacDonald's, and then later five cases of the maps were given to General Barker. General Barker kept three, giving two others to friends.

The next item is the "Report of the Theater Judge Advocate,
European Theater of Operations, United States Army, United States Forces European Theater, 4 April '42 to 3 April '46." This is contained in a kraft paper envelope addressed to "Maj. Gen. R. W. Barker, Ward 8, Walter Reed General Hospital."

The next document is a very interesting expression of gratitude to General Barker as he left his Berlin command. It was presented to him by the representatives of the Jewish leaders of the camp at , known as "Gypocenter." It's a translation and the original Yiddish document.

The next item is in a brown envelope marked in penciled letters and marked with the official "Bigot" stamp and "MOST SECRET."

The envelope contains a letter dealing with "Headquarters, Berlin District, United States Army." The letter was dictated by General Barker to his chief of staff, Colonel /Elmer Ellsworth/ Barnes, and addressed to Major General Kotikov, chief of the garrison and military commandant of the Soviet occupied territory. Attached to that is a hand written note signed, "Kotikova" in Russian. It's the receipt for the letter from Barnes to Kotikov.
A third item here reads as follows: "I, the aide to Major General Kotikov, received from General Barker's aide a letter addressed to General Kotikov." These items, then, are in the envelope marked "Bigot". In the envelope with the note to General Kotikov I’ve placed a letter to General Barker from the War Office, Whitehall, Southwest 1, dated 22 May 1945. It is a letter expressing thanks for General Barker's help in feeding prisoners of war.

This next item, which will be marked and set apart with a piece of notebook paper folded over and taped down, consists of a small sheaf of papers marked "TOP SECRET," "Bigot"; and in General Barker's handwriting on the front of the notebook paper wrapper is written the following: "/SHAEff/ minutes of the Chief of Staff meetings /early 1944/".

Next we have the amphibious operations from the United Kingdom. There is a document which sets forth the preparations that COSSAC /Ed. note: Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) and his invasion planning staff/ was to make. It is a tripartite thing--
GEN. BARKER: It's a directive.

BURG:—"A", "B", and "C". It is an amended directive to COSSAC as to its mission, dated 1943. Now that is identified by note paper with General Barker's handwriting, and it will be found inside a file folder headed by General Barker, "Minutes of COSSAC staff meetings, 1943--44." Now that file starts out with the earliest documentation—the start of COSSAC—on the bottom and ends with the most recent document from COSSAC—just before it became SHAPE—on the top. And both these documents, the amended directive to COSSAC and the COSSAC staff meetings—the minutes of those meetings—are to be found in the same folder. The next item is contained at present in a folder—a light kraft paper folder—with a violent purple "X" drawn across the front of it and is marked "CONFIDENTIAL" and "Bigot" and says, "Operation OVERLORD, Administrative Appreciation, Part 3, Third Draft."

Inside this folder is a considerable sheaf of papers which General Barker identifies for us, and I have written out the note as follows: "Folder containing studies relating to administrative and logistic aspects of operation OVERLORD." He tells us that the studies were made in the fall of 1943. This is all contained on
a label placed inside the folder. He called my attention to
the great interest of this data, and toward the end of the folder
archivists will find the estimated casualty figures—British and
American—and totals run for various times: "D-Day," "D+1," etc.
Then these casualty figures are extended out and broken down by
"wounded, killed, missing in action"—things of that sort. So
that folder is the next one.

The next item is contained in a kraft paper binder folder with
a very large red "X" across the face, and over that "X" is a
paper label which reads, "C OSSAC /43/ 28, copy number 77," and
the title "Operation OVERLORD appendices." Inside that will be
found a note paper label, handwritten by me at General Barker's
dictation, which reads as follows: "Folder containing a study of
various aspects of factors relating to the proposed operation
OVERLORD." I am told and have added to the note that "a major
part of this is based upon a document prepared in early 1943
(before COSSAC was set up) by Major General /Sir John Alexander/
Sinclair, British Army, and General Barker." I think I'll put
my label on there the same way.
BARKER: This again is self-explanatory. It's another folder on administrative and logistic aspects of operation OVERLORD. Leave it right in that folder.

BURG: O.K.

BARKER: Some of it I think is a duplication of--

BURG: O.K. Now it should be. The next item is again a kraft paper folder tied off--hinged, we might say--in orange colored thread--cord. And again it is marked "SECRET," "Bigot." The title is the same as the previous folder: "Operation OVERLORD, administrative appreciation, Part 3, third draft." It has the same purple "X"; also it is stamped "CONFIDENTIAL" down at the bottom. At the top--and perhaps the identifying mark--is the large red stamp, "Bigot," "Copy number 7." Some of the data within this folder may be the same as in the previous folder; some of it may be different. On the outside of the folder--actually the container for it--is still a larger kraft file envelope headed, "COSSAC /43/ 28-OVERLORD, appendices," and that
folder is stamped on its front side, "Maj. Gen. R. W. Barker." Here is another folder. This is in a kraft paper wrapper, legal size, as have been most of these documents I've just mentioned. It's arranged in sort of a three-part affair. There are a couple of rectangles at the top, left and right. Then beneath them it says, "Subject and office of origin, Operation OVERLORD, administrative appreciation /1st draft/." This is underlined in red. Then below that there is a regular standard form that says, "Referred to date"; and in that there is a classification change stamp reading "CONFIDENTIAL." At the top right-hand corner, the file folder is headed, "COSSAC/1580/16/AQ" and "This is copy number 36"--written in red. This is a folder of approximately half an inch in thickness.

The next folder is a legal size folder. On the front face is written, "Maj. Gen. R. W. Barker"; on the file tab face of the folder, "Joint Chiefs of Staff." I have slipped a note paper introductory statement underneath the clip on the inside documents which reads as follows: "This folder contains a discussion of various means by which artificial harbors might be created
off shore to afford 'quiet water' as the British called it for debarkation of troops and supplies." The top document is green in color and headed, "Joint Chiefs of Staff corrigendum to minutes of JCS 105th meeting note by the secretaries," and this is copy 36 for identification purposes. Also included as a separate item is an Office of War Information poster, stamped, "From the American Embassy in London." It shows a Japanese soldier in a terrible state of repair--

BARKER: Japanese?

BURG: Looks like it. Is he Italian?

BARKER: Sure, Italian. He's an Italian.

BURG: He is an Italian soldier being put back together by M's. Hitler and Mussolini doing the best they can.

BARKER: That represents the German Army.

BURG: And is a World War II document.

BARKER: It's one of the posters that was dropped by airplanes over Italy.
BURG: I might make a note of that: "Dropped by air into Italy for propaganda purposes."

Within another long legal folder, headed off, "Maj. Gen. R.W. Barker," we have again a purple "X'd" interior folder of kraft paper. This contains material headed, "Operation OVERLORD, headquarters, COSSAC, administrative appreciation, part 3, the final draft." It's copy number 7. At the top of this particular folder in red is written "Colonel Montgomery," /Ed. note: Col. M. M. Montgomery, attached to G-1, SHAPE/ and I have attached to it the following note: "administrative and logistic appreciations as General Barker described them."

BARKER: And now this is the final draft. These are final drafts of the administrative appreciation.

BURG: The next item comes in the same kind of legal, heavy paper folder with "Maj. Gen. R.W. Barker" written on it. Inside is another of the purple-crossed items. This one is designated, "Operation OVERLORD, headquarters COSSAC, administrative appreciation, part 1, final draft." All this is underlined, and this,
too, is copy number 7 with "Sigot" stamped in the upper right-hand corner. I have not attached any further identification to it, this one being pretty much self-explanatory.

The next item is a rather long, light paper envelope. Held before you with a long axis running horizontally, it says, "On His Majesty's Service," and then beneath that--printed--is "Agenda for CC meeting, 3:30 P.M. Wednesday, 30 September."

On the back side we find that it has been sealed in wax and opened. A note here says, "Opened personally by Brig. Gen. R. W. Barker STOUSA." Inside I have placed a note paper identifying sheet which says, "Some of the deliberations of the combined commanders". It was a British setup to which General Barker was attached when he arrived in England in February of 1942. This group was a British Army commander, an RAF marshal, and a Royal Navy representative with Barker added to it, and actually pre-dates COSSAC. The material within will set forth some of deliberations that took place in this particular combined commanders group. I'm also adding to the collection two London newspapers: the Daily Telegraph edition of May the 9th, 1945,
celebrating the end of the war in Europe, and the News Chronicle—
also for Wednesday, May the 9th, 1945. These newspapers will be
found with the collection from General Barker.

[Interruption]

BARKER: —the War College, but I figure—or to the Army War
College—but I figure that they already have them there or can
duplicate them from the War Department files. This is a series
of cables and operation orders—but principally cables—from
SHAEP to the War Department telling what SHAEP was doing. Now
this is interesting because it's a reflection of General Eisen-
hower, and I talked to Ike about this one time when he was at
Columbia. You know after I was retired—I was retired early
on account of my fusion in my back—

BURG: I understand.

