INTERVIEW WITH

Frank Carlson

by

Maclyn Burg

on

January 6, 1975

for

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of FRANK CARLSON.

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, FRANK CARLSON of Concordia, Kansas, hereinafter referred to as the donor, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of personal interviews conducted on January 6, 1975 and March 7, 1975 and prepared for deposit in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

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October 31, 1983
CARLSON: Winter terms. I didn't go full years, no. They're kind enough to call me a graduate which I did graduate in whatever I took. But I did not take a four-year course, just a winter course.

BURG: Now you saw service in World War I?

CARLSON: Yes, yes, I didn't go overseas. I finished up as part of the 90th Division which was just ready to go over on November 18; we were all set to leave Camp Travis, Texas.

BURG: So your service had been basically as an infantryman in the 90th Division and just missed going overseas with it?

CARLSON: Yes, yes, that's right.

BURG: So you were then demobilized I suppose about 1919?

CARLSON: 1919. And the interesting thing is they transferred the company I was in out to a remount at Camp Stanley. And then one day, there was about a hundred and twenty I think in the company, maybe more than that, now I've forgotten the number, pretty large group, they lined us all up, called the roll, were mustering this unit out but they missed three names and mine was one of them, and this was just about Christmas time. So I had to stay till May the next year; you talk about suffering, I suffered.
BURG: You were stuck there till May of 1919.

CARLSON: Yes, I came home in May, 1919, and Mrs. Carlson and I were married in August of that year, 1919.

BURG: I can imagine how you must have felt.

CARLSON: Oh, it was awful, just three of us out of the whole company.

BURG: Did you miss the influenza epidemic?

CARLSON: No, I really had it. I was in the hospital thirty days and seriously ill myself. Of course, they couldn't take care of the boys very well; I mean it's not critical in any way, but they had so many cases and most everybody seemed to have it. And I laid on these barracks next to rooms where boys died. And I tell you some of the nights there boys from Arkansas, Benton County, Arkansas, I'll never forget them, and there was great numbers of them. Oh they just died and they just moaned and it was awful; I pretty near died from just being there.

BURG: It's amazing that a disaster of that dimensions to our generation, Dave [Horrocks] and I really don't know much about that.

CARLSON: You couldn't explain it too, unless you went through it.

BURG: Yes, it must have been terrible. The death toll was--
CARLSON: Had two nurses to about two hundred beds. The doctors they brought in were just largely country doctors you know, fine old fellows and an old fellow come along and took temperatures and looked at us once in a while about twice a day, that's all, just a country doctor.

BURG: There wasn't anything that they could do.

CARLSON: There wasn't anything. There were hundreds of us.

BURG: Well, that's an amazing thing.

CARLSON: Yes, I went through that. In fact they tell me from my x-rays that I still have scars on my lungs from it. But it don't bother any; it never has.

BURG: Well, after you were out of the army and married in August of 1919, did you then take up farming in this area?

CARLSON: No, well, I didn't really take it up. What I did, I farmed with my father before I went to service. And after I came back and we were married, then Mrs. Carlson and I bought a farm and started to farm on our own.

BURG: In this area, Senator?
CARLSON: Yes, west of Concordia, three miles, still have it. I fed cattle and raised hogs and farmed in the beginning. In 1919 in August we moved immediately up to that place and were farming and continued on farming until I was elected to congress, really, is when I had to make some other plans.

BURG: 1928?

CARLSON: Well, no, 1928 I was elected to the Kansas legislature. I served two terms in the Kansas legislature and then twelve years in the congress, elected in 1934 beginning in '35. In 1946 I was elected governor of Kansas, served two terms. And in 1950 I was elected to the U.S. Senate and served eighteen years.

BURG: Well then let's go back and let me ask you, during the period 1919 until you were elected to the Kansas legislature, had you been active in politics during that whole period?

CARLSON: No, never intended to get in politics; it's an interesting story.

BURG: What drew you into it?
CARLSON: Well, I'll tell you what drew me into it. Of course I had served like a good citizen should; I was on the school board and took an active interest in our church and, oh, belonged to the Kiwanis Club in Concordia and did things like that. The only thing I'd ever done in politics, I had been a precinct committeeman from our township which was just one of the things people do, didn't take any active part in it. But in 1928, I'll never forget it, I was cutting wheat; I was running a binder myself. And a car drives up and I was harvesting and I thought to myself, "I sure don't want to be bothered; I don't know who it is." Well it developed it was four men from Concordia, Kansas, had come out, couldn't imagine what they wanted. I knew them all when they got out of the car. And they said they wanted to put my name on the ballot for the Kansas legislature. I said I just can't fool with it because I feed a couple of hundred head of cattle in the winter and the legislature meet January till April normally and I just can't be away. And they said, "Well, there ain't any danger of you being elected," they just wanted to fill the ticket. And so we had a very outstanding Democrat from this county; he was really, truly the father of the Kansas highway system and a good friend of mine, L.F. Davidson, of Glasgow. And to the amazement of not only Mr. Davidson and everybody else—I never campaigned; I told them I wouldn't do anything about it. And I won. And that's how I got started in politics. Never intended to get in politics.
BURG: Well, could you ever figure out, Senator, why it had happened that way?

CARLSON: I don't know. You know, maybe I'm kind of one of these people that believes that there are certain periods in your life when there are things that take place that maybe you would want to call them supernatural, but it seemed like every move I've made it's just been there, that's all. I didn't have to do anything; it's just natural, and that's true of several other moves I made.

BURG: To you, they just happened to you.

CARLSON: They just happened, that's right.

BURG: Your feeling is that the things that have happened to you in this way have been for the best.

CARLSON: Well, of course, I've enjoyed all of them. I mean, at the time they happened, that's true when I went to congress in 19--, elected in '34--that was the dust bowl days and [Franklin D.] Roosevelt's popularity was high; he was sweeping this country. We had many people out here, I don't know if you know Henry Busick out at Sylvan Grove; he's still living, one of our great Kansas stalwarts. Roy Bailey, editor of the Salina Journal, other people, they wanted to go to congress but
nobody could win, no Republican could win. We had a lady representative at that time from Hays, Kansas Kathryn [E. O'Laughlin] McCarthy, first term, and Roosevelt had carried this district by immense votes and he would do it again, did do it again. And so they come and asked me to make a race and Alf Landon, I probably shouldn't say this but I managed his campaign for governor in 1932 in Topeka, and I visited with Alf about it and he said, "Oh, you can't win out there now, but if you want to go to congress, maybe in two or three elections you can win." Well I won that first election by twenty-seven hundred; I don't know how we did but we did. And that's how I got started. That's when I began to make changes.

BURG: Had you campaigned hard for congress?

CARLSON: Well, yes, you did, but that was the dust bowl days. Were you out here then?

BURG: No.

CARLSON: Well that's a problem; you just can't understand how bad this was out here—it was awful!

BURG: We heard about it and so many Kansans moved out to the west coast that we had an idea.
CARLSON: Oh, it was just awful. Nobody had any money. And I mentioned Dane Hanson up at lunch. Had three people finance my campaign: One of them was Dane Hanson of Logan; the other was Billy Hughes of Stockton; and Ross Beech, Sr., father of young Ross out at Hays now, those three men. My budget was thirty-five hundred dollars running for congress from this district. And wasn't supposed to win but we did. And from then on I made all these campaigns in all these different places; I never had any problems with campaigns. But that first one about all you could do is just go out and meet the people and that's what I did.

BURG: Now we must fit into this two terms in the governor's chair.

CARLSON: That's right, '47 to '51. Then here again now, just visiting. What actually happened, our family's one daughter, and we took a boy to raise at four years of age but we never did adopt him because the mother wouldn't let us, but we raised him and put him through high school and Kansas University and he had a newspaper at Mulvane, Kansas. We're very happy about it, but it was not our own, but we raised him just like he was our own. So we had two children in a way, but one of them our own. And our daughter was eight years of age when we went to
Washington; so she finished grade and high school in Washington. And the only thing I'd ever told her about her education was that if she expected to live in Kansas she ought to finish the last two years in college in Kansas, and I didn't care where she went. Well out of a clear sky she came one day and she said, "Daddy, I want to go to Kansas University; as a matter of fact I'm going."

I said, "Do you know anybody?" No, didn't know a soul; she just made up her mind that's where she wanted to go to school. Mrs. Carlson said, "Well that's our only child; why don't we go out there and live with her and educate her like people ought to do?"

And I said, "All right, I'll make you a proposition. We got a secure seat in congress; I think I can stay here as long as I want, but I think also that I could be elected governor. And I'll go out and serve if I'm elected and I think I can be", based on what I knew I thought I could. "We'll educate our daughter and that's going to be the end of it; we're going back to the farm; that's going to be the finish of our political life." We had that understanding.

Well at the end of my last year as governor, in the last year, Senator Clyde Reed passed away. He was our U.S. Senator and a very able man, elderly man. His son has a newspaper in
Parsons right now, Clyde Reed. And he passed away and I appointed Harry Darby of Kansas City who I know you know; I appointed Harry as senator. And it was a very popular appointment. Everybody was happy about it because Harry is a great citizen. Well he spent nine months back here. One day he come back to the governor's office and he said, "Frank, I'm never going back to that damned place; I'm through." And he said, "You're about through being governor; you'll finish out now at the end of this year. Why don't you go back to the senate."

I said, "Well we sure haven't made any plans to go back to the senate." Well we visited around and other people began to visit and they said, "Well you know your way around Washington, why don't you go back?" And here I go back and spend eighteen years that we never intended to. That's the background of all this political stuff.

BURG: Did Harry Darby ever tell you what it was about the senate that he found--

CARLSON: Well Harry is an executive and congress is a legislative branch, a branch where you got to compromise all the time; you don't legislate unless you compromise. And Harry liked to call up his staff down there and tell them, "You make this boxcar; you do this or you do that," and that's not the way you run congress.
BURG: He couldn't take direct action himself, and so it got to him.

CARLSON: No, that's right, that's right.

HORROCKS: Was he enthusiastic about going when he was first appointed?

CARLSON: Well, I don't know that he was enthusiastic but it was a great honor of course. We had many people who wanted to go to the senate. I had some of the problems between some of my friends about that; you always run into that problem. But Harry Darby was a very popular appointment; he was just one of the fine men of the state.

BURG: Well, Senator, before we move on and in fact take you back to the senate, let me ask you about your congressional career. Since you were serving and one of the few Republicans serving during the depression years, the Roosevelt years—

CARLSON: Eighty-six out of four hundred and thirty-five in the House of Representatives. They didn't even know we were there.

BURG: Yes. Not what I would call a stunning majority in that house.
CARLSON: That's right.

BURG: Let me ask you what you now look back on as being maybe the most significant contribution that you were able to make during those years in the house, or there maybe more than one.

CARLSON: Well of course there's many things that happened in those days because that was the day of the Roosevelt era. For instance I helped pass the Agricultural Adjustment Act the first time; I mean I was quite active in that. And the Social Security Act was passed when I was on the Ways and Means Committee in the house. I've had very good committee assignments. I was on the Ways and Means Committee in the house my third term, and, outside of this session where they're putting new members on, why you wasn't even looked at for a member of that committee till you served three, four or five terms and I got on on the third term. So I served there, let's see, twelve years, I served there eight years on the Ways and Means Committee. And that was recognized as the main committee, in fact it is. This situation with Wilbur Mills I just--I know Wilbur so well and it's just unbelievable what's happened. We had some stalwarts I'm telling you on that committee and I helped--I wrote, did you ever hear of the Ruml Plan?

BURG: Yes, is that Beardsley Ruml?
CARLSON: I authorized that. I sponsored it and I introduced the legislation and that too is an interesting—I had a hassle over that for a year or two and we passed it but not till after a lot of difficulty. As a matter of fact, on the first roll call it was defeated by twelve votes. And Sam Rayburn, the speaker, and a very fine good friend of mine called me and he said, "Frank, we couldn't, the Democrats couldn't let you pass that. It's going to pass, but we couldn't let you author it." And so they changed it around some and passed it over at the senate, and I was on the house at the time. That's the legislation, the tax collections, it's the kind we use and have to have withholding because I sensed what was happening. We were building during the period there when we were getting into world war these cantonments. People made thousands of dollars working down there, and they'd never contribute a dime unless you collected when they got their check. And people like Fred Vinson, who later went on the supreme court, he was Secretary of the Treasury, he came up and opposed it. And after we had passed it he came up and told me, he said, "Well that's going to bring us five billion dollars; I couldn't say that because our party was opposed to it." So I've been through all those experiences and that's--
HORROCKS: Was your experience in the House Ways and Means, was that the background for going on to the Senate Finance Committee?

CARLSON: It helped, yes, it helped. I didn't have any problem to get on the Senate Finance, and it's a great committee; it really is. And then, as I say, I had good committee assignments. I was on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for twelve years.

BURG: Was it to your advantage, Senator, that your party was such a decided minority?

CARLSON: Well, it didn't make much difference. It probably was an advantage in a way because we didn't have too many people on our side. Well we didn't have enough votes to do anything; they at least would speak to us. I'll never forget when Roosevelt tried to pack the supreme court you remember—you read of it I know—well that was a real battle, and it was two men that saved that from happening and they are both Democrats, good friends of mine. One of them was Hatton Summers of Texas, and the other was Gene Cox of Georgia. They were real stalwarts I'm telling you. We had, I think, a different group of people back in those days. I don't like to say that; I don't say it to these boys that's there now, but they were real veterans, wonderful strong men, strong-willed men. There wasn't anybody going to push Gene Cox around; I don't care if it was Franklin D. or anybody else; they just couldn't do it. I served with many of those.
I think one of the greatest men we ever had in the senate during all my service was Dick [Richard B.] Russell of Georgia. He'd have been President in my opinion if he hadn't have been from the South. The Democrats weren't going to nominate a southerner, just weren't. And Dick, he was the ablest and I think the most highly regarded man in the senate in all the years that I served. And you get associated with that type of people and, I don't like to say it rubs off on you, but it's helpful to know them.

BURG: You found them to be tough-minded men and maybe cast in a different mold from today?

CARLSON: That's right, yes, different in some way, but at the same time they were great Americans, great Americans. You might disagree with them, but they were truly Americans.

BURG: I've sometimes thought about that when I've read, oh, the autobiography of Eddie Rickenbacker and some of the other types. I don't always agree with their political philosophies.

CARLSON: Right, that's right. That's true with me.

BURG: They certainly were hard-nosed determined types.

CARLSON: Oh, yes. Langer, I succeeded him on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee. You didn't know them in any way, did you?

HORROCKS: No.

CARLSON: Well you probably read about them. Langer was an interesting character. He truly was one of the, well, populist, most progressive; I mean he was more than that. He was quite something. He was ranking on and had charge of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee that year. And of course the Democrats were in control of the house, but Langer some way had that position on that committee that all the postmasters had to be appointed through that committee. And I served on that committee for eighteen years so I knew something about that. Well, the Democrats got a lot of postmasters appointed, and Langer wouldn't submit them to the presiding officer, the president of the Senate for confirmation. He carried them in his pocket. So I've been through all that kind of stuff.

BURG: Drive everybody crazy.

CARLSON: Oh, it did. It just drove them crazy.

BURG: The equivalent of a pocket veto.
CARLSON: Well he just carried them and they couldn't do anything about it.

BURG: That's funny. I was just going to say in the congressional--

[Interruption]

BURG: I should tell our transcriber that Will Jones [Eisenhower Museum Curator] has just joined us after another successful speaking engagement at the Concordia Rotary Club.

I was going to ask you, do you look back on your house service and does anything stand out in your mind as a disappointment to you? Something that perhaps you worked hard for and just didn't come across.

CARLSON: Oh, I can't think of anything. You worked hard in those days when you only had eighty-six Republicans out of four hundred and thirty-five and you didn't get any recognition.

BURG: Now you were one of those who worked for social security, Agricultural Adjustment Act.

CARLSON: Oh, yes.

BURG: Can you tell me what aspects of the Roosevelt program had the least appeal for you, or would we be embarking on quite a list?
CARLSON: There wasn't anything we could do about it, but, when you look back on it, it was interesting in this way. Roosevelt was in when you had to do things. And we all have to agree that we were in a real depression, and he did things that was completely out of cast. I mean, he had one of his runners if you want to call it that in the house, one of his close advisers and one who did any of his bidding that he wanted done was Maury Maverick of Texas. You may have heard of him.

BURG: Yes.

CARLSON: Well Maury was a man that would be at the White House. And I'll never forget we had met at noon and here he come running in the door of the house and he said, "I've got a message from the President of the United States." And he presented a type-written copy of a bill. I don't know, it was some far-reaching legislation, and as a Republican of course we wanted to see a copy of the bill. Well there was only one copy and, "the President wants this passed this afternoon," and we passed it this afternoon. Nobody ever saw it, nobody ever read it; the clerk read it. You just don't do that, but we did.

BURG: We in the sense of all of you there with eighty-five of you dissenting probably.
CARLSON: That's right. Well I don't know how far we went, but we did want to read it, but we didn't get to read it. So it was an interesting experience. Those are things you look back on now; they wouldn't do that now; I mean you don't do it now. At least you get up and demand a copy of the bill. I think even if there were only eighty-six there they would give you a copy of it--wait till they got it printed.

BURG: Your two terms as governor, are there aspects of that that you look back on with special pride?

CARLSON: Yes, there are many aspects. I think if you read the record you'd find that the many pieces of legislation that we passed during those four years were important. One of the most important was the improvement in our mental health care of people. That's one thing that I sponsored; I made a campaign on it the first election that if elected we are going to change the Topeka State Hospital and take care better of our mentally ill, and we did. I did it through the cooperation of the legislature, of course the people were ready for it too, but it was terrific hassle. We had a chancellor at the university; I don't know if you're a Kansan are you or not?

JONES: No, Oklahoma.
CARLSON: Well anyway our chancellor was Franklin Murphy at Kansas University, and he also had the medical center, a doctor, which they do have. And then of course we had the Menninger Foundation. And at that time the doctors or M.D.s and these mental doctors, they wouldn't even speak. And one of the first things I did after I was sworn in as governor I called Franklin Murphy and Dr. Karl Menninger in the office and I said, "You folks aren't going to leave this room until we reach an agreement on how to better take care of our mentally ill." Well there we were. Murphy, they wanted to spend great sums of money improving the buildings and fix up quarters and one thing and another. And there sat Karl Menninger, and he didn't care if we treated them in a barn or wherever they treated them just so we had plenty of psychiatrists. And we had a real hassle, but we did reach an agreement. And we did improve the mentally ill hospitals from forty-eight to number one in the nation; that's a matter of record. As a matter of fact Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, as the record will show, got up on the floor and said that I was one man in the nation that had been able to move it from forty-eight to first and gave me quite a compliment.

BURG: Senator, what had drawn you to that kind of work, that kind of reform--
CARLSON: Well I had visited the hospitals. We had no folks of our own or anything, but I had visited. And we were terribly deficient in that field, that was one thing. And our highway system, the highway legislation that they've been building on now goes back to my administration. But we had a highway study committee that laid out the roads of Kansas and they've still been working on it. And many other things. I was first governor to get money, state funds, for elementary schools, the first one, the first time we ever had any state money and that was the beginning, things like that. I think I could well be proud of that record and it shows it too.

HORROCKS: While you were governor did you meet General Eisenhower?

CARLSON: Yes, oh, yes.

HORROCKS: Did he ever speak to you with regard to running in 1948?

CARLSON: '48? No, I don't think so. No, I don't know of any, let's see it was about, well maybe--I went over there in '49 I think; that's the first time I'd ever visited with him about running for President, '49 I think.

BURG: That's when you went to Paris?
CARLSON: Yes, I went to Paris, went over there twice on that. He was very cordial about it, and he always felt that he was a military man; he didn't want to get in politics, didn't have any desire for politics.

BURG: Senator, in '49 when you made that first trip over, was that as a result of a group of you getting together and--

CARLSON: Not the first trip. The second trip over was a result of some of us visiting about it. I just happened to be over at Amsterdam at a meeting and I knew General Norgard [Lauris Norstad?] and some of the others and he said he was going down to Paris--"Why don't you fly down with me and we'll see General Eisenhower."

And I said, "All right, I'll go down." And I said, "I'm going down and I'll visit with him about running for President."

And he kind of looked at me and he said, "Well, the General probably won't be happy about that."

And I said, "Well, I'm going to talk to him about it." And I did. That's how I was the only one that went down at that time.

BURG: You had never met Eisenhower prior to that time?
CARLSON: Oh, I'm sure I had. I can't think of any date but I can't imagine that with all the Eisenhower family out in this state that I hadn't met him; I don't feel that I had any close association with him.

BURG: Might have run into him during the course of his stay in the War Department in the thirties.

CARLSON: Oh, I'm sure I did. It was no problem for me to get in down there; I had no difficulty.

BURG: Now you went in and you passed a few pleasantries between you and then you laid this proposition on him?

CARLSON: I said, "General," I said, "Our nation needs you; we want you to come back and be a candidate for President." And of course the Democrats had also been doing some work on him; they wanted him to run as a Democrat candidate. So I didn't want to let him know that the Republicans wouldn't welcome him anyway.

BURG: What kind of a response did he give you? How did he word it?

CARLSON: Well he was very nice about it as he always was. He said, "I just don't care for politics. I don't care to get into it." And that was a kind of a brushoff, and I didn't press him. But I did mention it and ask him to do it. That's about the size of it.
BURG: Do you have a further question along this line at this time?

HORROCKS: Later, did you work with former Senator Darby and Senator [James H.] Duff and Governor [Edward F.] Arn towards getting Eisenhower the nomination?

CARLSON: Yes, I sure did.

BURG: Before we have you respond further on that, let me ask you, Senator, had you taken active part in the national political campaigns let's say in 1936 and 1940?

CARLSON: Well I took an interest in Alf's campaign in '36.
In '40 if you can call it an active part in it is a Republican I don't know; I don't remember going out over the state, but in Kansas and at the conventions, I always attended them; I never missed a political convention, I mean a national political convention.

BURG: And '44 and '48 you did the same thing?

CARLSON: All through, yes; I never missed them, right.

BURG: Okay, I wanted to have that background. Let us pursue this matter of the group of you working to try to get the nomination. Can you tell us how all of that came about? The timing of it and who took part.
CARLSON: Well the only close connections I had at that time was with [Henry] Cabot Lodge. Cabot and I got to be good friends and of course I had many others that were interested too, but he and I were two that really discussed it before he had come back from Paris. And that's about the size of it.

BURG: How did you come to--

[Interruption]

CARLSON: --Cabot Lodge and I somehow gravitated together--you make friends easily. I think one of the choice friends I made from that area was Clare Boothe Luce. I haven't got a finer friend than Clare Boothe Luce, and I don't know how we should ever get together but we did and we have had many pleasant associations in the past years. And on the floor of the House, she was in the House, we often discussed legislative matters. I mean it's an interesting thing how you gravitate to certain people.

BURG: Now can we take it that between you and Senator Lodge this is sort of, at first, the sharing of a mutual idea in the coat room, at lunch, occasionally.

CARLSON: That's right.

BURG: Then does it take on a more formal, organized tone, Senator?
CARLSON: Individually, both Cabot and I, we, I don't say we agreed, but we had a feeling that we ought to try to visit with other people about it and begin to expand the program because that's what we did. When you're in the U.S. Senate with a leader like Bob [Robert A.] Taft it was a little difficult. I wouldn't say you'd want to be embarrassed about it because I never was embarrassed about Eisenhower. And I think I should say this, I went to Bob Taft and told him, I said, "Bob, I'm going to be for Eisenhower for President much as I regard you as a great candidate and a great President if you're elected. But I'm going to be for Eisenhower." And here's Bob's answer, he said, "I wouldn't have any regard for you if you didn't." So he was very frank to me about it. So we never had any misunderstanding.

BURG: When did you say that to him, Senator?

CARLSON: Oh, preceding the convention campaign you know, preceding sometime during that year--

BURG: '52?

CARLSON: Yes, the campaign convention year. So I had no problem.

HORROCKS: How about Senator [Andrew] Schoeppel?
CARLSON: Well, Senator Schoeppel was a Taft supporter and it made it a little difficult in some ways. It made it difficult for me in this way, that I was a junior senator, and I think Andy felt very close to Taft as I did too, but Taft's association with the people that, and I shall not mention names, that Schoeppel and Bob worked with closer than I did made it a little problem. It was a different clique. You know, a senate, they kind of break into cliques and Andy belong to that other group, and I was more of a free lance probably, wasn't careful about some of the choices that I made. I just took those that were left.

BURG: Senator, did the cliques tend to pass beyond age or personal wealth; did the cliques overlap?

CARLSON: Not necessarily but the association, I could mention names that were the type of Andy, and I mean I could see how Bob Taft and Andy and people, several senators, not a big clique but a group of probably eight or ten. And then that's true on the other side, there were so many senators who were for Eisenhower too. But they were in the senate with Bob Taft and they weren't as outspoken as I was. That's the difference.
BURG: I see. I wanted to ask and, David, you may have wanted to put this one too--when you and Senator Lodge decided to, in effect, poll the amount of senatorial support for Eisenhower, can you give us the names of those men who immediately came to your minds as men that you would want to enlist in this effort?

CARLSON: Of course we tried to enlist everybody. We didn't try to save anyone, but we realized that some of these men had so positioned themselves that there wasn't any use visiting with them, but we did visit with all of them. I mean we didn't hesitate to talk about Eisenhower and how helpful we thought his background would be in the campaign. I could easily talk about it because I had a very high regard for him personally and he had a great personality. Eisenhower was a very friendly, kind man, and I liked him. He could be rather stubborn at times and rather outspoken at times, but, at the same time, he was a Kansan and down to earth.

BURG: How did you explain his lack of political experience, or did you?

CARLSON: No, we didn't try. We just knew that Eisenhower was a good name.

HORROCKS: Was Senator [James H.] Duff from Pennsylvania particularly active?
CARLSON: Yes, and he and I and Cabot Lodge, that's three you could name that were really-- Senator Duff and I are very close.

HORROCKS: Before the New Hampshire and Minnesota primaries, what sort of specific actions were you able to take to help the Eisenhower candidacy?

CARLSON: Well about all we could do at that time would be, and did do, was to work with the state organizations and have our own as much as we could. We tried to get the leaders in those states which we did; we got good leaders in many states, all the states.

BURG: But prior to the convention there was no Citizens for Eisenhower, really, to help you out?

CARLSON: Oh, no you were just out on your own. When we were at the Brown Palace in Denver, for instance, that's where he had his headquarters preconvention, I'll never forget one Sunday morning he said, "Frank, today we're going to go down to Las Vegas." This Sunday morning he said they were going to get a plane and going to fly down there and we'd take a few of our friends with us; they took three or four press people as I remember it, maybe six. On the way down, someone remarked to him that, let's see, the name slipped my mind, this great Indian athlete, was it Carlyle?
BURG: Jim Thorp.

CARLSON: Jim Thorp. Now here's an interesting story; I'm glad it come to me now. I remember all these things if I sit down and think. Well, on the way down, somebody told the General that Jim Thorp was at Las Vegas. And the General said, "Frank, you got to find him." He said, "I played football against him; I want to see him."

Well, I didn't know Jim Thorp and I didn't know how I was going to start. So I got out of the plane and, instead of going to the gambling joints like most of these newspaper guys, why I had to find a taxicab guy, and I found one on the street and I asked him if he had ever heard of Jim Thorp. "Oh, yes. He's running a roadhouse right up here near Boulder Dam."

And I said, "Will you take me out there?" Yes, he'd take me out there. And I went out there and I tell you it was the rattiest looking roadhouse you ever saw; it looked terrible. Nobody ought—at least I'd never even gone over. Well I went over and went inside and there came a lady and met at the door and I asked if Jim Thorp was there and she said, "Yes, he's here."

And I said, "Well, General Eisenhower wants to see him."

And she shouted back to a back room and said, "Jim, come out here; there's a man that wants to visit with you." So he came out, terribly unkempt; he looked terrible, bad.
And I said, "General Eisenhower wants to see you."

"He said, "Oh, no, he don't.""

And I said, "Not only that, he asked me to bring you down there; he wants to visit with you. He's here for a couple of hours this afternoon." I brought him down there, and it's amazing about Eisenhower now what he could do with individuals. He sat and talked to Jim Thorp just like he was back there in the height of his hey-day. He didn't see Jim Thorp the way he looked. And when he left, I brought him back, and he said, "Well, I appreciate this a lot." But he didn't seem to be enthusiastic. But he passed away in California not too many years ago and I got a letter from his wife, and she wrote me and I've got that letter too, and said that that was the greatest thing that ever happened to Jim and I want you to know that I'm forever indebted to you. And I've often thought about that.

BURG: That's a nice story.

CARLSON: It's a true story and it's interesting, things you run into in your lifetime.

BURG: I was going to ask you if as you talked with various senators about an Eisenhower candidacy, do you happen to recollect what kinds of reactions they had?
CARLSON: Well some of them weren't happy. They said, "Why, we got Republicans running now," and of course they were Taft people and, naturally, "Why should we go outside," not that Ike wasn't a Republican or anything, but they wanted somebody that had been working in the party. And I could mention names that some of them just felt real mean about it. Well I think maybe I will mention one or two names, and one of them is John Bricker of Ohio, a very powerful man, a good friend of mine. John was a great senator and I saw him a year or two ago when I was in Columbus. He just didn't feel that we should go outside of what he called the party. It wasn't true but it had—Another, Carl Mundt of North Dakota the same thing, you had that. That was the group that were closely associated with Andy and the rest of the folks, Bob, you see. I can understand it.

BURG: Did they change their mind to any degree after the election—

CARLSON: Oh, yes, yes, but slow some of them, but they did, oh, yes. Yes, I don't know of anyone that didn't get into the campaign.

BURG: Now you were a Taft admirer yourself?
CARLSON: Oh, I tell you--I'm going to tell you a story about it. We lived at the Sheraton Park Hotel for eighteen years. And one Sunday morning the phone rang and I answered and he said, "This is Bob Taft." Well now Bob wasn't in the habit of calling me about anything, and he said, "Frank, I'd like to be majority leader of the Senate."

And I said, "Well, Bob, you can be if you want to be I'm sure." At that time Styles Bridges of New Hampshire and a few other people were kind of being mentioned as a leadership and not so much Bob Taft. And I said, "Bob, if you want to be a leader I know you can be."

"Oh," he said, "I'm afraid Eisenhower isn't for me."

I said, "I don't believe that at all; I just can't believe it." And I said, "I'll tell you what I'll do. I'll go to New York tomorrow morning and I'll visit with the General about it." And I did go up to New York Monday morning and the General was there at the Commodore Hotel; I was in Washington over the weekend. And I said, "General, Bob Taft wants to be majority leader."

And he said, "Well, that's the best news I've heard."

And I said, "Well Bob doesn't feel that way; he feels that you're against him."

"Well that's just absolutely untrue, I'd be happy to have him as majority leader."
And I said, "All right, General, I'm going to step outside this door and tell the press that you'd be very pleased to have Bob Taft as majority leader." Well they picked it up in a hurry I'll tell you, and that afternoon at three o'clock I got a call from Bob Taft who was in Cincinnati and he said, "Frank, that's one of the greatest things that ever happened to me in my life." And that shows how close I was to him despite the fact he knew where I was all the time.

HORROCKS: Had the Eisenhower people been under the impression that Taft didn't want to be majority leader?