BARKER: —I wanted something to do. I was still in Walter Reed
Hospital when a bishop [Peabody?] came to see me—Episcopal
bishop. He had been sent by General Eisenhower. And Ike had
been to see me at the hospital, and he knew I was going to be
retired. We talked about it, and I told him I was very worried.
I said, "I'm only fifty-seven and, Ike, at this rank I could look forward to years of interesting service. And," I said, "I just got to have something to do." And we discussed the whole general subject, and he agreed that I should. Well, also a man that came to see me—came down from New York—was Neil Cornelius Wendell Wickersham of the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft. It's a great law firm in New York, corporation firm. He had been my assistant in Berlin and in the planning for post-war Germany, and I think I'll give you a copy of that book that I prepared as a handbook for occupying troops.

BURG: O.K., very good.

BARKER: It's based largely—partly—on my experience in the first occupation. Well, anyway, Neil Wickersham, of course, was a very wealthy man and a lawyer of the caliber of, well, the top Wall Street type corporation lawyer, and he came to see me a couple of times. And finally he arranged for a man from U.S. Rubber to come to see me, and he came to see me twice. They finally made me a proposition and talked about salary and what I was to
do, and it was quite an attractive order. I didn't know people made that kind of money. But it would require me to travel a great deal and abroad also, and I was still walking with two sticks and getting physio-therapy and so on. But anyway I was considering that offer when this bishop came to see me. He was chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Episcopal Diocesan school up in central New York, the Manlius School. And it was a military academy. It was college prep school. That cup there with the inscription on it was given to me by the board. That's my finest piece of silver. That's George II, 1724. Well, anyway, it was a military school, and they had a vacancy there for the head of it. They wanted a general officer. So Ike knew I was an Episcopalian, and Ike sent him to see me. And I wound up going to the Manlius School and was there nearly thirteen years. I was a school master.

BURG: It turned out to be that long?

BARKER: Huh?

BURG: It turned out to be that long?
BARKER: That long, yes, sir. And I had a hard time getting away because I was engaged on a big building program there and I didn't want to walk out on it. But, at any rate, that's where I went after it was over. Well, while I was there at Manlius, I went to a meeting— to a group that both Ike and I belong to in New York. And we were talking there one evening. He was talking about some of his problems there, and we discussed this file here. Now what is remarkable about this is how few words it takes to direct the operation of large forces on wide fronts. There are some of these files here that—well, here is one of them: "The central group of armies will continue operations to join hands with the Russians in the Danube Valley and occupy that part of Austrian zone. Southern group of armies will seize the area at Landeck and Innsbruck, seal the Brenner Pass, capture Salsburg, seize the Bruck-Radstadt area, and occupy that of Austrian zone. Boundary between central and southern groups of armies subject to adjustment in detail" and so on. "Twelfth Army" and so on. Well, in paragraphs like this one: "From
the headquarters of the Moklova River, my forces will initially hold approximately along the line," and so on and so on and so on. And it's all over the map and all in just about that much time.

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: And if you're issuing an attack order for a division it could go into but it illustrates the degree to which high commanders must be given leeway and not pinned down by specific. Give 'em the overall objective, what is to be accomplished, and within what areas they're to operate; and let them go. And now I don't see it here, but these are particularly interesting. I don't imagine you have a file of them.

BURG: Well, there's every chance that we don't.

BARKER: This is on the very highest level. And it's between--Oh, what I started to say was I got off on this when I was talking with Ike that time. This was about the time that Mac Arthur was
having his trouble with Truman. Now Ike was careful—meticulously careful—to keep the secretary of war and the chiefs of staff in Washington and the president informed on what he was doing. Mac Arthur wasn't. He was free wheeling, and it finally got him in trouble. But this illustrates how very careful General Eisenhower was to make sure that the people in Washington—'cause it had political aspects of it as well. The movement on Innsbruck, for example, was talked over, and some of these things are the result of an all night session. We'd discuss it. We'd have the and the political aspects of it and whether or not it would get us into trouble with the Russians, and—

BURG: Right.

BARKER: --the British always took a longer view of it than we did, too. They were looking to the post-war world much more. We wanted to lick the Germans. They wanted to lick the Germans, but they had to live with that situation after the Germans were licked. And they were a very moderating influence in this thing.
General Walter Bedell Smith was a man who—often times Ike wouldn't be there, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, who was deputy commander, wouldn't be there. Bedell Smith would be there. The chief of staff would take charge of them at the staff meetings. And we had a meeting practically every morning at 9:00 o'clock, and each of us—we all discussed the whole thing. And Bedell was a man given to Napoleonic decisions—

BURG: Oh, he was.

BARKER:—just like that. And he had the answer right away without reflecting on what was liable to happen; and he would say, "We'll do this" and "do that" and so on. And this fellow Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan, who was deputy chief of staff to Bedell, was the finest balance wheel you ever saw, and tact was his middle name. He would listen to it and say, "Yes, Bedell, quite right; I'm sure you're right about that." This was the line he would take:"That's good. Now, let's see. If we do this, it'll work out that such and such will be the case, and the Germans probably will react in such and such a way. We'll find ourselves—and this will be the situation." And old Bedell
would begin to draw back, and before you'd get through he'd have Bedell Smith going in a hundred and eighty degree action. Nobody knows how much we owe to Freddy Morgan for his level-headed handling of Bedell Smith because Bedell was not a soldier—actually. He never commanded anything in his life.

BURG: Oh, he hadn't?

BARKER: He had commanded a company in the First War, but he never had any real command. And he had been a war department man, primarily. He was a wonderful office manager: that was his special gift.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: The administration of the headquarters. And he was known as the "hatchet man," too. He was a great chopper-off of heads, I want to tell you. And he'd go off half-cocked lots of times. But Morgan was wonderful. Instead of saying, "Well, I don't agree with you, Bedell, you see," he started out by saying, "That's quite right, quite right, Bedell. Now—let's see—that'll put us here, won't it?"
BURG: Yes.

BARKER: "And that'll put so and so there. The German reaction will probably be so and so, and we'll have this and that." And Bedell began to see that he'd put his foot into it. We used to---

[Interruption]

BURG: Side two begins. You have heard General Barker describe the importance of this particular folder which is headed off, "Operations [cable] Maj. Gen. R. W. Barker," and headed off on the file side—the file tab side of the folder—too. And inside, basically, are pink message forms marked "TOP SECRET" at the top and also with the designation: "SHAPE staff message control, incoming messages." These are a file of operational cables between SHAPE and Washington. Virtually all of them are from SHAPE to Washington, and General Barker has added his note that he views these as being of very great value to historians. I have attached the hand written note within the folder too.

All right. The next folder is a long, legal sized folder, headed off, "Maj. Gen. R. W. Barker," and the file tab reads, "Review of
certain factors affecting preparations for return to the continent." Inside is the lighter paper—almost blotter paper—material with that same title: "Review of certain factors affecting preparations for return to the continent, headquarters, combined commanders planning staff." I have entered a small note, paper note with this folder which states that "General Barker has added that the material is drawn largely from a study prepared in early '43 by himself and by General Sinclair of the British Army and is the basis in large measure for the OVERLORD plan."

Now this next item is loose—outside a folder—and is headed with my note paper label as follows: "First directive relating to planning for Operations in northwest Europe with a related paper concerning the meeting held with regard to that too with General Frank Maxwell Andrews (then Commander of ETOUSA). At this time General Barker was G-3 of the European Theater and as such prepared a memorandum attached hereto on this subject of joint planning. Typed, onion skin pages—two of them—were prepared in March, 1943, according to General Barker." So all of that material, plus my label, is together and will perhaps be found
within another folder for protective purposes.

General Barker has just given me another item regarding the initial directive for COSSAC. It is two pages, one of them cut short, and it's headed off, "Annex II, amphibious operations from the United Kingdom, directed to the Chief of Staff, the Supreme Commander." And then General Barker has clipped with that his own note: "Initial directive to COSSAC (later amended)." This material which is headed off, "General Barker's notes on D-Day message," begins with his handwritten notes from which he took his message and then continues with the first draft as he wrote it. Notice that in the first sheet, which is headed off, "Theme," he wanted to speak of the fact that the eyes of the world would be on them as they made their attack, and he put in quotation, "The eyes of Texas are upon you." He drew on his own experience in speaking to the Royal Regiment of Artillery, which had made him an honorary member. He used the word "crusade" and used it, of course, again in this message--perhaps inspired by the fact that he finally sat down to write the message on St. George's day. That same evening after writing the message he
became violently ill, one of a number of American officers to
become ill evidently from eating custard in the officers' mess
that noon that had gone bad. The documentation follows, including,
as you see on the typed draft in DDE's handwriting, final changes
and then his final "bring back to me" with the initials "DE."
Somehow General Barker failed to get it back to him. Note too
that the last couple of pages of this material, numbered "1"
and "2" at the bottom of the page and marked 7-D in orange red
pencil, is material suggested by the American political officer,
Mr. John Phillips. I have indicated that fact on a hand
written note of my own just previous to these two pages.
The next item is a sheaf of three letters. Each is two pages
long; all were drafted by General Barker; but Bedell Smith signed
them. And I have a sort of note paper wrapper attached to
them.
The next item is a two page memorandum for General Eisenhower,
dated 15 January 1944. It carries his initials up in the upper
right-hand corner. Subject is "Matters for early consideration."
It is a series of about eight paragraphs all together and signed
by Thomas T. Handy, Maj. Gen. One of the folders—the next folder in fact—is a Clark Music Company folder, and marked on the front you will see that the folder contains propaganda leaflets in various languages: Polish, French, Dutch, Belgian, Flemish, Norwegian—

BARKER: Polish.

BURG: --Italian, I think.

BARKER: Yeah.

BURG: They were dropped into the occupied countries at various stages during the war.
INTERVIEW WITH

General Ray W. Barker

by

Dr. Maclyn Burg
Historian

on

July 16, 1972

for

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
Gift of Personal Statement

PATRICIA B. WRIGHT

to the

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

In accordance with the provisions of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 as amended (63 Stat. 377) and regulations issued thereunder, I, Patricia B. Wright, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a transcript of a personal statement approved by me on May 15, 1976 and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. The gift of this document is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Title to the material transferred hereunder will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.
2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of this instrument available for research as soon as it has been deposited in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

3. A revision of the above stipulation governing access to the aforesaid document may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States or his designee if it appears desirable to revise the conditions herein stipulated.

4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

5. The donor retains to herself during her lifetime all literary property rights in the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of this instrument. After the death of the donor, the aforesaid literary property rights will pass to the United States of America.

Signed Patricia B. Wright
Date: June 18, 1976

Accepted James B. Ford
Archivist of the United States
Date: July 12, 1976
BURG: Let me just say that this interview is now commencing with General Barker on Sunday, July 16, 1972, in General Barker's home.

The first question that I want to put to General Barker is a question concerning the beginning of his career in World War II. Now, General, you were a regimental commander on the west coast of the United States in field artillery. The war came in December of 1941, and your career took a very surprising turn. Now how did that come to be?

BARKER: On Pearl Harbor day I was at Camp Roberts, California, in command of the 30th Field Artillery. We participated in the shifts up and down the coast following that and were observers of the almost chaotic fears that seemed to prevail through the populace. On February 7, 1942, I received a telegram directing me to report without delay to the New York port of embarkation prepared for service in temperate climate. I turned over my regiment to my second in command, and within forty-eight hours was ready to leave for the New York port of embarkation. It was impossible to get a flight by air so I had to go by rail. As I passed I made a remark that just about a week before I received this telegram I had a personal letter from the chief of field artillery, General Robert Melville Danford, advising me
that I would soon be relieved of command of my regiment because
I was to be promoted to brigadier general. Naturally, I was
surprised to receive this telegram about reporting to New York.
However, orders are orders. On my way to Washington I stopped--
or to New York, which--actually my destination was Fort Dix,
New Jersey, which was headquarters of the New York port of em-
barcation. On my way there I stopped off in Washington and went
to the office of General Danford, the chief of field artillery.
I happened to be an acquaintance of his, and so I went to General
Danford and asked if I might presume to inquire as to my desti-
nation and what my duties might be. He told me. First, he apolo-
gized in a sort of way. He said, "I'm afraid that this may
interfere with your expected promotion, but I was called upon
to designate an officer to take over the artillery section at a
large headquarters being organized in London for operations in
Europe." He says, "That's about all I can tell you." I said,
"Well, never mind about the promotion part of it, if I can just
go where the war is." And I said, "I'm quite happy about this
because I've been in England a great deal and I think I can work
effectively there." I then continued on to Ft. Dix shortly after.
And I found that there they were assembling the personnel which
would constitute this large headquarters. Amongst them were a
man who was to become the inspector general; another one was to become the chief finance officer; another was earmarked for judge advocate general. Shortly thereafter I was summoned to Washington, as were two or three others, including Colonel Edward C. Betts of the Judge Advocate General's Department. We were told that we were to go to London right away ahead of the rest of the proposed headquarters group. We were told to provide ourselves with civilian clothes and a civilian passport and not to take uniforms because we had to go through neutral countries. I got a civilian passport—an official passport—from the state department and had my picture taken in civilian clothes.

BURG: How did you manage that? Didn't you have to put on some of the photographer's clothes?

BARKER: I borrowed a necktie—civilian necktie—and a civilian coat from the photographer and had my picture taken. With this subsequently I went and bought myself a suit of civilian clothes. Shortly thereafter we took off by air, and we flew Pan American to Bermuda, thence to the Azores, thence to Lisbon. I'm not going to mention that incident at Lisbon.
BURG: Oh, you don't think so?

BARKER: No. And from Lisbon to Shannon. We flew to Shannon on BOAC. From Shannon airport we flew to Poole on the Channel coast and from thence by train to London. I found that headquarters in London consisted of a small group of officers headed by General James Eugene Chaney of the air force. This group was known as the "SPOBS Group", S-P-O-B-S. Amongst them was Charley Charles L. Bolté, later General Bolté. And the chief of staff was General Joseph Taggart McNarney.

BURG: Why did they call it "SPOBS"?

BARKER: S-P-O-B-S was the acronym for Special Observers Group, which had been sent to London for liaison purposes with the British before we entered the war.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: This was a small group of not more than about ten officers. I promptly began trying to function as best I could under the circumstances in the area of artillery matters.
BURG: What kind of duties did they expect you to perform in charge of artillery at that time?

BARKER: It was primarily planning for the employment of artillery in the area and had to do with equipment appropriate to the operation and the amounts that would be needed—types and so on.

BURG: Did you have to pick training sites too and—

BARKER: Well, that would have been part of it, eventually; but shortly after this General [George Catlett] Marshall came to the theater. While he was there, as I recall General McNarney was relieved as chief of staff and returned to the United States. Colonel Bolté, B-o-l-t-e—Charles Bolté—who had been head of the War Plans Section—was designated as chief of staff at the headquarters; and I was named head of the War Plans Section, as it was then called. This projected me into the planning field instead of—the overall planning field—

BURG: How did that happen, General? You were an experienced field artillery officer. You've told me how that army had to do
many jobs. How did it happen that you were picked for this kind of work?

BARKER: Because I happened to be standing there, and there was no one else available. And bear in mind that there were very few officers available—on duty—there at that time. And I was told out of the blue one day that I was designated as head of the War Plans Section, and I was directed to report to General Marshall at 2:00 o'clock—I don't remember the date—at 2:00 o'clock at Combined Operations Headquarters at Richmond Terrace. This was the headquarters of Admiral Louis Francis Albert Mountbatten.

BURG: Ah, yes.

BARKER: On my arrival there and going into the room, I found there was Admiral Mountbatten and General Marshall and a vast assortment of people in various kinds of uniforms. Also present was General Albert Coady Wedemeyer, then Colonel Wedemeyer, and an air officer whose name I do not now recall. They had come
to London with General Marshall. So I reported there at this long table covered with green billard cloth and was told to sit down. And so we there began the discussion on the employment of American troops in an eventual return to the Continent, as the British continually called that operation. General Marshall left a day or so later for the United States. He stopped en route in Ireland where the 34th Division was then stationed under the command of Major General "Scrappy"/Russell Peter+/ Hartle, H-a-r-t-l-e. From this time on, then, my involvement with the planning for operations in northwest Europe was continuous.

EURG: General, were you surprised at the size of that meeting and the personnel of that meeting, or was that pretty much what you expected when you reported to Marshall?

BARKER: I didn't know what was going on. I simply knew that I was to report to General Marshall at Lord Mountbatten's headquarters at Richmond Terrace, and I assumed there was a meeting in progress. I was not surprised to see this large number of British military personnel and--I might add--from the civilian
ministry because by this time I had learned that the British were very, very thorough in all these things and brought into the picture everyone who had an interest in it.

BURG: I see. Now were you known to General Marshall?

BARKER: No.

BURG: And did you report directly to him personally at that meeting?

BARKER: Oh, yes, yes.

BURG: And did he say anything to you? Aside from--

BARKER: He told me to sit down. Well, there was a discussion going on, and he knew what I'd come for and he knew what it was all about.

BURG: Was the discussion a friendly discussion, General?

BARKER: Oh, of course--

BURG: Right.
BARKER: --of course. And it dealt in very, very general terms, having to do very largely with the matter of the movement of American forces into the British Isles.

BURG: The BOLERO?

BARKER: The build-up.

BURG: The build-up for it.

BARKER: The build-up of American forces. As I say, General Marshall left; and the next day or the day after that and from that time--as I've said--I was in the planning bracket.

BURG: Right. Working at that time just primarily with Americans?

BARKER: No. We had very few Americans, actually, and I only had one or two American officers directly associated with me in my area of work.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: One of my first moves was to attempt to get more people there to assist in this, and I put in a demand--if I might call
it that—for highly qualified officers. Within a week or ten
days—about ten days—three excellent officers arrived. Amongst
them was Colonel Art [Arthur Seymour] Nevins—

BURG: Oh, I see.

BARKER: —Colonel Arch, A-r-c-h—I suppose that was Archibald—
[Archelaus L.] Hamblen, and another man named Schulz [Ed. note:
actually Col. Josef R. Sheetz], whose specialty was logistics.
They were most useful, but obviously the first thing was—it
seemed to me—to find out what the British were doing in this
field. I found that there was in existence a sort of joint com-
mittee called the Combined Commanders. These were the commanders
of the different British forces or their representatives of all
arms in Britain. The senior army man was Gen. Sir Bernard Paget,
but these commanders had designated men to actively carry on
the detailed work of planning. For the army, there was Brigadier—
cut that thing just a minute while I get the name. The British
army representative in this planning group was Brig. Colin [V.O'N.]
MacNabb.
BURG: I see.