CARLSON: I think there was a feeling he didn't care to be because he had been defeated you see in running against Eisenhower and I think they had that feeling, but that wasn't Bob's feeling. And I was so pleased too because I had never heard it mentioned, but that's the reason they were speculating on other people.

HORROCKS: Was there any jockeying by Senator Bridges or anyone else that would lend credence to this feeling?

CARLSON: No, I don't think so except that Styles had been there probably longer than anyone, and in the house, and there was a little feeling I think. But he was not Bob Taft, a good friend of mine too. But I think the right selection was made. I was pleased with Bob and, as I said, I was sure surprised he called me. But I did deliver.
BURG: Now, Senator, you are obviously drawn both to Taft and to Eisenhower, but you made a decision as to which man you were going to support.

CARLSON: And so told Bob Taft.

BURG: Could you tell us why did you make the decision for Eisenhower and against Mr. Taft?

CARLSON: Well I presume if you just got right down to it because he was a Kansan and I knew the family and I thought personally, from a political standpoint, the Eisenhower name would have more national appeal than Taft; I can just be frank about it.

BURG: How about Taft's personal mannerisms?

CARLSON: Well, you had to know Bob Taft. When you first met him you would think he was cold; he really wasn't. He kept a lot of things to himself. The Taft family of course were a great family in this nation, and so was the Eisenhower family as far as that's concerned although that built up mostly from the General. Bob's family goes back to a former President and a chief justice of the Supreme Court and a few things too.
BURG: But essentially you thought that the one man would have a greater appeal to the American public?

CARLSON: I wanted to win an election too, that's right.

HORROCKS: Had the drive for an Eisenhower nomination kind of reached a stalemate prior to his return from Europe?

CARLSON: Well, I don't know. I think there was always a strong undercurrent for Eisenhower even if it wasn't too vocal. But, among the leaders, it was not true. I mean the leaders were pretty much Taft people; I mean there was no doubt about it, and I can understand it. I did understand it.

BURG: Let's follow your own actions in 1952. Now you made a second trip to Paris, and what year was that? When did you make that?

CARLSON: That's right. That was evidently early that year before he came back. I would guess it was about January of the year he came back to run.

BURG: In '52?

CARLSON: Yes.

BURG: Who went over with you, Senator?
CARLSON: Well Cabot Lodge was over there; we just met there at the time. So Cabot and I were two people that did do the visiting at one time. We were the only two at that particular meeting; there may have been many others as far as I know.

BURG: But as far as that one where you attended--

CARLSON: We just happened to be there at the same time and we were good friends, and so we went in together.

BURG: Had the General made a decision that he would run?

CARLSON: He didn't tell us he had. No, he was very reticent about committing himself.

BURG: You were putting the matter to him again?

CARLSON: Yes, and probably a little stronger telling that we thought we had made checks around the country and with people everywhere and that his candidacy for the nomination would be well received. We went that far. I've often wondered since if he made up his mind that he was going to run till he got back to Abilene that first night, really.

HORROCKS: Was his prime concern at the time how much grass-roots support there was for his candidacy?
CARLSON: Well, I don't know that he was so concerned about that, but he just had a feeling that he didn't fit in a campaign, that's all. He just couldn't see himself out campaigning for an office.

BURG: And you did not diagnose this as a kind of false modesty?

CARLSON: Oh, no.

BURG: But rather his appraisal of his own abilities.

CARLSON: That's right. Well, and his interest in that type of campaign. I mean, he was a military man. He didn't want to get out and go out and ask people for votes; that wasn't his background.

BURG: Now when you returned from Paris, what was your next action?

CARLSON: All we did, and all anyone could do, was just to kind of visit with people around till the General actually said he'd run. We were all hoping; Cabot and I have talked about it afterwards when we got back. I remember one luncheon we were visiting one day and Cabot said, "I don't know what more we can do but just wait and see what his reaction is going to be and what his decision is. And when his decision is made, if he decides to run, we'll get busy." Which is about what happened.
BURG: Had he left you with any impression, the General that is, that he would get in touch with either one of you?

CARLSON: No, and he didn't.

BURG: Oh, he didn't?

CARLSON: No, he didn't. I just don't remember how he made his announcement now. I know what he did at Abilene, but I don't know what he did before. He may have told some people but he hadn't told either Cabot or me that he was going to run.

HORROCKS: Before he announced that he would run, did you find that a lot of state party officers would commit themselves to be in favor of Eisenhower if he would come out?

CARLSON: Well many had committed themselves to Bob Taft, and we had to go out and try to pick up what we could in various states, like when we went to Las Vegas we met who would be the delegates. And I don't remember the occasion, they didn't have very many in that state, but it seems to me, as I remember, we picked up three or four delegates out of maybe twelve or fifteen however many they had on that Sunday afternoon. That's about the only way we could do it.
BURG: Something similar I believe was done in Pennsylvania.

CARLSON: Yes, well, Jim Duff did a good job in Pennsylvania for us.

BURG: Did Hugh Scott help at that time?

CARLSON: Well, Hugh did but Jim was, after all, he had been governor and he had a lot of influence. He had, if you want to call it, the party organization.

BURG: Now, Senator, did you do anything prior to the convention here in the state of Kansas to enhance the General's candidacy here?

CARLSON: Well, of course, I tried to contact the folks who were going to be delegates or who later were selected as delegates and wanted them to support Eisenhower, and it wasn't too difficult. They had some feelings about it because many had, I don't know that many had, but some had practically committed themselves to Bob Taft in our own state. And, here again, it was rather difficult because Senator Schoeppel and myself, there was a little problem there. But actually as we approached the June convention there wasn't anybody vocal in Kansas at least. They were cordial at all times and did support him too. Some had some feelings about it; it's only natural.
JONES: Were you present during the Abilene announcement?

CARLSON: Yes.

JONES: Were you present at the Charley Case home following the announcement?

CARLSON: Yes.

JONES: What was the tenor, the mood, at the Charley Case house?

CARLSON: Well of course the mood was that Eisenhower was going to run, and the question then was what could we do and would we do to conduct a campaign as citizens of this state.

JONES: Was there a feeling of disappointment in the situation, the lack of people in attendance?

CARLSON: Well, there may have been some but not generally speaking. Those people that were there like Charley Case and Frank Carlson and many others, I can't remember anyone that weren't enthusiastic about it. But, as you say, lack of numbers, there wasn't a great overflow of people.

BURG: The weather was miserable that day too, wasn't it?

CARLSON: Oh, wasn't it awful? I tell you you just can't imagine how that day was.
BURG: The rain pouring down.

CARLSON: People lost their shoes trying to get away from that place. Yes. It was awful.

BURG: Now had you come from Washington, DC? Did you come out with the General?

CARLSON: No, no, came out on my own.

BURG: Came out independently.

CARLSON: Yes. And of course I had the advantage of being, from a personal standpoint, these people that were really doing things in politics were not only friends of mine, we understand each other--I mean, going back many years, not just in '52, going back to my administration as governor, even in my service in the house. There wasn't a Kansan of any importance in the state politics that I either didn't know or could visit with. That made it so easy for me, and that's one reason I think that the General asked me at Abilene that evening to help him in the campaign.

BURG: At the Case house?

CARLSON: Yes.
HORROCKS: Was he apprehensive about being a novice in politics at the time?

CARLSON: Well, it's only natural I think. I mean the political arena is a different field than a military operation.

BURG: So at the sessions that night, the night of the announcement, he drew you aside and asked you if you would lend a hand?

CARLSON: Yes. He said, "You've been in congress, you know a lot of people around, and I'd like to have you help me in the campaign." And that's when I remarked to him that I'm a member of the U.S. Senate; I just can't leave the Senate. And his response to that was, "Well you asked me to get into this, didn't you?" And what could I say.

BURG: Now one of your friends, was it Dane?

CARLSON: Yes, Dane Hanson of Logan. I went to Dane Hanson who was a friend of mine of many years politically and I said, "Dane, the General has asked me to help him in the campaign; he wants me to stay with him. And I told him I couldn't do it. I'm going to be in the Senate."

And it was Dane Hanson who said, "Well there are people in this nation who would give their right arm to do it, and here now you won't do it when you got a chance to do it." And I did. I didn't attend the Senate from then on until after the election, never went.
BURG: From roughly June until sometime in November.

Carlson: November, and campaigned all over this nation with the General and their party.

BURG: Had the General spelled out there in Abilene exactly what it was that he would have you doing?

CARLSON: Not a word.

BURG: He probably didn't know too much at that stage himself.

CARLSON: No, no. I'll never forget when we went out he said, "I think I'm going to have my headquarters in Denver," and I think he did that because he felt at home at Denver because of Mrs. Doud, Mrs. Eisenhower's mother. He thought of that town, I think, and it got out of these big industrial centers and more out in the middle west and, really, he had a love for the middle west, he really did. So we went to the Brown Palace; I went out with them and stayed with them continuously.

HORROCKS: At that time was he particularly reliant upon anyone for advice?

CARLSON: Well I can't remember. He had some staff people with him. He had a secretary and one or two people who came out of Washington with him. And of course he had Milton Eisenhower.
He had a brother out in Seattle and one in Kansas City, and he had good connections. He didn't start with any big staff or anything. He had two or three people out there and that was all to start with and then they began to fill it up.

BURG: Now you went right out with him in June following the Abilene--

CARLSON: Oh, yes, right, immediately, April or right after he went out there to begin the operation of the campaign.

BURG: You made your decision to go with him then shortly after you talked to your friend and went on out?

CARLSON: I did, right, I did, that's right.

BURG: Let's be even more blunt in your question, did you at the Brown Palace see a Dwight Eisenhower who seemed to be at sea and lost in this new--

CARLSON: No, well, I don't know if he was lost in the field he was in but he was not lost with people, that's one thing; he knew how to deal with people. I don't care if it was, as I said, Conrad Hilton or Billy Graham or who come, they all enjoyed visiting with him and when they left they felt they had a very wonderful visit with him, a satisfactory visit. In fact, his enthusiasm and his personality carried him through a long ways, really did.
BURG: At that stage, now this is prior to the convention in Chicago—

CARLSON: Oh, yes, prior to June.

BURG: At that stage, what kinds of help, what kinds of advice would he seek from you, Senator?

CARLSON: Well not so much advice. My mission around, well he'd ask me about people, but my detail around there was to bring people in to see him. And if somebody come in that I didn't think he ought to see I just told them that he had other things to do. But I did know how to select people I think and brought them in to visit with him, after all, they'd come from all over the nation.

BURG: What kinds of people did you screen out, Senator?

CARLSON: Well, there's always a group of cranks around that come around, and you can pick them out if you've been in politics. I was very careful about it, very few. We had delegations and we had some that was very difficult. You probably weren't out here when we had a real hassle in this state on the building of the Tuttle Creek Dam. The people of that community rose up in arms against Tuttle Creek, and we had two hundred and fifty women come out opposing Tuttle Creek. And that was a very delicate, difficult situation.
BURG: They came out to Denver?

CARLSON: They come to Denver. I had been involved in that thing myself, and they didn't have any regard for me I can tell you. I came nearly getting whipped by one of the farmers down there when I went out to look at the dam even. They come out and I had to handle that the best I could, but they had to see the General and I saw that they saw him. And when they left, I don't know, he somehow carried his enthusiasm to that group so they weren't too mad about it, but they were sure mad about the dam. So that's the kind of thing you run into; that's what I did. But the one thing that really changed Eisenhower, as I see it now in looking back, was the trip from Denver to Chicago. We had a train, special train, Eisenhower train. Ane when we started going through, starting in Colorado, I'll never forget Wray, Colorado, which is a very small town, but we had thousands of people at Wray, Colorado when the train come to a stop. We made all these stops through all these states on the way in. And he got carried away with these crowds, and then he really became a candidate after being with those crowds, not before. Before he had just seen leaders and groups, but when he saw these thousands of people—. I'll never forget Wray, Colorado because that was one of the earlier stops on the way from Denver. And they were there. I mean they come great distances; there are not that many people out in that country. And we had thousands out at Wray, Colorado. And then the General got to be a candidate from then on.
BURG: Now is Mrs. Eisenhower on that train, too, with him?

CARLSON: Oh, yes, and her mother.

BURG: And so she also saw those crowds.

CARLSON: Oh, yes.

BURG: Did you notice any change in her demeanor?

CARLSON: No, I don't know that I did. Mrs. Eisenhower is pretty much the same, a very fine lady and didn't get carried away about the campaign or anything, but of course she was for Ike, I mean she wanted him to succeed in whatever he did.

BURG: Senator, there in Denver before you took that train to Chicago, does any one or any two or three people stand out in your mind as the people on whom the General relied the most?

CARLSON: Oh, I don't know that there was any one at that time. He had some close friends in Denver and I was trying to think of an insurance man's name just this minute and I regret it, I missed it, who he visited with a great deal and who had a lot of good contacts and who had a ranch out at Fraser, Colorado, that Eisenhower loved to go out to.

BURG: Would that be Aksel Nielsen?
JONES: Aksel Nielsen.

CARLSON: Aksel Nielsen. Aksel Nielsen was one of his close friends, and I would say he was an adviser. Now he may not have been a national man of, I'll say, great stature like Bob Taft or anything, but he was a good politician and he knew how to deal with political people and was a lot of help to the General. He really was.

JONES: What about Governor [Dan] Thornton?

CARLSON: Yes, quite active, yes, very active. But he was a little different type than Aksel Nielsen, and I don't know just necessarily how he gets it, the governor was in it, oh, we had a lot of people, really.

BURG: But nobody who stands out as the chief adviser at that stage?

CARLSON: Not necessarily, they were all helpful. I can't seem to think of any.

BURG: All right. Does anyone come to mind, Senator, that you knew the General didn't particularly care for and would just as soon not have had around in Denver?

CARLSON: I don't know of anybody, really. I don't think we had that many people out there.
BURG: Aside from the two hundred and fifty people from the Tuttle Creek.

CARLSON: Oh, well we had that kind of group, we had smaller groups. They all come in when you're a candidate for the presidency, I don't care who it is.

HORROCKS: When you were trying to round up delegate votes for the convention, were most of the delegates and people more interested in issues or was there a great overriding interest in the General's electability as opposed to Taft?

CARLSON: I would say they were more interested in his election, in the election of a President because these were political people, largely. That's what you meet when you run into delegates for a convention.

BURG: The main thing was that they thought they could elect him as a Republican and they could concern themselves with issues later on.

CARLSON: Right.

[ Interruption ]

BURG: So you had asked a question about [Everett M.] Dirksen.

JONES: I asked what the involvement of Senator Dirksen was at this time?
CARLSON: Well very, very much Taft, very much Taft. In fact it made it difficult at times. Everett's personal feelings, you know, and they had worked together closely and had pretty much the same philosophy. And of course Everett had not only a lot of ability but he had a lot of contacts, really did, comes from a great state of Illinois.

BURG: Yes, he put up quite a fight as I remember on the convention floor; he took some very strong stands.

CARLSON: That's right and I'll never forget when he pointed his finger at Tom [Governor Thomas E.] Dewey in the convention, at one other one, boy that was a tragic moment too.

HORROCKS: After Eisenhower was nominated at the convention, did Taft call you and ask you to suggest Dirksen's name for the vice-presidential nomination?

CARLSON: Yes, he did. I've been talking about how close I was to all of them, and that is another interesting deal. After the nomination, at the Eisenhower headquarters in the Blackstone, I got a phone call and it was from Bob Taft. He just started out very bluntly and said, "Frank, I've got a commitment. I know you're going to meet now in a few minutes and are going to select a vice-president. I made a commitment to Everett Dirksen that his name would be considered." And he said, "I don't know
anyone to call but you to get that message to the group that's meeting."

   Well I said, "It will be delivered." Because Bob and I were close.