BARKER: The navy was represented by--I think he was a Commodore--/Cyril E./ Douglas-Pennant--later became a full admiral. Douglas-Pennant--hyphenated name.

BURG: Thank you.

BARKER: The airman was Air Marshal /William/ Sholto Douglas. I do not at this time recall the name of the representative from Lord Mountbatten's combined operations.

BURG: All right.

BARKER: Each of these men from the various services had, of course, several assistants. They were actively at work on a number of plans contemplating the return to the Continent. Foremost among these was a plan called "ROUNDUP." From this time on, then, I continued to build up a planning staff at my own--at our own--headquarters, and we worked in the closest daily cooperation with the British planning people whom I've mentioned.
BURG: Was it an informal cooperation, General, or had you been assigned to sit with their group?

BARKER: No one ever actually told me that I should associate myself or collaborate with these people; it was just the obvious thing to do because they were in being. They--
(Interruption)

BURG: --that they had accumulated considerable experience.

BARKER: No. They had accumulated a vast amount of material—intelligence about the German dispositions, and the German defensive organization, and about the terrain across the Channel. And we naturally availed ourselves of this, and they very freely gave us of everything that they had. There were daily informal visits—discussions back and forth as we worked ourselves into the situation. Periodically, there were held formal meetings at which the senior officers came—General Paget and the others. And formal minutes were kept of these. The British were expert in that matter of keeping minutes of meetings. Before long I was
invited to come to a meeting of the BOLERO committee, a British meeting of their so-called BOLERO committee to be held at Norfolk House, St. James Square. This was my first introduction to Norfolk House where I was destined to spend many, many, many working days over the next couple of years. BOLERO was the code name which had been adopted to designate the process or the operation of introducing into the United Kingdom the American forces for participation in the forthcoming—or the anticipated—operation in Europe. It included not only personnel, of course, but the vast stores of supplies and equipment that would be needed. The ramifications of this were infinite. It involved the erection of warehouses and storage facilities. I recall that the motor transportation was shipped knocked-down. That is, the wheels were off of the vehicles and were in the bodies. And it involved the construction or preparation of assembly plants for motor transportation. There had to be a vast amount of storage space for rations. There was the matter of medical installations and so on. The BOLERO committee had frequent meetings, and out of it came numbers of directives to the various British ministries on whom this whole thing impinged: the
General Post Office in the matter of telephone communication, for example, and the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of War Transport. This went on until by the summer of '42 the whole business had been pretty well clarified and its procedures set up. And as a result of this, the formal meetings—as I recall—of BOLERO just seemed to peter out.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: We didn't—

BURG: By that summer of 1942 were there any number of American troops in England or Scotland or were they all in North Ireland now?

BARKER: No, in the summer of '42 American troops began arriving in the United Kingdom. The first combat troops to arrive was the 1st Division, the 1st Infantry Division, which was stationed on Salisbury Plain. An important element for decision at that time was the priority to be given to different types of troops. The chief signal officer was calling for signal troops because communications lines had to be installed. Everyone was fighting for tonnage. There was a limited amount of tonnage, and we had
a prediction from Washington as to how many personnel could come in a certain month. And we were called upon to say how we wanted to distribute that allocation of troop space to the different arms, and I was in the middle of groups of different staffs and branches of the service demanding a large share of that personnel allotment. The quartermaster people wanted depot troops so they could house the supplies; the anti-aircraft people said, "Well, we ought to have some anti-aircraft troops here to protect these installations"; the chief surgeon was demanding medical personnel for the hospital; and so on. And the fellow in the middle, myself, in allocating these was under an awful lot of pressure and made a lot of enemies, I'm afraid.

BURG: Well, I suppose the engineers would demand personnel if they were going to build the hospitals.

BARKER: Oh, all of them were demanding personnel. And they wanted more than their—they all wanted their share of the shipped capacity for a month.
BURG: Well, how did you--

BARKER: And we had to, of course, operate sixty to ninety days in advance, too.

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: Because once a decision was made as to what personnel and what units were to come, then those units in the States had to be alerted and prepared and moved to the ports and so on. So we were operating on a lead of sixty to ninety days on all of this.

BURG: By what process did you establish these priorities? That's going to be of great interest. How does one determine whether to bring in more engineers than signal or--

BARKER: Well, you just had to look at the situation as it existed—or would exist—say, sixty days from now and use your own best judgment in the light of discussions with the various departments or arms or branches and arrive at the best possible decision as to which need was most pressing in the light of the situation as it existed.
BURG: After the event did you look back to find that by and large you people made the right decisions, or do you remember any time when maybe you had far more infantry than you could house or--

BARKER: The British were very generous in giving us housing for the combat troops and for troops. They made a lot of their barracks available—for instance, the Aldershot area. Sidworth \( \text{Ed. note: Sidmouth} \) in particular had been a big British garrison in peacetime, and they turned that whole thing over to us.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: They were very helpful with this. But we had a visit from General Marshall in June. He came over to discuss with us the matter of operations that year. The president was most anxious to have troops in action in the European Theater in the year 1942, especially before election.

BURG: I see. Yes.

BARKER: And General Marshall and others came over in June to
explore this whole thing, and General Marshall pushed us very hard to plan an operation on the Continent with such troops as were available that year. And under pressure for that, my little group prepared what we thought was the only practicable operation with the troops available in 1942, namely, a landing with available forces to seize the Cherbourg peninsula.

In an unreasonably short time—less than twenty-four hours—we did prepare an outline plan for that. I remember we worked all night—right through the night—Art Nevins and some of us—and the next morning I had to present this plan to General Marshall. It was what we used to call an outline plan. And General Marshall went to the British Chiefs of Staff to propose that, and the British Chiefs of Staff turned thumbs down. They said it was just not feasible.

BURG: Now your plan would have employed how many divisions?

BARKER: Oh, I don’t remember. The 1st Division. We had by that time the 1st Division and the 34th Division. I think the 1st Armored Division was in Northern Ireland at that time, and we
would have brought more divisions--more troops--over because it was to be some months hence. But looking back on it, the British Chiefs of Staff, headed by General [Alan Francis] Brooke--Alan Brooke--as I see it now, they were quite right about it.

BURG: Had you planned just to lodge yourselves in the Cotentin?

BARKER: That's right, that's right. To seize this--to get a toehold on the Continent where we could construct airfields and from which we could break out in conjunction with other landing operations, the following year--which would have been 1943. But all of this came to naught when in late July we suddenly got orders to drop everything in connection with planning for operations in northwest Europe because we were directed to prepare plans for operations in Africa. And that was the TORCH operation. And in the last week in July--I don't remember the exact date, but it was toward the end of July--I was in my room in my billet in the Dorchester Hotel where General Eisenhower was also billeted and I received a phone call from him to come to his room. I rather think it was about 9:00 or 10:00 o'clock at night. He handed
me this cablegram from General Marshall saying that the presi-
dent had directed that American forces must be engaged in the
European Theater in 1942—that was the president's direction—and
to prepare for operations in North Africa. That was the
beginning of the TORCH operations.

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: General Eisenhower had been there less than two months
and he was not—I would say a month and a half, something of
that sort; you can tell from the record—

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: --he was not yet thoroughly familiar; but he said to me,
"I will have to form a joint British-American headquarters and
staff for this. Can you recommend British officers for key
positions in this?" And at the same time he said that he wanted
me to take the job of G-3 on the operation. I told him that
there were two officers that I would particularly recommend to
him. One was General Humfrey /Myddelton/ Gale as the chief supply
and logistic officer. That was the first time Humfrey Gale ever came to General Eisenhower's notice. At that time General Humfrey Gale had this sort of position on the staff of General Paget, who was commander in chief, Home Forces, in England. And he subsequently asked for General Gale and got him. And General Gale stayed with him to the end of the war. That was a successful appointment.

BURG: Right.

BARKER: I also recommended Kenneth W.D./ Strong for G-2. He tried to get Kenneth Strong, but the British would not release him. Instead they offered a man in the intelligence field named Brigg. Eric E./ Mockler-Ferryman--M-o-c-k-l-e-r--F-e-r-r-y-m-a-n. Mockler-Ferryman joined the staff as G-2 but left it after the force got to Africa. And then General Eisenhower was able to get Kenneth Strong, who stayed with him to the end.

BURG: Right, right.

BARKER: I continued on this until shortly before the date for
the operation when word came from General Marshall to reconstitute the ROUNDUPT planners for operation in Europe. I had been head of that on the American side, so I was pulled out of TORCH together with a couple of others and went back to work on what became OVERLORD.

BURG: Had you completed the TORCH planning at the time you were pulled off?

BARKER: Well, it's never completed until the last. It had pretty well crystalized, and I was succeeded by—turn that off—I was succeeded by Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer.

BURG: Lyman Lemnitzer.

BARKER: Lyman Lemnitzer. So I went back to work on ROUNDUPT, as it was then called, which was a sort of a generic word for the return to the Continent. And I worked on it through the fall. It was very difficult because TORCH had first claim on everything.

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: And it was rather frustrating all through the fall, and the British personnel were being changed all the time. Finally, along about December they designated General Maj. Gen. Sir
John Alexander Sinclair—generally known as "Sinbad Sinclair" because originally—he was an officer of the Royal Horse Artillery, a gunner, as they called him—but originally he had been in the navy so they called him Sinbad.

BURG: Oh, I see, yes.

BARKER: But he and I were able really then at mid-winter to get down to brass tacks and with constructive planning.

BURG: Now let me ask you this, General: when you left the TORCH setup was there any final word to you from General Eisenhower? Did he say anything about——

BARKER: No, no. General Eisenhower was up to his ears in TORCH.

BURG: All right. Second question. Was it your impression at that time—now you're off TORCH and back on ROUNDUP and the British are changing their officers—did you think at that time that perhaps the British weren't as serious about ROUNDUP as we were? Or how did you view it?

BARKER: Well, we were dead serious about it from the very begin—
ning: I knew that from General Marshall. And we Americans were convinced that this was the prime way to defeat Germany. The British—the prime minister—as is a matter of history, swayed back and forth on this, and I won't go into that. They always wanted to go back to the Continent. It was just a question of how they would do it, and the prime minister had this idea about the "soft-underbelly" that we had heard so much about. We heard about it at Quebec. But the demands on the British for officers were very, very great. They were operating in various theaters. And a number of their planners had gone to TORCH just as ours had, so it took a while to get settled firmly back on to what was then called ROUNDPUP. But, as I told you yesterday, it was on New Year's Day, 1943, that I put it up to General Sinclair that we had a vast amount of data, information, intelligence, and tentative plans but it was time for us to produce something that would bring it all to a head and come up with a definite conclusion and a definite recommendation as to what in our view was the most promising answer to the question of where and in what way the operation could be launched with
the greatest prospect of success. And we did produce this paper in February of 1943 and submitted it to the Combined Commanders. It was a very exhaustive study and, we thought, a very constructive one. And this paper became known as "CC-109," CC standing for Combined Commanders. I think I'm right with that number 109. But it was this paper that was available to COSSAC when COSSAC was formed, and it was the springboard from which the planning for OVERLORD was launched.

BURG: How wide a dissemination did CC-109 have? Did it come here to the United States for example?

BARKER: Yes, it did. We submitted it to the Combined Commanders, and it went from the Combined Commanders to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which was the top armed forces committee under the prime minister. The Chiefs of Staff Committee was presided over by General Brooke, who was CIGS, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. And it numbered the top naval man, who varied from time to time, and the senior man for the Army--actually that was Brooke--and he had an assistant. Also sitting in on that was General Hastings Lionel Ismay, "Pug" Ismay. Air Marshal
Charles Frederick Algernan portal was a very potent member of that group; Mountbatten was a member of it. So this paper of ours did go through to them also. I don't recall just what they did with it, but--

BURG: In short it did not come back to you with any written statements on it from them?

BARKER: I don't recall just what their comment was. But it was available to us, and, of course, things began to move. The Casablanca Conference was held, and out of that came the decision to form a planning group to make definite plans. By that time it was evident that the operations in North Africa were going to succeed, and so the decision then was taken to proceed with definite planning for operations for a return to the Continent across the Channel.

BURG: Ah, you qualify that by saying across the Channel--

BARKER: Yes.

BURG: How did you feel? Did that please you that they were setting a very definite range in north Europe?
BARKER: Well, I was too far down on the ladder at that time. I became aware of all this when they directed that a staff be formed to do this planning in the name of the supreme allied...
BARKER:--to do it in the name of the supreme allied commander.
And out of this came the appointment of General Frederick
Edgworth Morgan with the title of Chief of Staff to the Su-
preme Allied Commander (designate).

BURG: Yes, yes.

BARKER: And I was designated as deputy to General Morgan.

BURG: Did Morgan have any say in your being picked, or was he
in effect handed you as an experienced American officer?

BARKER: It happened that at that time I wore two hats: I was
head of the planning group and I was also G-3 of the European
Theater at Grosvenor Square, the American headquarters. So
I had two hats, and General Jacob Loucks Devers was in command.
He took command after General Frank Maxwell Andrews was killed
in a crash in Iceland. And Morgan consulted with Devers, and
Devers--I am told--said, "Well, the logical man is Ray Barker.
He's been in this racket all along. He's more familiar with it
and is more deeply immersed in it than any one else." So as a
result of that, I was a brigadier at that time.

BURG: You had been promoted?

BARKER: Yes, I was promoted in the summer of '42.

BURG: All right.

BARKER: And so I moved on over into COSSAC.

BURG: Leaving now your duties as G-3?

BARKER: For a while I continued to supervise that in G-3 as well, but after a time I was relieved entirely of that. And it was at this time that I was promoted to major general.

BURG: And your official designation in COSSAC was Deputy Chief of--

BARKER: Deputy Chief of Staff.

BURG: --of Staff.

BARKER: Deputy Chief of Staff. Morgan was senior to me: he was a lieutenant-general.

BURG: Yes.
BARKER: We worked on an equal plane. As a matter of fact, Morgan said many times, "Actually, I ought to be the junior member of this because the Americans are going to be the preponderant force ultimately."

BURG: He saw that early?

BARKER: Oh, he saw it right from the beginning.

BURG: Right.

BARKER: Right from the beginning, he said, "The British are going to be the junior partners in this eventually."

BURG: Can you describe your first meeting with this man? I know how much you admire him. What was your first meeting and what took place?

BARKER: Well, I was told by General Devers that I was to be the senior American officer on that and was to be deputy to General Morgan, and I said, "Well, who is he and where is he?" And he said, "Well"--and as I recall Devers made an appointment for me. I went to Norfolk House and there met General Morgan
for the first time.

BURG: His offices were there?

BARKER: Well, we really hadn't set up COSSAC yet. We were just getting together—getting acquainted—and were starting to gather some people around us.

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: And as a natural thing the small group that I had working on the planning for ROUNDUP—the "ROUNDUP planners" they called us—we just redesignated ourselves and were absorbed into COSSAC. And a group of Britishers moved in, and so the thing just flowed together without any formal thing. Finally, of course, after we began to accumulate people, General Morgan called us all together one day, and he introduced himself. He told them what it was all about and read to all of us the first draft we had of our directive. And from that time I was in COSSAC.

BURG: Now you must have been concerned. You were going now to work very closely with a senior British officer. What was your first impression of Morgan?
BARKER: Oh, like every American who met him, it seemed that I was very much attracted to him. I realized that here was a great character: here was a man who above everything else was honest and straightforward. And it was apparent right away that he was a man of great ability, but the outstanding impression that one gained was that "here is a straight shooter."

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: I've heard that so many times from Americans: "He's a straight shooter."

BURG: Now he's known to have liked Americans. He seems to--

BARKER: Known to have what?

BURG: To have liked Americans.

BARKER: Oh, yes, yes.

BURG: Seems to have admired us.

BARKER: Yes, he liked Americans, and Americans sensed it.
BURG: Now you have a reputation of having admired many English. Was there anything in your mind that you might have been placed in your position because you were known to get along with the English and to admire them?

BARKER: Well, we mustn't use that word *admire* too freely. I think I understood the British point of view and the British people better than most Americans. I'd been in England a great deal.

BURG: That is, before the war, General?

BARKER: Before the war. And I'd always been a great student of English history. And I seemed to be able to establish a rapport with them better than a great many of them. General Marshall said to me one day, fairly early in the game--I think it was on one of his visits to England--he said, "They tell me that you are pro-British." I said, "I don't know what they mean by 'pro-British,' but certainly under the present circumstances
here I shouldn't be anti-British. That would be fatal to our cause, but, "I said, "I do get along well with them. I understand them and I understand their point of view." And General Marshall smiled. It didn't seem to--

BURG: And your assignment was not changed?

BARKER: Well, I told him I felt that my loyalty was first to my own people and to my own command—and that prevailed over everything else—but that I did get along well with the British and seemed to be able to establish a rapport with them.

BURG: Now let me ask you this, General. Marshall looked at you and said, "They tell me you're pro-British." Did any others in England say this to you and perhaps say it as though that was a bad thing for you to be pro-British? Any trouble with your fellow officers?

BARKER: No, no, that never interfered; that never arose.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: There was one circumstance. When I left to go to
England, I had to leave my uniforms back in the States because I went in civilian clothes, and my uniforms were in a foot locker. It didn't arrive for a couple of months, and I was not in uniform. There were no American uniform supplies available, no quartermaster; and I had to get a uniform tailored in England.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: And I had to use some British material which was slightly different from ours. It's upstairs here now. And someone commented on that one time.

BURG: They did.

BARKER: Jokingly. But this question never bothered me, never had any--

BURG: But there was one button on your tunic that was non-American.

BARKER: Yeah. I moved that down to the bottom of my coat where it attracted the least attention, and I wore that for quite some time to please General Morgan. And he did the same, but eventually we took them off.

BURG: But this was the circumstance where--
BARKER: This was a little symbol that just meant something and General Morgan felt meant something.

BURG: How did he remove your button and one of his own and trade with you just about the time that you first met in COSSAC?