   We went over to that room and went in the same hotel that Taft had had his headquarters. We met there about twenty people; I don't remember how many. Earl Warren was there and, oh, Cabot Lodge and many, many of that type of people, about twenty. And I made the comment there that, "I've got a commitment that I've got to," Tom Dewey was there, "to deliver." I said, "Bob Taft has called me and he wants Everett Dirksen's name presented to this group." And I said, "I want you to understand that I am presenting this at the request of Bob Taft." And it didn't get anywhere because Tom Dewey was in that meeting. The truth of the matter is I was for Walter Judd for vice-president, myself. Then they wrestled around about it for a while and made the selection they did.

BURG: Were you in a position to watch Dewey's face when you made that--

CARLSON: Well, I wasn't very far from him, but I kind of looked over when he spoke up rather brusquely that, "That will not be given further consideration."

BURG: Oh, ho, he put it that way?
CARLSON: That bluntly. Yes, that's the way to handle it. And it wasn't. They weren't going to nominate Everett Dirksen.

BURG: And General Eisenhower--

CARLSON: He wasn't there you know.

BURG: Oh, he wasn't at that meeting.

CARLSON: Oh, no, no. He didn't go to the meeting for the selection of the vice-presidency.

BURG: One more question before you ask yours, was this before you and General Eisenhower had gone over to see Taft?

CARLSON: No, no, after the nomination, we went over after the nomination, and then we went back to our headquarters, and I would assume an hour or two after we got back I got this call from Bob Taft. Because then they had to reach an agreement as to who was going to be at the meeting and where. And they met then.

BURG: We must be sure and get that too, but you have a question you wanted to--

HORROCKS: If Dirksen had a commitment from Taft to suggest his name as vice-presidential nominee, then I guess Dirksen was anxious, he wanted to become vice-president.
CARLSON: My guess is that Bob Taft had made a commitment that if I'm nominated you'll be the candidate, you'll be the vice-president, my guess is. Because he just told me very bluntly and frankly that he had made a commitment to Dirksen's name that he would be considered for the vice-presidency. Well, of course, if Taft had been nominated there wouldn't have been any question about the consideration.

BURG: You never heard that confirmed though?

CARLSON: No, I never heard it. But that was my thought on the matter.

HORROCKS: What was the jist of the discussion at that meeting with regard to nominating Senator [Richard M.] Nixon?

CARLSON: Well, there were several names mentioned and just a general discussion as you would have in that group because most people had some personal feelings about it and in selecting a vice-president one thing that is generally considered is geography. And Earl Warren was at this and while I shouldn't probably say this, but Earl and Nixon had had some problems too, and yet he felt California was a great state and probably ought to be given consideration.

HORROCKS: Warren did support Nixon?
CARLSON: Oh, yes, yes, he did. Well he wouldn't have been nominated if he hadn't of, oh, no.

BURG: Senator, did anyone in that meeting stand instead of General Eisenhower, somebody there assigned to convey his wishes to the group?

CARLSON: No, well, I don't know, I think maybe all of us at that group meeting were close enough to stand for Eisenhower, like Cabot Lodge and any of them; I don't think that ever was brought up even. But he had sent word over and I think he sent word over by Fred Seaton that, Fred was there, that he wanted Nixon.

BURG: After he had been informed that Nixon's name was one of those?

CARLSON: Oh, yes, he knew it would be. I mean, he knew it would be.

HORROCKS: Was there very broad consensus at the end of the meeting that Nixon was a good choice?

CARLSON: Yes, I don't think there was any problem; I never heard of any. There wasn't any roll call or any debating, just a general agreement. And they said, "Well that seems to fit." And that was that.
HORROCKS: What happened to your suggestion about Congressman Judd? How did that fare?

CARLSON: All agreed that Judd was a great campaigner, and they just didn't think they were going into congress to pick a nominee.

BURG: I was going to ask you, too, in the light of what happened with [Senator] Thomas Eagleton [in 1972], is it your recollection that in that meeting the backgrounds, the total backgrounds, of the vice-presidential nominees was gone into?

CARLSON: No, not too much. There was just a general discussion like when I brought up Walter Judd's name, why, everybody had a high regard for Walter Judd, there wasn't any question about that. I figured that he would be a great campaigner, and he would have been and he had been nationally known in a way, but that's all the further we went. We didn't go into any of the backgrounds. They mentioned several candidates. I think they mentioned Jim Duff from Pennsylvania, and I don't know if you remember Bill [Governor William] Stratton; I mean we had names floating around there.

BURG: Was Arthur Langlie's name brought up in that meeting? Do you remember?

CARLSON: I don't remember if it was; it could well have been, I don't remember; it could have been. Arthur was a good friend of mine.
HORROCKS: Which was really the more important consideration on Nixon's nomination, his geographic location or--

CARLSON: That would be my guess.

HORROCKS: And that was perhaps even more important than his relation with, perhaps, the right-wing of the party?

CARLSON: Well that of course might have some bearing too, but keep in mind California had a lot of votes and it was on the west coast.

BURG: Did Tom Dewey commit himself on Nixon at that meeting?

CARLSON: Well, I'm sure he did or he wouldn't have been nominated. They were not going to nominate anyone that Tom Dewey would oppose. I'm sure, because New York is a great state and Tom had a lot of weight there, not only New York but in the east, that's right.

BURG: Do you have other questions about that meeting?

HORROCKS: No.

BURG: Let's drop back just a moment, Senator, and pick you up at the time that the convention has decided on Eisenhower as the nominee, and a short time after that you went over to Senator Taft's hotel.
CARLSON: Immediately after we got back, that was the first thing we did. One thing the General said, "I'm going right over now and visit with Bob Taft." And I mean we had just come from the stockyards, up to the hotel room, and I don't believe we were there fifteen minutes till he just said, "I'm going over right now." And he asked me and Fred Seaton to go with him.

BURG: The two of you went?

CARLSON: Yes, we did. And we walked over. I can remember it so well because the crowds then knew he had been nominated and they were beginning to press in, and Fred and I had to try to protect him. He had a couple of secret service men I think at that time, one or two people who were always with us, and that was about all. And we had difficulty getting through those lobbies of those hotels I'll tell you.

BURG: It was quite a long trip for you.

CARLSON: Well, it was a long trip considering the pressures we had. And we had just come from a convention that had a lot of emotion in it too.

BURG: You've spoken of the emotion that you saw in the General as you came into the Taft hotel; people there were not very happy.
CARLSON: No. I've never gone through a place like that. In fact, I remarked maybe a little earlier, that they had three floors at least of people, of offices. And I don't know, we walked through one of them for some reason and desks everywhere and everyone was crying and some very audibly, loud crying. I mean they were just shaking with what I would call emotion and regrets for a loss of their nominee. And then we went on up further and there was Bob Taft; we walk in and he meets us at the door and he was the man that he was. He didn't show any emotion, not the least, just as though it was an every day occurrence, nothing ever happened to him and he congratulated the General on the nomination. The General couldn't understand it. I mean he didn't know how to express himself, and under the circumstances I can readily understand, but it didn't bother Bob Taft. Just an every day occurrence to him, amazing.

BURG: So the General had difficulty phrasing what it was he wanted to say to Taft?

CARLSON: Well, yes, he didn't know how he could say it. He couldn't say he was glad he beat him, defeated him. "Bob, I'd like to have your help in the campaign." And I don't remember Bob's response, but it couldn't have been enthusiastic because it took some time to get Bob Taft into the campaign, quite a little time.
BURG: So your recollection now is that, whatever his response 
was at that minute, it was not--

CARLSON: I know doggoned well it wasn't enthusiastic, I can tell 
you. He may have well said, "I'll be helping you," but it wouldn't 
have been with any great force, and I can understand.

HORROCKS: After the convention did you and Arthur Summerfield 
meet with Senator Taft in an attempt to get his cooperation?

CARLSON: I don't remember any meeting with Arthur Summerfield; 
I know Arthur had been doing some work on it. He was in Detroit 
and he was close to Canada and he had tried too. I'm sure that 
I wasn't the only one, but I was given that assignment by the 
General. I guess he just thought maybe that I was fairly close 
to Bob. I'm sure there are many other people tried; whether the 
General asked them or not, that's another matter. Everybody 
wanted to get Bob Taft into this campaign.

HORROCKS: What was the senator's initial reaction to your attempts?

CARLSON: First he said, "Well, I'll think about it' I'll take 
some time. I'm going to spend a month or two up here in Canada. 
I'm just going to take a rest now." And gradually after making 
another call or two and asking him if I should come up or if 
there was anything I could do or if he wanted to get anything 
from the General, why he finally said he would come down if I'd 
meet him at the airport and we'd go out to Columbia University 
and visit with General Eisenhower.
That's the first break and we did have that visit, that trip out. He came in the night before. He gave me a copy of the statement that he was going to present to the General. He said, "I've written this. I've been doing a lot of thinking about this." And it's a statement that he presented to the General and I was there when he did. They had questions about it, both of them. Bob had some suggestions and Eisenhower had some; they struck out some language; they wrote in some language, and that became the document that brought the two together. And, as I stated earlier, I do have it preserved here. I have that document.

BURG: That's the document with the handwritten editions of the two men?

CARLSON: The handwritten editions, that's right.

JONES: Who was in that room of Senator Taft's with him when you went in?

CARLSON: Well, I don't know that there was anybody in that room outside of maybe his secretary and one or two people of that kind.

JONES: Senator Dirksen wasn't in there, none of the others?

CARLSON: No, no.

HORROCKS: Going back to the meeting at Morningside Heights--
[ Interruption ]

HORROCKS: Going back to the meeting at Morningside Heights, had either Senator Taft or General Eisenhower stipulated any pre-conditions for a meeting between the two?

CARLSON: No, they just wanted a meeting. The General was most anxious to visit with Bob Taft, and Bob finally had gotten around to the place where he consented to the meeting and came in with that intention. And they had a very fine, frank discussion, no mention of the past in any way.

BURG: No rancor whatsoever?

CARLSON: No, no feeling at all. Bob Taft was his usual, I call it stoic way of being. I mean he was just Bob Taft, and Eisenhower with his personality was the same as he always was, and they had a pleasant visit. They had quite a discussion about that statement, which I didn't think was too important. But it had language in it about what they were going to do, that Bob would agree to do in the campaign and he would try to be helpful, and that's about it.

HORROCKS: Had Eisenhower seen a copy of this draft statement before he came in?
CARLSON: No, he had not. I had the only copy and one of the stipulations was from Bob Taft, "Nobody but you is to see that. No press man or anybody, not even Eisenhower is going to see it till I bring it up there."

BURG: But you had it in your charge?

CARLSON: I had it and I was concerned. In fact I think I told Bob, "I don't even want it. It might get out around here." Because I wasn't going to get involved; if that had gotten out why I think that would have been the end of it.

BURG: Senator, in that meeting, did either of those men ask you to contribute to their discussion?

CARLSON: No, I was just there.

BURG: And you did not contribute to it?

CARLSON: No. I brought Bob Taft there and I had the copy of the piece that he had which I gave to Eisenhower to look at.

HORROCKS: In the morning before the meeting.

CARLSON: In the morning at Morningside. I don't know, there may have been other copies, but Bob had the original and then I got the original after it was over with.
HORROCKS: What was the discussion basically about as they discussed that paper?

CARLSON: Well what they should do in the campaign, how they should work together, how they could work together. After all, there's still a little feeling around, not between the individuals probably as much as many of the supporters. And that was one of the difficulties to know how to get these different views together, and there were divergent views between people who were in the party, even after the nomination to some extent.

HORROCKS: Would you say that the main interest of the meeting was not to reach agreement on principles but to smooth things over?

CARLSON: That's right. Oh, no, they didn't get into discussing principles and legislation and things of that type. They discussed the campaign, the tactics to be used, what to do, and how to do it best to help Eisenhower with the election now after he was nominated.

BURG: So what you're describing, Senator, is, on Taft's part, a positive kind of aid?

CARLSON: That's what Eisenhower wanted and badly needed.

BURG: And that's what Taft was delivering to him at that meeting?

CARLSON: And he could; he could. And the question then got to be: How can I best do it.
BURG: Now what was the quid pro quo, if any, that Eisenhower offered Taft?

CARLSON: Well there wasn't any quid pro quo except that he told Bob, he said, "I've got a staff of people here; I've got people who are in the organization and they will want to work with you in any way they can. And you feel free to direct them, to tell them what you think ought to be done, don't hesitate." And that's about the size of it. That's the best way to handle that kind of a situation.

BURG: So you were one of those staff members so to speak that Taft contacted later on with respect to his desire to be majority leader?

CARLSON: That's right. In fact I think Bob felt a little secure with me sitting there. I was surprised I got to stay to be honest about it. They didn't ask me to leave, and I thought maybe the General would ask me to leave so they could have a discussion. But I think he probably felt that I had brought Bob in there and he thought maybe that Bob rather respected me and maybe was hoping I would stay. So it was never brought up. I didn't expect to stay, really didn't.

HORROCKS: Was there any sort of specific agreement about what Taft would do for the rest of the campaign?
CARLSON: No, it was to be developed of course with the people that run the campaign. And the General wanted him to know that he was not only welcome but to feel free to make suggestions with the people that were leading the campaign and anything.

BURG: Now looking back on it, Senator, do you think of specific instances where of your own knowledge or because someone told you, you saw evidence or knew of evidence of Taft actually lending a hand?

CARLSON: Well, I could begin to see after the meeting that many of his most ardent supporters who had not been enthusiastic for Eisenhower to say the least became enthusiastic. Now how that was brought about I don't know except that the event had taken place.

BURG: You noticed this after the Morningside meeting and not before?

CARLSON: Oh, yes, it became very noticeable, became very noticeable. Now these people who had been Taft people I think had held back some because they weren't going to do anything that Bob didn't want done. They weren't sure how far he wanted to go in this campaign. But once he made this statement on the record that he was going to help Eisenhower, which he did tell the press, they got into the campaign.
HORROCKS: Would it be fair, just to kind of sum up this, would it be fair to characterize this meeting at Morningside Heights in what the press called the "surrender at Morningside Heights" as really a kind of face-saving device for Senator Taft to come out strongly in favor of Eisenhower?

CARLSON: Well, I don't know how quite to say that. Not necessarily a face-saving device. After all, Bob didn't need that; he was a man in his own right and he didn't need to have his face saved for anyone. But he did want Eisenhower to know, and I think very sincerely, that he wanted the campaign to be successful.

BURG: He was enough of a party man then to swallow his own anguish and make this gesture.

CARLSON: Oh, yes, very much so. That's right.

HORROCKS: Moving on to another part of the campaign, were you present in a hotel, right before Nixon made his "Checkers" speech? Was there a discussion with Eisenhower and other campaign train advisers as to whether Nixon should remain on the ticket?

CARLSON: I was there and I'm telling you that was a tragic evening in many ways. Was this Columbus?

HORROCKS: Cleveland, Ohio.
CARLSON: Cleveland, yes. I knew it was Ohio and I have got to thinking about it since; it was Cleveland. Well, I tell you things were really down at that time, and it was a very hectic situation. We went from there as I remember into West Virginia from Cleveland. All that evening, I don't know, you just began to wonder what was going to happen to the campaign, whether that was the end of it, not only for Nixon but for Eisenhower. It was not an easy decision for Eisenhower. He had some heart-rending moments on that before he made the decision that he was not going to change. And I was around on that deal; it was something.

BURG: Did he discuss in your presence the possibility of having to drop Nixon and did he have any--

CARLSON: Not with Nixon present.

BURG: No, not with Nixon present.

CARLSON: No, but friends that came in and out he said, "I've got a real problem." He said, "I don't know, I'm seriously thinking and trying to get it through my mind as to what I should do." And he was really walking the floors, so to speak.

BURG: Did he mention any names that might be substituted?

CARLSON: No, no. No, no.
HORROCKS: Do you remember what the stands of the different advisers were on this issue?