BARKER: Yes, right at the very beginning.

BURG: Right. And the two of you then wore each other's uniform button on your own tunics.

BARKER: For a time. I think I took mine off when I went to Quebec.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: I took it off at that time, but I wore it during the early days of COSSAC.

BURG: It was an interesting symbol. Let me ask you this, General, because it's the sort of thing that typically doesn't occur to people, I guess. Can you describe for me a fairly typical day for you at COSSAC with General Morgan? How would the day begin
for you, and what kinds of things might you be doing during that day—what kinds of meetings, with what kinds of people—just a typical day of operations in that unit?

BARKER: As far as we two were concerned, there was no typical day. The British working day is different from ours: there's an hour's difference. We Americans, after all, we had to—for the great bulk of the people that worked there, there had to be office hours. There just had to be an hour when you began work. We had American clerks and American WACS and secretaries and sergeants who were typists and who worked on maps and all that sort of thing and handled the files. Those people—the general run of them, officers and men—came to work at nine o'clock in the morning. They were scattered all around in billets, and it took time to get there. So nine o'clock in the morning was the usual time for Americans—the American element—to start work. The British, however, liked to begin work at ten o'clock. We liked to quit work at five. The British liked to work until six—same number of hours but a different time. And this, strangely enough, was a minor problem all the way through; the working habits of the two people were different. But for Morgan
and myself, we free lanced. I might start the day by going to one of the British ministries. I might start the day by going first to Grosvenor Square to see the Americans about something that had come up. And Morgan and I made it a habit to get together in the early part of the morning—about the middle of the morning—to talk about things that had happened and what we were going to do to plan. He'd say, "Well, I want to go to the War Office this morning to see Brooke" and so on. And we spent a great deal of time with the planners on the next lower level, giving them our ideas, checking on what they were doing, and so on. We were often called to meetings in the War office where the British were having conferences, and we would go and sit in on that. Morgan and I worked late, later than anybody else. We would have something to eat and by eight o'clock or eight-thirty we were back in Norfolk House. There might be two or three others there of the senior officers: General Maj. Gen. Charles A. West or Brigadier Kenneth G. McLean or someone like that, but Morgan and I a great deal of the time never left
there till ten or eleven o'clock at night--oftentimes working specifically on a given problem, or a given set of figures, or just having a bull session on how things seemed to be going--trying to size up the situation. But I would say four nights out of five found me working my way back to my billet sometime between ten, eleven, eleven-thirty at night, in the dark--

BURG: Blackout?

BARKER: In the blackout.

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: And so on. And usually being stopped along the way by a street walker, as there were plenty of those on the streets. They were French, incidentally, most of them.

BURG: Sundays off for all of you, or did you run seven days a week?

BARKER: For most of the rank and file Sunday was off. For the senior ones amongst us, we worked Sunday morning and then tried to get some exercise in the afternoon.
BURG: Yes.

BARKER: And I would often take a bus out to the outskirts of town and hike on the country roads until dark. And General West and I were great walkers together and turn it off.

(Interruptation)

BURG: Let me ask you this, General: were you and Morgan--were your offices close together--that is were you on the same floor of a structure?

BARKER: Oh, there was no--is this being recorded?

BURG: Yes, it's running.

BARKER: There was no distinction whatever along national lines, no severance. Here was a team, and whether a man wore a U.S. or a Crown made not a bit of difference, not a bit of difference. No one thought about it. You just worked together as a team, and no one thought about whether a chap was British or American or Canadian. We had some Canadians with us, and we had some South Africans too. No one thought about that at all.
BURG: Well, you were, that is, you and Morgan were fairly close physically in the building—

BARKER: Yes.

BURG: --so you could easily consult?

BARKER: I was in the next room.

BURG: Right. How big a force was this? How many people in C OSSAC?

BARKER: Oh, before we got through and the planning took more definite form I think we must have altogether had at least three hundred people of one sort or another.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: Now that included everything from orderlies, clerks, typists, file clerks, mimeograph operators, draftsman who could make maps, and people who could do multigraph work. There were translators because we were translating German and French documents quite frequently. And then if a major decision was made
to carry out a certain project there had to be people in the lower ranks who would have to sit down and do the nuts and bolts of it: how many craft of this type, how many craft of that type, how many men are needed to man these craft and then the capacities of craft, how much you could get onto different craft, how many craft could be funneled through a certain point—through a certain hard—and so on, and the rates of flow of supplies. Now that took a lot of calculating, and for that you needed a great many people—experienced people, intelligent people—in the grades of captain, major—some of them lieutenants—and so on.

BURG: Now some of those men are Americans; some are Canadians; some are British; some are South African. How was it determined that when you needed some intelligent young officers—how did you determine where you would get them? Did you go to all the services and then pick out, or how was that done?

BARKER: No, we would call on the War Office to supply officers with such and such a qualification from the British, and we would call on American headquarters in London for officers of such and such a grade with such and such qualifications. Or we would ask
Washington for them frequently. We had to ask Washington for officers, and that is the way we got most of our American officers. They were sent directly from the States. And you'd ask for men of such and such a grade who were capable of doing such and such things. Then we would get them; sometimes we would find that they weren't capable. Then we'd get rid of them and so on.

BURG: I see. Then beneath you and Morgan we have high ranking officers to whom the two of you turned over certain problems? You mentioned McLean. For example, if you and Morgan are discussing a problem concerning, well, let's say, landing craft and obtaining landing craft, you would then turn to McLean and say, "Here is what you must do," and McLean would then see to it that it got done?

BARKER: Well, there were staff sections. There were different groups organized for certain functions; and if Morgan and I decided that we wanted to explore the feasibility of the project, we would call in the heads of certain groups and perhaps their assistants. We would call in the people who would be involved therein. And we would discuss them with them, get their views—they were intelligent, good people—get their views on it. And out of that would come a decision: "Well, we better try something
else. Or, go ahead now, and produce a paper which will put this
into effect." So it might—usually would—start from a dis-
cussion between Morgan and myself, initially, probably at ten
o'clock at night or something like that. And we'd say, "Well,
then, tomorrow morning, then, we'll call in West and McLean
and Col. Frank M. Albrecht and Huggins Capt. Gordon Hutchings,
USNR, and we'll put it up to them and put them to work on it."
It was quite informal—

BURG: Let me put this to you: How effectively did your informal
organization work? Did you find areas where you had to make
adjustments to get results? In short, it seems to me that it
would be impossible for this group to form an organization that
worked perfectly. There must have been things you did wrong
at first and corrected. Can you remember that?

BARKER: Well, there was always in a project like that, which is
starting more or less from scratch, a period of trial and error,
getting acquainted with each other, finding the most effective
way of making the machine work. And that came out of consulta-
tion. And as we became better acquainted we found the best
way to handle projects of this type was thus and so, and so the thing evolves. We didn't start out with any table of organization; we didn't have an organizational chart. We had to build that as we went along. And it started with a box that had Morgan and myself in it; and like an inverted tree, there's the usual organizational chart. And we put a box and say, "This is logistics; this is intelligence planning; this is transportation; this is amphibious"; and so on. Then you began to put into each box the people who seemed to be appropriate; and each box in itself sometimes would subdivide—it evolves.

BURG: Right.

BARKER: Because unlike the organization in the War Department or unlike the organization of a division or a corps in the Army __[where]__ there is a prescribed organizational chart and slots which have to be filled, we didn't have anything like that; and there was no one to prescribe it for us. We had to develop it as we went along.

BURG: And the two of you then—the two countries—you and Morgan—
you drew upon your knowledge of organizational matters in your respective armies--

BARKER: Oh, sure.

BURG:--but you put together a pragmatic workable thing--

BARKER: Sure.

BURG:--unlike both.

BARKER: And there was a certain amount of trial and error. You would say, "Well, we'll organize it this way," and in a short time you'd find that you'd have to make an adjustment on that.

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: That's the way it goes.

BURG: Think back now, General. Do you remember what disappointed you most about this planning period in COSSAC? Was there any problem or set of problems that disturbed you because perhaps
they were not solving themselves?

BARKER: Well, problems don't solve themselves—you solve them. No, I don't think so because I think Morgan and I were experienced people. We were accustomed to working with staffs and—

(Interuption)

BARKER: Morgan had an uncanny aptitude for understanding and knowing how to work with our people, and I had already had a good deal of experience with the British. I was known by this time—pretty well known—in Whitehall in the many of the ministries. I'd established rapport there. The people knew me, I knew them. And I could call them on the phone and say, "I'd like to come over and talk to you about this. What would be a good time?" And so on. And they would call me on the phone and say—I was known by my first name amongst a great many of them—"Ray, can you stop by and have a chat with me about this or that?" And you might think it was just a little thing; and when you get there, you find it was something that was worrying them a great deal.
BURG: Can you give me an example of that kind of problem?

BARKER: No, I can't think of anything specifically at the moment.

BURG: I was wondering about the assimilation of our troops in England—the results of BOLERO. Were the English sometimes troubled by us and how we acted?

BARKER: Oh, well, of course, that's a different story. You're getting into an entirely new field. The British and the Americans—we on our part and they on their part—made a very definite effort to see that relations would be good. We had handbooks that were given to the soldiers on the ship coming over telling about the English people, who they were, what their habits were—

BURG: Yes.