CARLSON: Well they were varied. He got both kinds of advice from close friends of his. Some thought you just can't overcome it and some said you just can't afford to change.

BURG: Was Lodge there on the train at that time?

CARLSON: I don't remember Cabot Lodge being there at that time.

BURG: Sherm Adams.

CARLSON: Yes, Sherm was there all the time.

BURG: How did Adams react to this?

CARLSON: Well I would say, not maybe immediately, because this thing was a shock when it hit; you just didn't know which way to go. And I remember Sherm Adams, he got around to the place where he didn't think that you could change. But, maybe at the beginning, he might well have thought that, and probably did, that we better take a look at this.

BURG: Was Fred Seaton there too?

CARLSON: I don't remember Fred being at that meeting.

BURG: How about Arthur Summerfield?
CARLSON: He was there.

BURG: Do you happen to remember his initial reaction?

CARLSON: No, no, I don't; I don't remember.

HORROCKS: How about Bob Humphreys?

CARLSON: Well I don't remember Bob either, his reaction. Bob was around, I mean, they were all there and if they ever called in troops to get advice why that was the evening. They were there.

JONES: What was Senator Carlson's reaction?

CARLSON: Well my reaction was you couldn't change. I mean you just can't change at this stage of the campaign. That would have been the end of it in my opinion.

BURG: You counselled the General in that regard?

CARLSON: He really didn't ask my advice but I told him, I said,--

HORROCKS: You gave it anyway.

CARLSON: --I just remarked that, "I don't see how you can change now and pick somebody else up and start rebuilding." And I didn't think you could at that stage in the campaign.

HORROCKS: What was his reaction?
Sen. Frank Carlson, 1-6-75

CARLSON: Well he didn't say anything. The General wasn't much to express himself. He was listening to everybody.

HORROCKS: When do you feel he made his final decision?

CARLSON: Well it took a few hours, and I think then he decided that you just can't do it. He was going to go down with the ship if it went down.

BURG: The "Checkers" speech had not yet been made?

CARLSON: Had not been made, and after that of course things began to change in favor of Nixon, and that of course developed into a very important speech from the party's standpoint and Nixon's standpoint.

HORROCKS: I'm kind of confused, was Eisenhower's mind settled before or after the "Checkers" speech?

CARLSON: Oh, before.

HORROCKS: It was settled that he would keep Nixon before the "Checkers" speech.

CARLSON: Yes.

BURG: You felt he would go down with the Nixon ship if he had to rather than change?
CARLSON: That's right.

BURG: Now we've heard conflicting reports of the General's reaction while watching the "Checkers" speech. Were you in the room with him?

CARLSON: Not with him at the time. I watched that with some other friends as I remember it, but I was not in there when--so I don't know the General's reaction to that.

BURG: Can you tell us who was in that room? I don't happen to recall, maybe we can look it up.

CARLSON: I can't help you on that.

BURG: Because some people have indicated that he viewed that "Checkers" presentation with a certain amount of visible cynicism; others have indicated that he viewed it and was quite visibly touched by the speech, moved by it.

CARLSON: I saw him after the speech, and I would say that he was touched by it.

BURG: How long after, Senator?

CARLSON: Oh, I imagine hours after, some hours, shortly, an hour or two afterwards. I would say he was moved by it. And I gathered that from the days following the speech, I mean, not just immediate, but afterwards as we campaigned on into West Virginia on through he
began to get the reaction I think from the press and from the people who were working in the campaigns that that had been a very satisfactory explanation and it was kind of everything swept under the rug.

BURG: Now is that your own personal view? Let's take a question from Mr. Jones, how did Senator Carlson feel as he watched "Checkers"?

CARLSON: Well I felt that after that, why, the campaign would soon get back to the momentum we had.

BURG: You thought the "Checkers" speech had cleared the atmosphere?

CARLSON: Yes.

HORROCKS: Why did Eisenhower refrain from making a full statement of support for Senator Nixon immediately after the "Checkers" speech?

CARLSON: Well I think the General was always cautious and he wanted to kind of get the reaction, let the country come up with their reaction, which they did.

BURG: You don't fault him for that, Senator?

CARLSON: No, no, no.

BURG: You felt that as a politician that was what he should do?
CARLSON: That's right. I think there's times you probably shouldn't say anything.

BURG: Hold the cards close and wait and see what happens at the table.

CARLSON: That's right. I think you're in better position to move, if you have to move, if you don't get committed some place.

HORROCKS: Was Eisenhower upset at Nixon's failure to fly immediately and meet him after the "Checkers" speech?

CARLSON: I can't comment on that. I don't have any occasion to-- I don't remember it in any way. I just don't.

BURG: Were you present when the two men did meet?

CARLSON: I was present when they did meet, and I was not in on any of the discussion, so I wouldn't know what their reactions were when they sat down privately and talked, but I was there when they got together.

BURG: Do you happen to recall the exact words that Eisenhower used in greeting Nixon?

CARLSON: No, I don't, I don't remember; I just don't.

BURG: Was that the occasion when he says, "You're my boy." What was that occasion?
CARLSON: I don't remember that. But I can readily understand that the General would do that.

HORROCKS: Was there any sort of a friendly relationship afterwards, at least for the balance of the campaign, between Eisenhower and Nixon?

CARLSON: Yes. From there on out, I could never see that anything had happened between them. They just carried on the campaign as we were proceeding before it happened. We were getting along very well, very fine and the campaign was going good. After this thing developed and after it broke and after it was over with, I think the campaign then went on as it had previously.

BURG: If the pace did not increase, neither did it decrease.

CARLSON: No, it didn't. It didn't make any difference where we went, we had immense crowds and there was never any problem with it. Maybe behind the scenes or undercover if some people would bring it up quietly, but they were very cautious about it too.

HORROCKS: Did the General ever appear to have second thoughts about getting involved?

CARLSON: Not that I know of. I'm sure there were times when he was tired. I think probably I have heard him say on some previous occasions or maybe several times, "I don't know why I got into this thing."
BURG: During the campaign, Senator?

CARLSON: Yes, during the campaign when you sat in the car after we had been on a platform with some appearance in some town. Yes, I've heard him say that many times. He didn't know why he ever got in this campaign.

BURG: Now his wife has said to me that she found those platform appearances as you suggested, Denver to Chicago, she found them buoying; she found that that kind of reaction from people was what sustained her. I wonder if it sustained the General in the same way.

CARLSON: Well, it sure did. You go into a city like, oh, we were in Columbia, South Carolina, early in the morning, and I had grave question about how many people would be out. I think we had thirty or forty thousand people out there in a big football field or something (I don't know what that stadium holds down there), but people out early in the morning, thousands of them. And you can't help but get carried away in that kind of meeting, and it helped the General. Well it helps any candidate.

HORROCKS: Did the General ever feel during the course of the campaign that he had an inadequate background or was inadequately informed about certain domestic issues, say agriculture?
CARLSON: He didn't discuss it that way, but I think he probably had a feeling that that's not his field. Legislation wasn't his field. Not that he stressed it too much, but he said, "I'm a military man", and he was. He had been in the army all his life, so to speak.
INTERVIEW WITH

Frank Carlson

by

David Horrocks

on

March 7, 1975

for

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
This is an oral history with Senator Frank Carlson at his home in Concordia, Kansas with David Horrock of the Eisenhower Library on March 7, 1975.

MR. HORROCKS: Senator, you were mentioning earlier about the prayer breakfasts.

SEN. CARLSON: Well, I mentioned the beginning of what turned out to be the beginning of what was first called the Presidential Prayer Breakfast and presently called the National Prayer Breakfast. It had an interesting origin and the way it got started was that after President Eisenhower's election— or General Eisenhower's election—as President, he had his headquarters in the Commodore Hotel in New York City, previous to the inauguration in January. And I was in New York at the Commodore Hotel and had a few errands before the congress really got under way and the President was inaugurated. And one day I mentioned to the President-elect, and I always called him General, and I said, "General, we have a prayer breakfast in the U.S. Senate every Wednesday morning and sometime after your inauguration I'd be pleased if you would want to attend."

And without a second's hesitation he said, "Why, Frank, I'd be delighted to." And I thought, well, that was great.

So after the inauguration I began to think about making plans to have the President attend our prayer breakfast. Well, the Senate prayer breakfast meets in the Vandenberg Room in the Senate side of the Capitol and we had room for thirty-five people. Well, the story soon got out that the President would attend a prayer
breakfast and the House has a prayer breakfast group, they heard about it and they wanted to come and attend it. Pretty soon some other people heard about it in the executive branch, they thought they'd like to attend and here I was, I had a commitment from the President he'd like to attend a prayer breakfast and it just looked to me like I was going to be stymied. And that's when I first learned too about the movement of a President--you don't move a President very easy. Secret Service and FBI and everything else involved for a week investigating before they let you take him up to the Capitol even. I had the fine response from the President and I thought how wonderful it would be, and it just looked like I wasn't going to be able to carry it through. Well, somehow, someway my thoughts went back to a meeting in May in Denver where Conrad Hilton, this great hotel executive came in to meet and visit with the General, who was then a candidate for the nomination for the presidency. I brought Mr. Hilton in and as he left visiting with the General, I mentioned to him as he was about ready to leave that the next man in to see the General is Dr. Billy Graham and Mr. Hilton said, "Well, you know I'm a devout Catholic, but I have contributed to his campaign for years and never met him. I'd like to meet him." So after Billy Graham came out, I got the two together in a room, they visited for about thirty minutes. As Mr. Hilton left he said, "Senator, if there ever comes a time I can be of any help in a Christian or religious cause, you call
on me." And of course that was a very nice gesture on his part; I thanked him and never expected to think of ever using it. Well, when I got involved in this trying to arrange a presidential prayer breakfast, somehow, someway, my mind flashed back to that meeting in Denver in May with Mr. Hilton and Billy Graham. And in my own office in Washington I picked up the telephone one morning and called Mr. Hilton at Beverly Hills in California. And I didn't know Mr. Hilton very well; I'd met him on two or three occasions probably and on this occasion when I brought him in to see the General. And if you haven't been around Mr. Hilton, he's a man of few words—a great business executive—and I started out by saying, "Mr. Hilton", after telling him who I was, I said, "Mr. Hilton, last May you made a commitment in Denver, Colorado," and I think he thought I was going to ask for $100.00 because he said in a very terse, sharp language, he said, "What do you want?" And I told him, I said, "Mr. Hilton, you own the Mayflower Hotel and I'd like to have the use of your ballroom there for a breakfast, a prayer breakfast that the President of the United States will attend and I'd like to have you pick up the check for the breakfast."

He said, "How many will you have?"

I said, "Two hundred and fifty." We had four hundred and that was truly the beginning and every President from President Eisenhower down, this was 1953, his first year in administration, and every President, every year until this last February 2, 1975, which was
our twenty-third, and it's been an interesting thing to follow it through. I want to say this about Mr. Hilton, he was very fine about it. He did let us use the ballroom for four or five years and picked up the check for the breakfast, but the space was getting so small and crowded that we had to move. We moved first to the Shoreham, then the Sheraton-Park, and now they're meeting in the Washington Hilton; we had over 3,000 this year.

HORROCKS: Good size.

CARLSON: That's the story. At the beginning I mentioned it because it happened with a statement that Eisenhower made in the Commodore Hotel. So it's been interesting to me to watch its development; I've been very pleased with the growth of it.

HORROCKS: Was Billy Graham a close friend of Eisenhower's?

CARLSON: Oh yes, yes he was. They'd had sessions together and Billy Graham was a close friend of mine and he spoke at the first presidential prayer breakfast—he was the speaker.

HORROCKS: Do you know how they met?

CARLSON: No, I haven't any idea, but Billy Graham, I'm sure, met him in Europe when he was over there for one thing and in this nation, too, and probably another reason that Dr. Milton Eisenhower
and Billy Graham had been together, I mean, on various occasions and various meetings.

HORROCKS: As colleagues, rather than friends.

CARLSON: Yes, that's right.

HORROCKS: Where were you, in 1952, on election night? Were you with the Eisenhower party?

CARLSON: Yes, in '52 I was, well let's see, '52, no, I was not with them on the election night. No--I was trying to think back--no, but I was with them when the nomination took place there in Chicago, that night--the day he received the nomination, I was with him then.

HORROCKS: Were you disappointed at the congressional election results in '52?

CARLSON: Well, we didn't sweep the country like you might think we would with the President running the way he did. The President made a strong race and won the election by a very substantial vote, and yet it didn't do the normal thing. The normal thing, the head of the ticket, the President and Vice-President on a ticket, usually carries with them enough members to control both houses of Congress; probably not the Senate always because it doesn't change but a third every two years, but the House normally. But it just didn't happen that year.
HORROCKS: Do you have any ideas as to why that would take place?

CARLSON: Well, there's always a problem involved in that we were in a period of many, many years of Democrat party in control and these people who were running were, a great majority of them, were well established in their districts, and it wasn't easy for a new person to come in and upset them, regardless of politics.

HORROCKS: So it was really a question more of incumbency rather than the issues.

CARLSON: That's right, it was. The incumbents and that's true, I think, even to the present time.

HORROCKS: What were your activities in the months between the election and the inauguration.

CARLSON: Well, of course, I was a member of the U.S. Senate and my principal business then, after the election with the exception of the time I was up in New York City with the General, was taking care of legislative duties as a member of the Senate; so I traveled between Washington D.C. and New York a great deal. I'd go up and spend a few days.

HORROCKS: Were you involved at all with the selection of cabinet members?
CARLSON: Well, not to what you'd say a great extent. I knew what
was going on; I sat in on conferences between individuals who were
interested in the cabinet and some of them who were appointed to
cabinet positions--people like Tom Dewey who was governor of New York,
and Cabot Lodge and Earl Warren and people like that who were involved
and were up to visit with the General in addition to the Senate
leaders.

HORROCKS: What was Earl Warren's role?

CARLSON: Well, of course Earl Warren himself, preceding the
nomination, I mean, he'd been a candidate in previous elections,
and he took a very active interest coming from the state of
California, one of our largest states, and had many close contacts
with President Eisenhower.

HORROCKS: Well, were they on close friendly terms?

CARLSON: Well, yes, I would say so. Oh, yes, maybe not what
you'd call neighborly terms, but good, political friends and
discussed political problems.

HORROCKS: Do you know of any individuals that Governor Warren
was particularly interested in having in the cabinet?

CARLSON: Well, I can't think of any right now individually, but
I'm sure that he did have, and I personally, I wasn't around when
he discussed individuals, but I knew all the time that he was being
considered for chief justice--wasn't any question about that.
HORROCKS: That was under active consideration.

CARLSON: Yes, I mean, people come in to visit with the General and generally that topic'd come up—someone would remark that Earl Warren would make a great chief justice.

HORROCKS: What would be the General's reactions?

CARLSON: Well, he'd just listen like a good President should. I mean, he got a lot of encouragement on it.

HORROCKS: Do you recall who was suggesting that Governor Warren would make a good chief justice?

CARLSON: Well, I think Herb Brownell and Tom Dewey for two and Cabot Lodge. Those were people that were close in and they were close, politically close, in addition, geographically they were close, it was convenient, I mean.

HORROCKS: What were the reasons why they thought that Governor Warren would be a good supreme court justice?

CARLSON: Well, he was a very stable man; he'd had twelve years I believe it was as Governor of California; he knew how to work with people; and he had been attorney general in California. And evidently they felt he had every qualification and he did have, I mean based on his confirmation by the Senate, so there was no problems.
HORROCKS: Had the idea been discussed with Governor Warren before the convention?

CARLSON: That I wouldn't know. I have grave doubts about it.

HORROCKS: How about during the election campaign itself?

CARLSON: Well, of course, Earl Warren was in the campaign. I don't think there was any commitments made—I have no doubt many people, during the campaign, and I have no personal knowledge but I can just sense it—that many people would have mentioned that Earl Warren would be an excellent man for the cabinet as secretary of state, for instance. And then it developed that, of course, he was appointed chief justice.

HORROCKS: Were you consulted, or involved at all, in Secretary [Ezra Taft] Benson's appointment?

CARLSON: No, no I was not involved; I was familiar with it. Personally, I wasn't happy with it. I did express myself on it. I was for Clifford Hope of Kansas, and, as a matter of fact, I would say to this day, that I wished that Clifford Hope had been nominated, but he wasn't. Clifford had had all these years of experience on the committee and knew agriculture and knew the problems of agriculture and had every qualification and one of the finest men our state's produced—would have made an outstanding secretary—but they didn't take my advice and that's about all I can say.
HORROCKS: Did you express your objection directly to General Eisenhower?

CARLSON: No, I did not. I had some personal feelings about it. I didn't think his background fit into the picture at that time. Secretary Benson had had some good, cooperative support and cooperative strength, cooperative organization strength, but I didn't think he knew agriculture.

HORROCKS: How about his position on price supports—was that well known at the time?

CARLSON: Well, there wasn't much said about it, really, wasn't too much. Those were the days, of course, where that was always a hassle. The Democratic organization and party leaders always talked—we had to have ninety percent of parity, but I think the highest they ever got during those years was about seventy-four, or seventy-five. They never could get up to even the present-day figures.

HORROCKS: Did you have much contact with the General, over the years, on agricultural matters, know of his thinking at all?

CARLSON: No, not necessarily. I was down there on occasions; we'd go down on legislation affecting grains and livestock and dairy. I'd generally always go with Clifford Hope because we were from Kansas. I don't talk to anyone in Washington that
was interested in agriculture, with regards to discussions on agriculture with the President or some other top people without having Clifford Hope along. It was just natural. And then we had a very fine Democrat as head of the committee, Marvin Jones of Texas. Marvin Jones and Clifford Hope come from this great area and they were both not only able, they were substantial and held in high regard by all people, regardless of their views.

HORROCKS: Did the General take an active interest in farm policy or did he tend to leave these things to Secretary Benson?

CARLSON: Well, of course he left it to Benson, yes he did. But of course the General, coming from the Middle West, was always interested in agriculture. He had a personal interest in it.

HORROCKS: So he was pretty well informed about it from the beginning, would you say.

CARLSON: I would say so, yes. I mean, he knew the problems of agriculture out here, having done, as a youth, some work out here dealing with handling dairy products and other things at a creamery and he knew the farmers and he knew their problems. Here again, when you're in the President's office, you've got to rely on people for information and suggestion, and he did, of course.
HORROCKS: Had he made up his mind, during the campaign, that he was strongly in favor of lower price supports?

CARLSON: Now I don't know that I ever heard that mentioned. No, I doubt it.

HORROCKS: Do you know if there was ever any interest in replacing Secretary Benson--

CARLSON: Well, of course, there was--

HORROCKS: --in the administration.

CARLSON: --well not necessarily in the administration. President Eisenhower was not a man to move easily when it come to moving people out. Once he had selected a person, he expected them to deliver in whatever field they were in, and he stayed with them, too.

HORROCKS: Do you think it might have been a fault?

CARLSON: Well, it could be a fault, you know, but I don't think there's any more difficult position in the cabinet than secretary of agriculture. We've had so many of them and I haven't yet found one that goes out as a hero, I don't care who they are.

HORROCKS: Why was Secretary Benson chosen?
CARLSON: When you select—and I wouldn't say this is the only reason—his background was such that he had been working with cooperatives, but he also was one of the outstanding members of the Mormon church. And when you try to pick cabinet people, you try to pick people that represents groups and he certainly was highly regarded in the Mormon church.

HORROCKS: Were you ever considered as secretary of agriculture?

CARLSON: No, I'm sure I wasn't. I've heard rumors and reports of that, but I—well, Senator Carl Mundt, who passed away a couple of years ago, went down and urged President Eisenhower to appoint me—said there'd be no problem. But I never had a feeling that I—well in the first place, I wouldn't have wanted it. I had, I thought, a very fine position in the U.S. Senate which I enjoyed and I was getting along fine with the Kansas people and other people, why bother with that which is a very difficult assignment.

HORROCKS: If you had an objection or a comment and wished to suggest someone for a cabinet post before the inauguration, who would you have contacted?

CARLSON: Well, the one person I would have contacted would be Sherman Adams.
HORROCKS: He was handling those matters even though he--

CARLSON: He was handling those matters, and a very good friend of mine, and all I needed to do was pick up a telephone or drop him a note and I knew it would be getting into headquarters if it should be mentioned.

HORROCKS: Would you have had to have much contact with Lucius Clay for instance?

CARLSON: I had very fine relations with Lucius Clay, very fine.

HORROCKS: Are you familiar with the choices of George Humphrey and Charles Wilson, as to who proposed them?

CARLSON: Generally, just generally, I mean. I knew of them, their consideration. And I remember well when George Humphrey was being considered; I was in on a discussion with Senator Harry Byrd about it because it was being mentioned the President was considering it and we were talking about what action we should take and things like that, but that's the only way. Charlie Wilson I didn't know too well; George Humphrey I knew quite well and it's just a general, routine matter. I wasn't, what you'd say, personally involved--I didn't go down there saying, well, we just had to nominate them. It wasn't that type of a deal at all.
HORROCKS: Well, who pushed George Humphrey and--

CARLSON: Well, I don't know; I wouldn't say "pushed." But I would use the term, people who thought George Humphrey would make a great secretary of the treasury, who would be Bob [Robert A.] Taft and Senator [John] Bricker of Ohio and a conservative group of people who did have, not only a very high regard for George Humphrey, but for his ability.

HORROCKS: So, do you think that they suggested his name, or--

CARLSON: I'm sure they did, but personally I can't say that. But I'm sure they did.

HORROCKS: When the Republicans organized the Senate in early 1953, was the White House advised or consulted or involved in the committee assignments and such.

CARLSON: I wouldn't say they were interested in the committee assignments, but they were interested, of course, in who would be in charge of the leadership of the Senate and on the House side, as far as the minority was concerned, and that's about the extent of it.

HORROCKS: But they didn't take any active leadership?
CARLSON: No, I mean they were concerned, but they didn't call someone down at the Senate or the House side and say, well, we've got to have so-and-so, but they might go so far as to say that so-and-so would be an excellent choice for the position.

HORROCKS: Can you think of any examples?

CARLSON: Well, of course, we always had a problem in the Senate side at that time when we came in; we had some strong people there, for instance, Everett Dirkson and Styles Bridges and Bob Taft for three that were rather prominent at that time, and individually they were concerned about their positions and I'm sure that the President was interested in it, although, from my own knowledge, he didn't call anyone and say that we've got to have so-and-so. So they didn't go that far. But any President is interested in who the leadership is down at both bodies of congress.

HORROCKS: I was just curious as to whether he actively involved himself--

CARLSON: No.

HORROCKS: --in reorganization.

CARLSON: No.
HORROCKS: Was there much, well, trepidation in the Senate as the first session began, as to relations between the conservative wing of the party and the executive branch?

CARLSON: Well, there's always more or less of that. And that's been true in years past, the people with differing viewpoints—you can call it conservative and liberal and moderate—all concerned and seriously so on occasions, as to what course the administration's going to take and where it's going to be on issues—left, right or center. And that was true, I think, in the Eisenhower administration as it's been true in most administrations during my thirty years in congress.


CARLSON: Well, I wouldn't say they weren't concerned, but I think a President, and that's true of Eisenhower and I think it's been true of most presidents, they're going to select a course and trust that things will work out for the best despite various viewpoints that individuals have and we have those individual viewpoints now; we've had them all these years; it's there. But, generally speaking, the press and publicity make it such that you would think there was a great feeling between the two—normally there is not, there's differences of opinion and different viewpoints, but it isn't critical, really.
HORROCKS: You attended several legislative leadership meetings over the years. What was your most memorable one; the one that really strikes you?

CARLSON: Oh, I don't know. I imagine if I had to come up with one that I thought was one of the most difficult leaderships, speaking now strictly of the Republican leadership, we had monthly caucuses, monthly membership meetings in the Senate, was the one at which time a discussion on the McCarthy situation. That was a very rugged, heated discussion between those who were in favor of doing something about the McCarthy situation and those who were so rabid in support of Senator McCarthy that they just couldn't see, well, they just couldn't see any reason for doing anything and it was a rather rugged, lengthy, session.

HORROCKS: When was the session; was it before or after the Flanders Resolution?

CARLSON: Well, it was, well it was building up you know before the Flanders Resolution. It was a problem for months in advance, and then, of course, when Senator [Ralph] Flanders threw in that resolution, that opened up Pandora's Box and from then on--. This particular meeting was a meeting as to what should be the attitude and position of the party, and you can well imagine that it wasn't unanimous--there was a lot of heated discussion.
HORROCKS: Well, could you relate who was saying what?

CARLSON: No, I don't know that I could except it was a general discussion. Joe McCarthy had very strong friends and they had convictions, deep convictions, about it and they would be rather conservative, I mean very conservative. And then there was more of a liberal group led by Senator Flanders. And the majority of the members, I would say, were concerned about it, they regretted the situation, and the party was being pushed all over from all sides for Joe's activities. It was a very mean, difficult time.

HORROCKS: Who were the most outspoken persons supporting Senator McCarthy?

CARLSON: Oh, well, of course, Carl Mundt of South Dakota and Bill Jenner of Indiana--Bill was adamant in his support. I mean he led the fight on the floor of the Senate as far as that goes--many others, I mean.

HORROCKS: How about Senators Taft and [William F.] Knowland?

CARLSON: Well, they supported Joe, of course, but they realized there were problems involved, too, so they weren't the radical, real radical type.

HORROCKS: What did they think should be done?
CARLSON: Well, it was hard to know what to do. There were many solutions, many suggestions, but it was very difficult to get it crystalized because, nationally, Joe McCarthy had a lot of support and your mail indicated that, and it was true of every member of the congress--the Senate particularly. These people who were supporting Joe didn't hesitate to write letters, and the mail flooded in so the post office had one of their largest volumes of mail that they'd handled at that time.

HORROCKS: Was there an effort to have Senator McCarthy at least slow down a bit, or play it low key?

CARLSON: Well, it was done, I'm sure, by several people, but the committee that censured him, tried, we tried--we called Joe in on two or three occasions and tried to help him. We sincerely wanted to help him, and urged him to tone down his activities and try to help us because we were not happy with our role in this matter. It's not an easy matter to vote censure on a member of the U.S. Senate and I don't care who you are and what they have done, but we just didn't get any cooperation from Senator McCarthy and I regretted it.

HORROCKS: Why didn't he want to cooperate.

CARLSON: Well, he had problems of his own. I shouldn't say this I guess, but he was drinking very badly and he really wasn't himself at the last.
HORROCKS: So really, during the meetings of the Watkins Committee and during these attempts to reach an agreement with Senator McCarthy, he was--

CARLSON: Intoxicated, I shouldn't say this I guess, but it was, it's a true statement; he just wasn't himself.

[Interruption]

HORROCKS: How did you happen to be selected for the Watkins Committee?

CARLSON: Well, I think the first thing I should say is that there wasn't anyone that wanted to serve on the committee. It was agreed, of course, between the majority and minority leadership that there should be six members and an equal number of Democrats and Republicans on the committee. And then they began to check around and Joe McCarthy was asked, if he had certain people he wanted on, or what they were to do about it, and the leadership were doing the same thing, trying to pick out people. And I probably shouldn't say this, but they tried to find people they thought would be objective--wouldn't be so prejudiced one way or the other that they couldn't be fair in a problem like this, because there was terrific tensions and pressures.

HORROCKS: An honor, but an unsought one.
CARLSON: It sure was and that's true of the members that served. It was a thankless job and they, I think, made a very good selection. I've often thought of that committee, not because I was on it, but the other members. There wasn't a one of them that had any hard feelings about this case; they tried to be sympathetic—go as far as they could. Now that it's over with, I'm happy that I did serve on it. It was a very trying ordeal because of the great pressure you had from all over the nation on this matter—wasn't one-sided. But I think we had a wonderful committee when I look back on the records of the men who served, and Judge [Arthur] Watkins was a wonderful chairman. He's a Mormon and he stuck strictly to Mormon principles; I mean they had to be just right. He served as not only a chairman, but he was a Judge and he was a fair one.

HORROCKS: Did he dominate the committee pretty much?

CARLSON: Well, no, but he was generally so thorough and so fair there was no question, from all sides—both the Democrat side and the Republican side—that Arthur Watkins was really an outstanding chairman for this occasion.

HORROCKS: Did the committee get together in advance of its hearings and discuss procedures in light of McCarthy's behavior at previous--
CARLSON: Well, we discussed procedures. We made the procedures for the hearings and we discussed things generally. Of course, Joe McCarthy was defended by probably the outstanding lawyer, [Edward] Bennett Williams, who was, to me, just second to none. And he was outstanding—we knew he would have that type of defense and should have—we had no objection. We thought it was wonderful he could get Bennett Williams because he was regarded as the number one, and still is as far as that goes. And we had our own staff and own people and had good attorneys too, but—

HORROCKS: Had you consciously set up the procedures of the committee to minimize Senator McCarthy's disruptive—

CARLSON: Well, we didn't set it up, but we set it up on a basis that the committee hearings would be absolutely fair and above board—there was to be no pressure from the committee either way.

HORROCKS: Well, during the legislative leadership meeting that you were discussing earlier, what were your thoughts as to what should have been done.
CARLSON: Well, of course, my thought was one starting in as one of sympathy for Joe McCarthy more than anything else; yet I felt personally that he'd gone clear out of reason on some of his statements and some of his conduct and that, as far as the government and the U.S. Senate was concerned and the operations of our government, it was necessary that something be done.

HORROCKS: You attended some legislative leadership meetings with President Eisenhower in 1953. What were those about? What was discussed?

CARLSON: On several occasions I was in on the leadership meeting at the White House, particularly when it dealt with postal operations. And one of my unfortunate experiences that I may say was that Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield and I had some disagreements, and that was the President's choice and he was a postmaster general. I was on the committee; I'd been on the committee for years and I was not a stranger there. As a matter of fact I went on the committee in 1950, so I had been on some time before the General was President. Arthur Summerfield was an outstanding businessman, and the President wanted him appointed postmaster general and I wasn't going to oppose it, which I didn't, but I had questions about it.
HORROCKS: Were you consulted at all, about--

CARLSON: Well, yes I was told--yes, they had to reach an agreement and he said the name would be coming up. But we had differences of viewpoint on the operation of the mail, the postage rates and things like that. One of the things, as I look back, and I spoke very frankly in one of those sessions at the White House around the table with the President and members of congress and some of the cabinet people, including Arthur Summerfield, that I didn't appreciate some of the things he'd said and some of the things he was doing, and it didn't set too well. I've thought about it many times--why I did it I don't know, but I did, I expressed my feelings. So that was one of the regrettable experiences that I had.

HORROCKS: This was in '55--

CARLSON: '54, '55--in through there somewhere.

HORROCKS: About the time they were discussing postal rate increases.

CARLSON: Postal rates and changes in policy and different things of that type.

HORROCKS: I guess President Eisenhower felt strongly about what he thought was strong lobbying by the postal workers' union and such.
CARLSON: That's right and the publishers and everybody else—that's right. I sponsored the subsidy program. My theory was then, and is today as far as that goes, that the post office department is not a profit-making organization. It's an organization that, in my opinion, will never pay its way. I mean you're just not going to get the rates high enough and therefore I favored a $500,000,000 subsidy every year, because you can't deliver out in the rural mailboxes without subsidy—that's all there is to it. And I come from the rural area and Summerfield, postmaster general, convinced the President that there wasn't any reason they couldn't pay its way. Well, it hasn't yet and in my opinion, never will.