BARKER:—and giving their background and their social customs and so on. We had an excellent pamphlet on that, and every soldier had one of them in his pocket. We'd given it to them on the ship. The British prepared films to show American troops, and they circulated a great deal of literature amongst their
people—their civilian population. They made a definite effort to orient the civil population on the matter of having to live with the Americans for a while.

BURG: Yes. Well, I thought that might—

BARKER: Incidents arose.

BURG: Oh, yes.

BARKER: Unquestionably they would; mostly over girls—

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: —more often than anything else. The American soldiers had more money to spend than the English soldiers, and it irritated the English soldiers.

BURG: Yes. Well, I thought perhaps it might be along those lines that they would occasionally call you in to find out—

BARKER: In the earliest days before COSSAC—they talked to me a great deal about it, but at COSSAC we never concerned ourselves
with that. We were working within a different framework entirely.

BURG: All right, let me change directions on you just a bit. So far, besides Morgan's name, we've referred to General West. We've referred to McLean. Could you briefly describe each of these men? What special qualities did West, for example, bring to the COSSAC planning staff?

BARKER: Well, primarily, General West brought—he was an engineer—to COSSAC a keen, analytical, engineering mind that could analyze a problem and get to the roots of it and an ability to reduce it to fundamental terms at first.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: He was an engineer. McLean was a hard, pragmatic Scot—came from a little village up in Scotland. And he too was a man very much like West [and] who had more combat experience. Well, I won't say that because West as an [MRPM?] officer in the First War had a tremendous amount of fighting—saw a great deal of
fighting. But they were men of very much the same type: both of them engineers, both of them of long service in India.

BURG: Uh-huh.

BARKER: And you know in the British service in the line regiments—in the combat arms—they took a peculiar view of engineers: they regarded them as a separate breed. We very often did too. But these were both hard thinkers—pragmatic men—who had a keen power of analysis. West *was* a much quieter man than McLean. A fine man.

BURG: Do other British officers in your group now stand in your mind for their qualities?

BARKER: There was *Maj.* Gen. Nevil Brownjohn, *B-r-o-w-n-j-o-n-n-* B.J. He was a supply man. He was with us the counterpart of Humfrey Gale. And he was what we would call quartermaster type, and he was tops in the field of supply. He headed up in our organization all the supply planning. He was an outstanding man. He later after the war became a full general, was in command of
British troops in Berlin, and was knighted. He is now Gen. Sir Nevil Brownjohn and a very, very sick man. Last year when I was in England, I called his house. I wanted to go to see him, and Lady Brownjohn said that he was in bed—that he can't see anyone.

BURG: That's too bad.

BARKER: He was a very outstanding man too.

BURG: Did you have any Royal Navy types with you?

BARKER: Oh, of course, there was commodore John Hughes-Hallet. I've mentioned him.

BURG: Yes, "Hughes-Hitler" was the nickname.

BARKER: Oh, behind his back, we called him Hughes-Hitler. He was a most excellent man. He had had lots of sea service—lots of fighting at sea—and was an intensely practical man. We were not well represented at COSSAC by the U. S. Navy. They didn't give us their best men, I'm afraid. I'd like not to discuss that.
BURG: Well, just discuss what you think their reasons were. We needn't name the men if you don't wish to but--

BARKER: Well, I don't know. In the first place Admiral [Ernest Joseph] King was interested in the Pacific, and he would put in everything he could into the Pacific.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: And, no, the main burden of the planning at COSSAC fell on Hughes-Hallet and his group, and our navy was not well represented either numerically or otherwise.

BURG: Now, how about the British Royal Air Force? Did you have good people drawn from that branch?

BARKER: Oh, we had excellent men. Our best man there was Air Commodore Victor Groom, later Air Marshal Groom.

BURG: How did he spell his name?

BARKER: G-r-double o-m.

BURG: All right.
BARKER: Maybe there was an 'e' on it. He was an excellent chap. And we remained friends for many years after the war. I visited them in England. We corresponded, but it sort of petered out in the last few years. But we kept in touch with each other over the years, Victor Groom. He made a tremendous contribution. But I worked with him from the very beginning; he was one of the earliest people in my experience there. I was with him right from the very beginning. He and I were associated, and when we formed COSSAC, I made a special request that Groom come over with us at COSSAC.

BURG: Now how about the strengths of the American contingent? Who were the senior American officers, and how do you see their contribution?

BARKER: Oh, I think their contribution was, of course, competent and excellent. I wouldn't derogate them for a minute because I speak of the British—you've been speaking about the British—

BURG: Right.

BARKER: —and not the Americans. We had some very very excellent people. Colonel Frank M. Albrecht of the engineers was an outstanding man.
BURG: Was his quality of mind very much like his British counterpart's? Was he a practical and--

BARKER: Oh, yes--

BURG:--sharp minded?

BARKER: Oh, yes. He was an engineer, and he later became a major-general and was chief engineer in the European Theater for a time--

BURG: I see.

BARKER:--after the war. He was an excellent man. Names have begun to slip me on a lot of these people.

BURG: Was Arthur Seymour Nevins with this unit?

BARKER: What's that?

BURG: Was Nevins with this unit, Arthur Nevins?

BARKER: No, no. Art Nevins was not in COSSAC; he was in North Africa.
BURG: I see.

BARKER: And after Ike joined us Art came up from Africa and was absorbed into SHAEF. There were a number of people from North Africa who came up because Ike had known them there—Ike and Bedell Smith—and they wanted them. They had proven themselves, and they wanted them.

BURG: Right. Now you've told me that our U.S. Navy representation on COSSAC was rather weak. How about our Air Corps representation?

BARKER: Oh, we had some good men. They changed a number of times. We had a man named Col. Haywood S., Jr., Hansell, and we had Col. Paul S. Edwards; but they seemed to be shifting all the time. We didn't have continuity in the air planning, which was very unfortunate. But the Air Force changed their people a number of times with us, and that was unfortunate. And as a consequence, most of the work was done by Groom—headed up by Groom.

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: But we had Air Force officers too. But we had too many
changes in the Air Force component.

BURG: Later on there was quite a--I would have to say a great--argument over the fact that Eisenhower wanted to pull bombers off the strategic bombing of Germany to bomb for OVERLORD. Do you suppose that some of the arguments came from the fact that Air Force representation changed?

BARKER: No, no. By the time Eisenhower came the operation—the form of the operation—had crystallized, and Bomber Command in the Royal Air Force—headed by Air Marshal [Arthur Travers] Harris—was quite a potent influence in England. They were all for bombing the hell out of Germany itself, but as the time approached for OVERLORD it became increasingly important that we seal off the area where we were going to make our landings. And you look at that big book, and you'll see the pictures all around the arc, an arc which enclosed Normandy. The railway bridges had to be knocked out; the tracks had to be knocked out; and the marshalling yards had to be destroyed. But there was one thing we had to be very careful about: not to concentrate
everything on the Normandy area cause that would be a dead giveaway as to where we were going.

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: So, unfortunately for the French, we did a hell of a lot of bombing around Pas de Calais area and other areas so as to keep the thing in balance and not point the finger too closely. Then, of course, once the operation was launched, then it was intensified around the area where we were operating.

BURG: Did you ever encounter great resistance to any of your ideas, say, from the Combined Chiefs, the British—well, Alan Brooke, for example? Any real opposition from that level?

BARKER: Opposition to what?

BURG: To any aspect of your plans?

BARKER: Well, of course, the prime minister right on up to the time of Quebec had reservations about the cross-Channel operation. He had lived through the first war. He'd seen the destruction of a generation of young Englishmen. And at a briefing that we gave him one time at Norfolk House he shook his head, and he said,
"I wake up at night and see the Channel floating with bodies of the cream of our youth." I'm paraphrasing that. He was worried about the losses. He thought there might be a cheaper way of doing it. And he kept proposing operations in the Mediterranean—the underbelly; but after Quebec he was into it heart and soul and so was Brooke. And occasionally there might be differences of opinion about some of the details. But, basically, they were all for it, and they threw themselves into it just as we did.

BURG: You and Morgan were both quite satisfied in your own minds as you singled down to Normandy that you were right—better that, than the Baltic coast of Germany?

BARKER: Oh, yes, yes. There was no question about it.

BURG: And that—

BARKER: No question about it.

BURG:—the best thing to do was Normandy with a deceptive feint at the Pas de Calais?
BARKER: Well, yes, that was part of the deception, of course. That had to be.

BURG: Now you spoke of coming over to the United States, and you brought over with you material which you then presented to our Joint Chiefs. Could you describe how it occurred that you were sent to do that and what the trip was like for you? And who it was you talked with and their reactions? Could you sort of sketch in for me that experience while you were in COSSAC?

BARKER: Well, I think General [Thomas Troy] Handy probably was the one who had proposed it; but, at any rate, General Marshall and the American Chiefs of Staff didn't want to go into the Quebec Conference cold to be confronted with this plan for the first time right there with the British who already knew about it because we had presented it to the British Chiefs of Staff on the 15th of July. So I was ordered to come over to Washington and bring the proposed plans with me and make a presentation to the Chiefs of Staff—which I did. And we did that in Washington. Then we went by train to Quebec.
BURG: What was the reaction of the United States Navy to the plans when you presented in Washington?