HORROCKS: Well, did your relationship with President Eisenhower cool after this issue on which you felt so strongly.

CARLSON: Well, I don't know that it cooled any, but it didn't help it any, because I was very blunt about it. I didn't pull any punches.

HORROCKS: Did he respond at all; he supposedly had quite a temper.

CARLSON: Well, he didn't respond in any temper, but he still supported the postmaster general.
HORROCKS: I was doing my homework on this, and I guess there was also at least one legislative leadership meeting in April '53 and you were there and among the others were [William] Jenner, and McCarthy, [Harold] Velde, [William] Knowland, [Robert] Taft, Phillip Young of the Civil Service Commission and Herb Brownell. What was that meeting about? Would it have been connected with the administration's government security program?

CARLSON: I wouldn't think so. I don't believe I was involved at any time in any program in which we got into the security program; I really don't believe so. We had many sessions on postal operation and sometimes on finance and sometimes on agriculture, but I was not involved in any of these other matters dealing with--

HORROCKS: Were you involved at all with the executive order that reorganized the civil service in '53 or 4?

CARLSON: Yes, yes. I was in on that. We were discussing it on several occasions. It was, of course, discussed in committee; it was discussed in the party caucuses; and also discussed down at the White House. Yes, I was familiar with it.

HORROCKS: Can you tell us what some of the considerations were; what problems it tried to deal with?
CARLSON: Well, of course, the government at that time they said was growing like topsy and turvy and it was growing topsy and turvy and: We're going to reorganize it; we're going to cut back here and there and going to make many changes, which you hear every two years, every four years at least when they get a new President or a second term for a President. Well intentioned, but, in the final analysis, not very much done, and that was the case at this time.

HORROCKS: Were you involved at all with the appointment of Phillip Young?

CARLSON: Yes, I was for Phillip Young. Yes I thought he'd make an excellent choice and I think he did.

HORROCKS: Did you get caught in any of the struggle with Charlie Willis and Phillip Young on patronage problems?

CARLSON: Well, here again that's always a problem and every administration wants as many of these positions that are outside of civil service—you can call them political positions if you want to. But every administration wanted them--Eisenhower administration wanted them—and they're positions, of course, that you can remove these people from a position they were holding, regardless; they don't come under civil service. And that gives a lot of openings for appointment and every President has gone through that period and it's always caused us problems.
HORROCKS: Why was Phil Young chosen?

CARLSON: Well, as I remember it, the President himself had some connection with Young--

HORROCKS: At Columbia University.

CARLSON: Yes. And he had a high regard for him and was someone he thought he could work very closely with, and one that he felt would advise him correctly. No, I had no problem with Young.

HORROCKS: Did you find that Milton [Eisenhower] was really actively involved in many instances in advising the President.

CARLSON: Oh yes, yes. My guess is he would be his closest adviser. Oh yes, they were very close.

HORROCKS: Did President Eisenhower take an active interest in Kansas politics particularly? Did he follow the native state very closely?

CARLSON: Well, he followed it very closely. I don't know that he personally got involved anywhere, but he knew the individuals and Kansas was his home state, too. It really was, oh, yes.

HORROCKS: When Majority Leader Taft died, was there any attempt or interest on the part of the White House in replacing him with someone other than Senator Knowland?
CARLSON: No, I think not. I don't know that Knowland would have been the number one choice, but I don't think anyone at the White House got involved in it in any way. It was purely a selection on the Senate side up there.

HORROCKS: Was there much controversy within the Senate Republicans?

CARLSON: Well, here again, you get back to an, I don't like to use individual names, just as well I guess, like Bill Jenner and Karl Mundt and some of those people who were strong Taft people, that weren't too happy with Bill Knowland.

HORROCKS: Why not?

CARLSON: Well, Bill Knowland, a conservative, was sometimes, didn't mind stepping over on the liberal side and did on occasions; I think that was about the only problem we had.

HORROCKS: Who did they want? Did they have a candidate?

CARLSON: Well, I don't know that they pressed any candidates, any of these names I've mentioned, and there were others there too, would have probably been more satisfactory to them. But Bill Knowland had, in the campaign, spent a lot of time with the Eisenhower organization and traveled a lot with the President in the campaign personally, and I knew he knew the President quite well. That was to Bill's advantage, and with me, it was fine. Bill Knowland and I were quite close.
HORROCKS: So really, when Knowland became majority leader, the administration was looking forward to perhaps good relations with him and not thinking they would have the conflict they later did.

CARLSON: That's probably true. Yes, I don't know, that got to be kind of mean at the last. Very unfortunate, but it seemed to be a developing feeling there. And, I'll never forget, Bill Knowland on one occasion stepped away from the leadership, left the leadership chair in the U.S. Senate, and moved back to his assigned seat in the back of the room and fought the administration program.

HORROCKS: What issue was that over?

CARLSON: Well, I was trying to think what the issue was—but it was a very heated one and it's the only time I have ever seen it done.

HORROCKS: When Senator Taft appointed Knowland as temporary majority leader, was this done in consultation with the administration?

CARLSON: I'm sure it was. Well, personally I wouldn't, but I just know it was. Yes, I know it was. It was just natural that it would be that way because Bill Knowland is one that had been active in the campaign.

HORROCKS: What had he done in the campaign?
CARLSON: Well, he traveled on the train some; he wrote speeches; he did whatever you do in his position, which he could do a lot coming from California. He'd done work on getting delegates to start with and in the campaign had a lot of contacts.

HORROCKS: So he was working on getting delegates for the convention; so he was really working for Eisenhower then instead of for Warren.

CARLSON: Well, there was a little feeling on that, but he never left Earl Warren. I mean, he stayed with Earl Warren as long as he saw the opportunity for anything to come Earl Warren's way, but he also felt Eisenhower was the strongest candidate.

HORROCKS: Had he come to feel, pretty well in advance of the convention, that the Earl Warren candidacy was just not going anywhere and it was time to--

CARLSON: I think that was true. I think other people felt that too. I mean, you can sense it.

HORROCKS: Senator [Richard] Nixon, perhaps?

CARLSON: Well, that I don't know, but I would assume so. I would assume so.

HORROCKS: How would you evaluate Knowland as majority leader?
CARLSON: Well, he was not a forceful leader. He was more the type to try to follow along without trying to press his views or the administration views. He was just, what I would call, a leader and that's all.

HORROCKS: He was not particularly effective in party discipline.

CARLSON: No, he was not.

HORROCKS: Did someone else try and pick up this role?

CARLSON: No, not necessarily, but there was a lack there and I think that's where it stemmed down to in the final analysis. For instance, if you had key votes, Bill Knowland, on many occasions, he just wasn't able to deliver.

HORROCKS: Did the administration eventually wish to replace him; try to find a way to replace him?

CARLSON: I don't know. No, I think there might have been some feeling, but there was nothing publically--

HORROCKS: Nothing they could do about it?

CARLSON: No, no. No, they just wouldn't meddle with the U.S. Senate like that. No, you don't do that.
HORROCKS: In light of the unfortunate thing that happened to Senator Knowland in the past year or so, could you see anything leading up to that?

CARLSON: No, I could not. And I was shocked when I read it; I really was. In fact, I had seen Bill Knowland within the year before this tragedy occurred. I saw him in Washington and visited with him. He'd gained a lot of weight, and he looked like he had aged some and looked like—I was going to say carrying a lot of problems, and I think probably he was. After all, he had a big operation there. That's a large newspaper, and I don't know about anything—I wasn't close enough to know, but I just couldn't believe it when I heard it.

HORROCKS: What were his relations with Lyndon Johnson during those years?

CARLSON: Very good.

HORROCKS: They had very good relations.

CARLSON: Very good, very good. Yes, Lyndon and Bill Knowland cooperated very well.

HORROCKS: Was Lyndon Johnson able to take advantage of this cooperation to really maneuver?
CARLSON: Well, only in this way. That Bill Knowland and Lyndon, they thought pretty much alike on many issues. Bill Knowland was quite liberal and it was easier for him to get along than others who had worked with Lyndon.

HORROCKS: What was Robert Taft's relationship with Lyndon Johnson?

CARLSON: Well, of course, Robert Taft was so outstanding and so highly regarded, not only in the Senate and in the country, that Lyndon recognized that and he fully understood his position there too. While Lyndon was a leader always, except one term, he fully appreciated Taft's standing and was very cautious and worked with him very well on that basis, not always agreeing of course.

HORROCKS: It was kind of a cordial, businesslike relationship.

CARLSON: It was very businesslike, businesslike's the right word. It sure was.

HORROCKS: When you were involved with the administration on the issue of postal workers' salaries and postal rates and the administration felt very strongly about it, were they effective in exerting influence over the Senate in persuasion and cajoling?

CARLSON: Not too much on some of those matters because the members in the Senate, both majority and minority side, were closer to these particular problems when it come to rates, when it come to
postal employees' salaries, that it was very difficult for someone down in the executive branch to tell them what to do.

HORROCKS: Did the Eisenhower administration try, very often, on any issue, really to come right down to the Senate--

CARLSON: Well, they never hesitated to express their views on rates, but they, of course, did it through the cabinet officers. The president didn't do it directly, but he did it indirectly.

HORROCKS: I was just thinking more, in terms of executive branch leadership and follow-through on their programs under Eisenhower.

CARLSON: Well, they tried on many occasions, particularly the cabinet people who dealt with these problems, no matter what committee it was, to follow through with the President's wishes and sometimes with a great deal of pressure. But here again, when you get up into the U.S. Senate, you deal with people who were there long before these individuals were in the executive branch, people that had views of their own.

HORROCKS: What was the most personally satisfying thing that you did in the U.S. Senate in the '50s?
CARLSON: Well, I don't know. Many things we've been involved in and during all these years, particularly when it come to matters in the tax field, in the foreign affairs, our relationships with the international problems and the foreign relations committees and in the post office department. Forgetting all that, I imagine when all things are said and done and written, probably around the Capitol Hill and probably in the nation, too, the beginning of the Presidential Prayer Breakfast is one thing that stands out. I've gotten information to that, it surprises me, from people that write me and call me and that's the one thing they come up with. My activities in the House dealt with the tax program, sponsoring legislation that made our income tax collections current, the Ruml Plan, was at that time back in the 1936-40s, the big issue in this country; it was a real issue and I was deeply involved in that and it, eventually, became the law of the land.

HORROCKS: When you were on the Senate Finance Committee, I guess you were there with, well, Senator [Harry] Byrd and Senator Johnson.

CARLSON: That's right.

HORROCKS: How did these men work together on one committee. Did it get kind of crowded at times?
CARLSON: I tell you, it's a great committee and in the committee sessions, one of the great opportunities I had was to serve first under Senator [Walter] George of Georgia was chairman of the Finance Committee, and then Senator Harry Byrd--great, great citizens--able people and substantial people and you grow close relationships in these committees. Senator Clinton Anderson and I, I don't want to say that we represented agriculture, but Senator Anderson had been secretary of agriculture and he was from out in this western section and so was I, and we teamed up on several occasions and we were successful in matters affecting agriculture when it come to tax legislation. Particularly, we rewrote the coop tax, oh, I don't know, about 1966 or something like that when the cooperatives of this country were under terrific pressure, and that's still the law of the land.

HORROCKS: Were Secretary [George] Humphrey or Secretary [Robert] Anderson sympathetic to farmers and their tax problems?

CARLSON: Well, yes, they were, of course. But they represented more, so to speak, industry though. They were industrialists and it's only natural that they should.

HORROCKS: Did you notice any kind of, oh, switch in emphasis between Secretary Humphrey and Secretary Anderson in Treasury?
CARLSON: Well, there's always differing viewpoints, but they followed along pretty much the same course, really. When you get into this field, you just can't move too much. The course is set long before you get there, and while there are changes, there are changes today, but they're not material changes that happen over night. They're a gradual growth of the development in economics and in the problems of the nation, and I think things today are pretty much like they were back in those years, except there's immediate pressures because we are in different periods in our economic structure, but not serious.

HORROCKS: Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey was, I think, anxious in some ways to switch emphasis from income tax to excise tax.

CARLSON: Yes.

HORROCKS: Was any real effort made along those lines?

CARLSON: Well, of course, there are always efforts to move some one way or another. Individuals come in with different ideas, but here again the legislative branch, particularly the U.S. Senate which had these, I like to say veterans, who were there for years--Harry Byrd was there many years, Senator George and others--you just don't move too rapidly. Take your time and while they come in with ideas, and that's true of today, didn't any of them
recommend fast changes, and they'll be some changes, but they don't happen very fast. And that's the nice part about it that we do have that type of a government that doesn't act too hastily. It isn't like in a town council where you can pass an ordinance and next week you can change it. You don't do that nationally.

HORROCKS: The problem of balance of payments and gold drain came up at the very end of the Eisenhower administration. Was this seen coming very much earlier?

CARLSON: It wasn't openly discussed much, but I'm sure people in the committees were watching the trends and that's all it is--it's a trend--see what's happening. Of course, President Eisenhower was one of the people in this nation who didn't like unbalanced budgets and he was very conservative.

[Interruption]

CARLSON: --that area I like first Puerto Rico with which we, at that time, were having sugar problems. Sugar seemed to be a problem. And I spent two or three days there checking up, visiting with the president of Puerto Rico and government officials and then I went to the Dominican Republic where we had the Trujillo situation; it was very delicate at that time. Arrived in a country where--
HORROCKS: For the record of the transcript, this is a trip for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1959.

CARLSON: Right. And a country that was under strict dictatorship and rule and it was not easy for us as a nation. I had many conferences with our ambassador and you could sense it when you arrived in the Dominican Republic: They had people marching on the airfields, up the streets; every place you went there was a man stood with a rifle. It was an unusual situation. And one of the things that was interesting to me was, if you remember the son Rafael, Trujillo's son was attending our military academy at Leavenworth, and there was a lot of discussion about having him in this country and one thing and another.

HORROCKS: Were you briefed by the administration or the State Department on what to look for and what to discuss before you made the trip?

CARLSON: Yes, I was and in addition to information that we had at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which they furnished us, the information that they get continuously from all these countries.

HORROCKS: What sort of things were you told and what were you asked to look out for?
CARLSON: Well, just to check conditions as best I could and sense what I could pick up from the leadership. For instance I met Trujillo himself, visited with him, and we had a very frank discussion—a very fine discussion. He did not appear to be critical, but it wasn't pleasing to us to have a neighbor that was under that type of leadership.

HORROCKS: Did he have any sense of the danger his regime was in?

CARLSON: I'm sure he did because otherwise he would not have had it so completely dominated by military. I mean you couldn't go anywhere without running into an armed officer, just anywhere.

HORROCKS: Did you discuss at all with him the possibility of his resigning or changing the situation.

CARLSON: No, oh no, no I did not. That was a detail for our ambassador and others, but I didn't get into that. And then I went over to Haiti next. Went out into the rural areas and I visited a Baptist college about forty to sixty miles out and talked with the leadership there, out in the rural section, observed things there. I had quite a visit with the President, Dr. [Francois] Duvalier. One of the things I shall never forget, I visited with him about it and mentioned the fact that I didn't suppose he knew much about Kansas and that's where I was from, and he said, "Oh, I got my psychiatric training with Menninger's in Topeka."
HORROCKS: He was a psychiatrist, was he?

CARLSON: Yes, he was, and we had quite a nice visit on that and things generally. He talked about their problems and, of course, here again was another country where it was pretty much under military rule—I mean you didn't move too freely.

HORROCKS: What were the problems that he discussed?

CARLSON: Well, of course, his problem was with the people and their poverty. I've never been any place in all my travels that was as bad as some sections of Haiti; I've never seen anything like it, never did.

HORROCKS: Was there anything that the U.S. Government wanted him to do in relation to Cuba or the Dominican Republic?