BARKER: Well--

BURG: King was there and Admiral William Daniel Leahy was there.

BARKER: Leahy was there and Admiral King. Well, Admiral King--I gained the impression--now this is purely an impression--and I told this to Samuel Eliot Morison, who is a friend of mine, up in Maine one summer; and he disagreed with me--I told him that my impression was that Admiral King had no enthusiasm for the thing at all: that he didn't like it very much because he was mad at the Japs and wanted to divert everything--wanted to fight in the Pacific and give that the first priority. But again, that was my impression at the time. I just felt that he didn't have great enthusiasm for it.

BURG: Did he ask many questions?

BARKER: Oh, yes, but I don't recall too much about it.
BURG: Anyone at that meeting who seemed very enthusiastic as you think back to those days?

BARKER: Well, of course General Marshall was. He was all for it.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: And General /Henry Harley/ Arnold was also.

BURG: Right.

BARKER: They were in it right up to their eyes, yeah.

BURG: And then, when those sessions were over, you took the same basic material up to Quebec?

BARKER: That's right.

BURG: Now did you present the material then before Roosevelt and Churchill or--

BARKER: No, no. On the way over--Kenneth McLean had come over with the Prime Minister, and aboard ship he had made a presentation
to the Prime Minister. I've got a picture here of our COSSAC group, and it includes Kenneth McLean, myself, Albrecht and Capt. Gordon (USN) Hutchings and one or two others taken at Quebec. Gosh, I looked young.

I thought I'd never go back to that. But they were both familiar with it--both the American Chiefs and the other--and I don't think a formal presentation was made to them there. Kenneth McLean didn't, as far as I know; and I didn't. They were familiar with it, and they just discussed the implications of it. Their discussion was largely on a--I think--most of them--because they sat in closed session almost all of the time.

And there was one time when everybody was driven out of the place, and it was reduced right down to the prime minister, Louis Francis Albert Mountbatten, and Brooke and General Marshall and the president and General Marshall. And I don't know what others. It was pretty hot there for a while between them. But better qualified people than I have talked on that subject.

BURG: So at Quebec there really wasn't a great deal for you to do?
BARKER: No, I had more or less done. However, there was a great deal done on my level between officers from the War Department and from Washington because we on a lower level did a great deal of talking about landing craft and weapons and the question of artificial harbors. We had tremendous discussions on that, and it was there that the decision was made to use the Mulberry system and to embark on that. And Sir Harold /Maj.

Gen. Sir Harold Augustus Wernher came over from England in the midst of the whole thing because he had been exploring the Mulberry problem--heading it up. And he came over to Quebec, and it was there that the decision was made to adopt the Mulberry plan.

BURG: So it had turned out to be a profitable thing for you because it put you in contact with some of your opposite numbers in Washington and--

BARKER: Oh, sure. Oh, sure. There were constant discussions of the people on the working level.
BURG: Yes.

BARKER: The prime minister and Brooke and the president and General Marshall were on the policy level—don't you see?—the overall statesmenlike policy and political aspects of it. And we people were the nuts and bolts—on the nuts and bolts level—

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: --working level.

BURG: Now when you returned to England and to COSSAC, what was the situation? What was next? Was there any change of pace after Quebec?

BARKER: Oh, yes, of course. Then we knew that it was definitely on and that there was no question about it. And I won't say there was a change of pace. Perhaps everyone felt that the thing was nearer and nearer a reality and we better jolly well get to work and pick up all the loose ends if any and so on.

BURG: Right.
BARKER: I think the work intensified from that time on.

BURG: Now Eisenhower is back in England in very early January of 1944. Is that right?

BARKER: Yeah.

BURG: And before he actually appeared, you had had to cope with Bernard [Law] Montgomery, I understand. Was he the first of the high-ranking generals who was going to use the plan? Was he the first one to see it, then, and—

BARKER: He appeared first. Monty appeared first, and we made a presentation. Kenneth McLean did it. We asked him to do it because he had known Monty and so on, and so before the maps Monty was given a briefing on the plan. And then the next person to appear was Bedell Smith, and finally along about the 10th of January General Eisenhower came. That’s all in the records so there’s nothing I can add.
BURG: But Montgomery was unhappy about the size of the attack?

BARKER: Well, so were we. Monty didn't bring anything new to us in that. At Quebec I made a very strong plea for more landing craft so we could extend the frontage and put another division ashore, particularly on the Utah beaches; but I didn't speak with any authority so to speak. We were just the planning group, and we could present our—

(Interruption)

BURG: Now after COSSAC—after the attack—after Normandy has occurred, what happens to you? What is the course your career takes?

BARKER: Well, a peculiar thing—. I guess I told you about General Marshall having told me in Washington after Quebec about his having been designated as a prospective supreme commander. I told you that.

BURG: Yes, and he asked you to do what, sir?

BARKER: And, well, he said he was beginning to think about his staff; and because I'd been in the sort of G-3 end of it,
he said he wanted me for his G-3. And that was when I told him I appreciated it, that it was a compliment, and so on. And then he brought up the question of the chief of staff as I told you. You have that on your--

BURG: Right, I think we do have it.

BARKER: And then he began to think in terms of General Morgan as his chief of staff, and he told me to have General Morgan come over. It was at that time that I suggested to him that if Morgan was to be his chief of staff—and he seemed to be quite sold on it—that then I could be of more use to him as deputy chief of staff to Morgan as I had been at COSSAC—because we were a team. He seemed to look favorably upon that, and from that time on we sort of went on the assumption that Morgan was going to be chief of staff, and that I would be deputy chief of staff. General Marshall then said to me he would have to think of someone else as G-3 instead of me if I went to deputy chief of staff. So he then hit upon General Harold Bull, whom he had known at Benning. And so he said, "We'll send General Bull over right away." And General Bull was ordered over forthwith, and he
joined us with the understanding that he was going to be G-3. General Marshall fully expected to come over as supreme commander; and his secretary—fellow named [Lt. Col. Frank] McCarthy—actually sent over to me some of General Marshall's personal effects for use in his office. A package arrived, and we began setting up an office for him. And we actually had some of General Marshall's personal effects there in anticipation of his coming.

BURG: What kind of personal effects?

BARKER: Mostly for his desk.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: There were desk pads and so on and things for his personal use in his desk. Those things actually came, and they were sent by this man—I think his name was Frank, Frank McCarthy—

BURG: Most interesting.

BARKER:—which is evidence that he expected—that General
Marshall expected—to come over. And I had some personal correspondence with McCarthy, who was a sort of a secretary to General Marshall, on the subject of General Marshall's coming. And Morgan seemed to think when he came back from Washington that he was going to be chief of staff and that I was going to be deputy chief of staff to the commander; and we worked on that basis. Then all of a sudden along about Thanksgiving you know what happened.

BURG: Yes.

BARKER: The president designated Eisenhower. And that put an entirely new aspect on the staff because everybody knew that Ike would want Bedell Smith for his chief of staff. Morgan began to wonder what was going to happen to him, and there's a telegram here in that file from Bedell Smith to General Eisenhower in Washington on the subject. Bedell talked to me. I was the first one he talked to when he came to London the first time from Africa, and he raised the question of Morgan—
just what was going to happen to Morgan. And I urged him very, very strongly to keep Morgan on as his deputy if Morgan would accept it. And also when Bedell first came, I said, "Under this setup here Pinky Bull is going to be G-3; and if Morgan—and I don't know just what my status is going to be. And," I said, "I'll tell you what I'd like very much, Bedell. I would appreciate greatly a chance to go back to soldiering." I said, "I would like to go back." I said, "I'm fed up with this sort of thing." I said, "I'm a soldier; and I prefer duty with troops to everything else; and I would like to get command of a division." I said, "That's my ambition." And I said, "I've had an awful lot of this, and I'm fed up with it." And he said, "No, you can't." He said, "You're too deeply into this, and I need you here with me to help me get oriented and get broken in." He said, "I can't consider your going back to a division." And so I stayed on, and for quite some time I spent a great deal of time in Bedell's office getting him oriented and helping him to get the feel of everything.

BURG: Right.
BARKER: And later I again asked him after he seemed to be getting in if I could go back to soldiering, and he said, "No." He said, "You've got to stay here with us." And he said, "We'll make you G-1." And I said, "Bedell, that's not my field--personnel and that sort of thing. I don't know anything about that, particularly, except in a very general way." He said, "Well, that's the way it is." He said, "I can't let you leave the headquarters; there's too many things that you are involved in." So gradually I began taking on quite a lot of special projects for Bedell Smith and became in effect a sort of a liaison between SHAPE and the British authorities because I knew everybody.

BURG: I see.

BARKER: And I did an awful lot of liaison work back and forth. And then the whole business of prisoners of war was dumped in my lap: the responsibility for everything having to do with how many prisoners of war in allied hands, allied prisoners of war
in German hands. And what a job that was! And gradually I had to build up quite a sizeable group that did nothing but work on prisoners of war data.

BURG: select group; Eisenhower, Bedell

Smith, Morgan as Bedell's deputy and you as sort of a special--