CARLSON: Well, of course, they were always concerned you know, and so was Dr. Duvalier. He thought either the Dominican Republicans were going to come over there and take his country, or—. He didn't know about Mr. Castro at that time, he didn't say anything about it, but he felt he was in between. He felt those pressures, and of course he, as a ruler, didn't want anything to happen to his government. So he felt he had to be armed that way. My report back was more about the poverty conditions than anything else and the help that we had. We had been giving help
to all these countries. And I went to Cuba and spent three days. You didn't get around too much; here again it was under strict rule, and all those big old hotels and casinos that used to operate full blast were closed, things were just kind of desolate around and was different.

HORROCKS: Were you treated courteously?

CARLSON: Yes, yes I was treated courteously. I never had any problems with people where you stayed.

HORROCKS: How about with the government, the Cuban government.

CARLSON: No, I had no difficulties at all. I mean I had freedom. I could go and the people were very courteous where you lived, but it was an austere period around the hotel. I walked in some of those old casinos where they'd operated night and day, you know, and you might see six, eight people. It just felt like you were at some funeral or something; it was sad and dark.

HORROCKS: What Cuban officials did you meet when you were there?

CARLSON: Well, I met what you'd call the secretary of commerce principally. I don't know if that was his official title, but that was his work, and we talked about commercial relations and problems. I was on the finance committee, and we discussed things from that angle. Of course we'd been getting a lot of sugar from Cuba--was another deal, we were having problems--they shut it off.
HORROCKS: Well, did they shut the sugar flow off or did--

CARLSON: Well, we weren't getting any. I don't remember just--

HORROCKS: Was this when we ended their quota?

CARLSON: Yes.

HORROCKS: Okay, we had already done that, hadn we?

CARLSON: Either that or it was being discussed. I know it was right in that period, because we were talking sugar principally. That was their big export and they, of course, do produce great quantities of sugar. That's about the principal thing. But it was an interesting trip and I've got mental pictures of all these countries and their leaders.

HORROCKS: Well, what was the Cuban secretary of commerce's position on sugar?

CARLSON: Well, of course, he wanted markets. And, of course, if he couldn't sell to us, why he was going to sell to the Soviet Union, which is what they did.

HORROCKS: Was he willing to make any sort of concessions or compromises?
CARLSON: No, he was in no position to do that. I mean Mr. Castro made all those and he may have made suggestions; I don't think they'd get very far. Mr. Castro was in complete control. There's never been any question in my mind what he was down there, and while there may have been some rumblings, they were not open. As I say, he made one of those speeches where he spoke all night. I know I had the radio on about 8, 9, 10, 11 o'clock and got up the next morning, he was still talking. So he was rousing his membership. But he was talking about plans for building and they were making some progress in building. They'd already made some down there in the way of highways and streets and condominiums; they were building places of--

HORROCKS: Did you make any attempt at all to meet with Castro?

CARLSON: Not there I did not. But Mr. Castro came to Washington and we had him in, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He came up, and I'll never forget it; Bill [J. William] Fulbright was chairman at the time and we had a session one morning. Mr. Castro was in Washington and he came walking up to the committee with three bodyguards with pistols on their sides and never forget--

HORROCKS: Quite a sight!
CARLSON: Fulbright says, "You're not coming in with any people with weapons in this office." There wasn't any hassle about it, but they walked outside and stayed outside and Mr. Castro stayed in there alone.

HORROCKS: When you got back from your trip, you met with President Eisenhower about it?

CARLSON: Well, yes, I just briefly told him about the trip, but I met with the cabinet people, oh, Secretary of State Dulles and people like that.

HORROCKS: What was really on their minds?

CARLSON: Well, they just wanted to know what reaction a member of the U.S. Senate could get by just going down and visiting and feeling his way and meeting people that were interested in the government, and I did in every occasion. I hadn't any problem and I reported back on that basis, and I reported back on what I observed. That's an interesting thing to observe how people conduct themselves and what activities you saw and just get a general reaction, and you get it when you travel.

HORROCKS: During the time when you went to the Dominican Republic, was the U.S. ambassador at that time--

HORROCKS: Farland, was he interested in convincing Trujillo to resign, or leave the country?

CARLSON: No, I wouldn't go that far, but he had his contacts with Trujillo, and he had expressed the views of the U.S. without any doubt to Trujillo---about what their views would be and how concerned we were about the situation as a neighbor; that was about as far as you could go. I thought Mr. Farland was doing a good job; it was a trying one down there. No, these places--it seemed to be a situation where one section of the population lived in great wealth and the others in extreme poverty. This is one of the things you noticed, I thought.

HORROCKS: What would you consider as a decent definition of Modern Republicanism that the Eisenhower administration was pushing?

CARLSON: Well, I hadn't thought of that necessarily. The General, despite his entire life, so to speak, in military, was a very human sort of person, and he had a great interest in people who were not faring so well as some others, and he always had a concern for people in need and people who had difficulties, and that could go for an individual or it could go for a group. And I think he, in fact I know personally, he wanted the party to be a party of the people--all people. And he was in position, too,
to deal with all groups. One thing about President Eisenhower was that no matter how humble or how low a person—I don’t mean low physically or mentally, but in what condition he lived in—he was the same as the most outstanding man in the state or nation when they met. And I've never been around a person that could make someone feel more at home than President Eisenhower. He could visit with them.

HORROCKS: When Arthur Larson, President Eisenhower and the whole idea of Modern Republicanism was introduced, oh around ’55, ’56, was there resentment among many Senate Republicans about such a thing?

CARLSON: I don't think that I'd use the word resentment, but there was concern. Oh, yes, there was many concerned as to where we're heading off to.

HORROCKS: Who was concerned?

CARLSON: There was a group who felt that you had to stay with the old conservative principles, that situation still prevails and it prevailed long before Eisenhower as far as that goes. It's a great segment and I'm not so sure but what it's not a substantial segment in the nation that, quite conservative, I mean deep down in their hearts they're concerned. It was true then; it's true now. But there was a great liberal movement, liberal pressure
and they seemed to be in the news media, in the press and quite active too and some good individuals too, strong individuals. Now John Gardner, for instance, head of Common Cause, he was one of President Eisenhower's close friends and had an important position and I think he had some influence, I really do. I'm sure you would agree with me that some of his suggestions have not met with favor with some people.

HORROCKS: I was thinking in terms of Eisenhower and Modern Republicanism, his desire for that. In the end, looking back, did he involve himself sufficiently in party affairs and bring to bear his executive powers and his personality sufficiently to achieve the result he wanted.

CARLSON: No he did not. This is not a criticism of the President in any way, but he did not exert the influence he could have or in my opinion should have. He was in the position with the power that he had and the following he had to do some of these things, but he didn't do it because he was very sensitive about offending people. He didn't like to offend anyone and when you start out on some of these movements, you're going to hurt some feelings, you're going to ruffle some feathers, and that was not President Eisenhower's type. Under leadership of some other Republicans, I think they would have gone much further had they had the power and ability that he had.
HORROCKS: This kind of ties in then with our earlier discussion about reluctance to remove people, ask them to resign.

CARLSON: That's true. He was very sensitive about people. He was. And that's a great trait, too.

HORROCKS: Was it a question of wanting very much to be liked by other people, or was it not wanting to hurt other people's feelings.

CARLSON: Well, he was liked. He was liked by people and I think he was liked for his frankness, his sincerity, and he was a very sincere man, and coming from the background he had I think that was particularly noticeable among our people. You would expect a military man to be domineering, and I don't like to use the word ruthless, but a little careless the way he handled people. That wasn't Eisenhower. It just wasn't.

HORROCKS: Was he conscious at all that he might have this failing, that he might be too easy-going. Do you think he was conscious of this?

CARLSON: I don't think he felt it, was conscious of it, but I don't think it's a trait that he wanted. I don't think he wanted to be that type of an individual, and looking at his background, you know, that would be so easy for him to have been. And in the military—which I don't know too much about him military, except I've been around him during his military—I don't think he was a man to push people around. He just wasn't, and he could have.
HORROCKS: Did you ever discuss this approach of Eisenhower's with your colleagues or cabinet members particularly?

CARLSON: Well, along this type of discussion you and I have just had--I knew him well enough and there were criticisms because he didn't do some of these things.

HORROCKS: From who, for instance.

CARLSON: Well, some of the, I would say, conservative leadership for instance. They thought, well, he ought to do this for the party's standpoint, not that they wanted him to go more moderate or liberal, but they wanted activity and he just wasn't the type man. I mentioned to several of them that he's just not going to do those things.

HORROCKS: Did the liberals in the Republican party grumble that President Eisenhower did not take a more active role in promoting their position in the party.

CARLSON: I don't know that I ever heard them say much about it, but I'm sure they had a feeling about it. They had a feeling that this was our time to get some building done, but it didn't work out.

HORROCKS: How about any of the cabinet members?
CARLSON: Well, here again you've got a pretty conservative group--Charlie Wilson, George Humphrey, Arthur Summerfield, I mean those were, you could say, very stable, substantial, conservative people. And they were very helpful, too, but it wasn't what some of the Republicans in the country wanted at that time.

HORROCKS: You were on the Republican Policy Committee under Styles Bridges in '58. What did you do then? What were your duties?

CARLSON: Well, of course, we met and discussed issues and it was at least monthly meeting, sometimes every week, quite often, every week. Discussed policy and, with the exception of two years, we were always in the minority; so we had to try to decide what we were going to do and what our position would be and that's the duty of the whichever party you're in, majority or minority, and both have their leadership groups. I happened to be on it.

HORROCKS: Did you work at all in trying to develop issues for the '58 election?

CARLSON: Well, of course, the issues were developed and we tried to figure out ways to not only protect our position but to present proposals, too, which we did. When you're in a legislative body that doesn't have the votes to pass legislation, you've got to
protect your positions and make suggestions and force rollcalls on them if you want them called to the attention of the country. That's about all you can do.

HORROCKS: And you were on the 1960 Senatorial Campaign Committee, also. Did you work closely with the administration or with Vice-President Nixon's campaign?

CARLSON: Yes, quite active. I traveled over the country, made speeches in many states and did what I could as a Republican U.S. Senator.

HORROCKS: The committee had control over party funds, did it?

CARLSON: Yes.

HORROCKS: To distribute them--

CARLSON: I never had any control over that because I didn't get involved in handling any of the funds. I may have made some suggestions as to where they might spend some money or something, but I was particularly interested in the election of members of congress; that's what I did mostly.

HORROCKS: Was there any effort in that campaign committee to especially bring along more liberal members of the Senate?
CARLSON: There always is, of course, more or less, and depends on where you went to speak or where you went to help in a campaign. If you went to California, you were going out to speak in a state, at that time, that had fairly liberal leanings although they elected conservatives at times too, and that's one of the unusual things you'll see in this age. You go to a state and you think well, it's got great liberal leanings and yet there's enough people in some of these states, not just California, but other states, they can elect rather conservative people, and they do it. Which indicates to me that basically we have, in this nation, large numbers of people who --and I'm speaking now of hard-hat labor people who are receiving substantial salaries and down in their hearts they're concerned too, they're conservative. They may belong to the COPE [Committee on Political Education, AFL-CIO] and other organizations, but down in their hearts they're a little concerned too.

HORROCKS: How about your 1956 senatorial campaign. You ran against George Hart, here, didn't you?

CARLSON: Yes, I did.

HORROCKS: Was it a hard campaign?

CARLSON: Well, all campaigns are hard. I always conducted my campaigns as though it was a very hard one and they were, but they had no problems. George Hart was a good friend of mine. I visited with him afterwards and he said, "You can't do anything running against 'Old Man Mountain' Carlson."
HORROCKS: What were the main things that were on the minds of the Kansas voters during the campaign?

CARLSON: Well, of course, always in this state it's agriculture and I've never had any problems with, well, I would say with anybody as far as that goes. It's people, generally, but I've always got along well in the agricultural field, and I think I largely got along because I worked closely with Cliff Hope.

HORROCKS: Did foreign affairs issues impinge much on your campaign?

CARLSON: No not back in '56; '62 some, yes, they did. I'd been around some and I had some views that were very definite. We always have a problem with foreign aid and World Bank and things of that type. They had them then, they have them now. My position has always been that, while I'm not too happy about it, we can't live to ourselves. We've got to live in this world as it is.

HORROCKS: I wonder, I guess we're getting towards the end here, that if we could go down and give a thumb-nail sketch of some different senators that you worked with as to what sort of people they were and who their closest friends in the Senate were, your own closest friends in the Senate for instance.
CARLSON: Well, of course, they were all friends of mine. I don't think I had an enemy in the U.S. Senate; in fact I know I didn't. But when it come to working closely with people, who I had especially high regard for, Senator Dick Russell of Georgia. To me he was the ideal for a member in the U.S. Senate. I mean, his word was as good as his bond and he was able and realized problems of individuals of the senate. Truly a great senator and in my opinion, would have been a President of the United States had it not been that he was a Democrat from Georgia, of the South. John Stennis serving in the U.S. Senate now, in my opinion there isn't a finer man in the Senate today than John Stennis--more able, more sound, sincere, constructive. You feel like working with them, you're associated closely with them. On the Republican side of the aisle, John Williams of Delaware, who resigned a few years ago; he didn't resign, he left the Senate. I visited with him and urged him to stay on; we needed John Williams. But he was solid as they make them, stable and you might say he was conservative, but he was also a great senator. We needed him.

HORROCKS: Senator Jenner--what was on his mind?

CARLSON: Well, Bill Jenner was a different type. He was a scrapper and a little rugged at times. So ultra-conservative that at times I think he felt if they didn't agree with him, why, you were just on the wrong track, and there's always two sides to an issue.
HORROCKS: Did he literally believe some of his charges about communism in government—say George Marshall.

CARLSON: Well, I would have to say that he was sincere about it, yes. I think so. I don't see how a person could be any different. He had some real deep feelings on some of those things, yes, I think most members do. That goes for liberals and conservatives—they have some very deep feelings and deep convictions—but that type of people. I had a very high regard for Bill Fulbright. I think he was one of the able ones; I really do. Bill had a lot of publicity that wasn't too good at times, because Bill was not the personable type of person that people are just naturally attracted to. He wasn't that type, but he was able.

HORROCKS: Did Jenner have really close personal friends, particular senators?

CARLSON: Oh, he had some close support. You take John Bricker of Ohio and Bill Jenner and, oh, well, of course, McCarthy during his day--

HORROCKS: Were they personal friends?

CARLSON: --Karl Mundt. Oh, I mean they were quite close. Oh yes. He wasn't alone. No, no.

HORROCKS: How about Senator Goldwater?
CARLSON: He and I are very good friends. I didn't always agree with his votes; I didn't like his campaign for the presidency. It wasn't really his campaign, but his followers were so carried away by Senator Goldwater and some of his programs that they didn't think anyone else were entitled to existence, and I just don't believe in that; I didn't at the time. But Barry Goldwater is rendering a real service. We need Barry Goldwater.

HORROCKS: Are you familiar at all with his personal relationship with Eisenhower when he was President?

CARLSON: No, not too much. Except it was cordial, of course, and I don't know how much further it went. I don't think he was one of the President's advisers, or anything. But it was cordial. After all, you're in that position.

HORROCKS: I guess I have just really a last question. You were on the finance committee with Eugene Millikin, he was chairman, and he served on the Randall Commission. Did you have much contact with Clarence Randall?

CARLSON: Not too much with Clarence Randall, but Gene Millikin and I were very close. He was a very able man, really was.

HORROCKS: Did his work on the Randall Commission, did he change his mind or did that affect his thinking significantly on trade problems?
CARLSON: I think it had some affect on his thinking, his serving on that commission. But Senator Millikin was solid and he knew the tax and he could handle himself in committee or on the floor and presented programs and proposals in a way that attracted the attention of those who were concerned about the final affects of a program. He was looking further ahead, not just for the day.